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 With the rapid proliferation of the Web, the search engine constituted an increasingly vital 
tool in everyday life, and offered technical capabilities that might have lent themselves under 
different circumstances to a sweeping democratization of information provision and access. 
Instead the search function was transformed into the most profitable large-scale global 
information industry. 
 This dissertation examines the evolution of search engine technologies within the context 
of the commercialization and commodification of the Internet. Grounded in critical political 
economy, the research details how capital has progressively shifted information search activities 
further into the market, transforming them into sites of profit-making and poles of capitalist 
growth. It applies historical and political economic analysis by resorting to an extensive array of 
sources including trade journals, government documents, industry reports, and financial and 
business newspapers.  
 The first chapter situates the development of the search engine within the wider political 
economy of the Internet industry. The second shows how the technology of search was 
reorganized to enable profitable accumulation. The third and fourth chapters focus on another 
primary concern of political economy: the labor structures and labor processes that typify this 
emergent industry. These pivot around familiar compulsions: profit-maximization and 
management control. The search industry is famous for the almost incredible perks it affords to a 
select group of highly paid, highly skilled engineers and managers. However, the same industry 
also relies not only a large number of low-wage workers but also an unprecedented mass of 
unwaged labor. Google and other search engines also have found means of re-constructing the 
practices of a seemingly bygone industrial era of labor control: corporate paternalism and 
	  iii	  
scientific management.   
 Today, the search engine industry sits at the “magnetic north pole” of economic growth – 
the Internet. This vital function of search is controlled disproportionately by US digital capital, 
mainly Google. US dominance in search seems to carry forward the existing, deeply unbalanced, 
international information order; however, this US-led industry actually faces jarring oppositions 
within a changing and conflicted global political economy. Chapter Five investigates two of the 
most important and contested zones:  China, whose economic growth has been unsurpassed 
throughout the entire period spanned by this study of the search engine’s development, and 
which has nurtured a highly successful domestic Internet industry, including a search engine 
company, Baidu; and Europe, US’s long-time ally, where units of capital both European and 
non-European are struggling with one another. By situating search within these contexts, this 
chapter sheds light on the ongoing reconfiguration of international information services, and on 
the geopolitical-economic conflicts that are altering the dynamics of information-intensive 
transnational capitalism.  
 There is a well-developed critical scholarship in political economy that foregrounds the 
role of information in contemporary capitalist development. This dissertation contributes to and 
expands this research by looking at search to uncover the capital logics that undergird and shape 
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 “New” Digital Economy 
In announcing that 2.5 million jobs were lost to the global economic crisis in 
2008, President Obama vowed to renew the “information highway” in order to create jobs 
and strengthen America’s “competitiveness” in the world.1 This was followed by his visit 
to Silicon Valley – the epicenter of the “new” economy – to meet with high tech industry 
CEOs including the late Steve Jobs from Apple, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, Oracle’s 
Larry Ellison, Google’s Eric Schmidt, Yahoo’s Carol Bartz, Cisco Systems’ John 
Chambers, Twitter’s Dick Costolo, and Netflix’s Reed Hastings.2  
Obama’s visit to Silicon Valley was not merely to express his gratitude toward the 
tech giants which were the largest of his presidential campaign contributors, but was also 
to discuss the “partnership” between the public and private sectors to reboot the process 
of capital accumulation3 through the Internet sector in order to shore up the depressed 
capitalist economic system. The search engine industry lies at the center of this larger 
effort.  
The Internet sector is a strategic growth industry, which has been refueled by 
fresh capital to jolt the capitalist economy. In the midst of one of the worst global 
economic crises, when millions of people were losing jobs, homes, pensions, and social 
welfare rights around the world, the Obama Administration – as part of its stimulus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 David Rochelson, “President-elect Barack Obama lays out key parts of Economic Recovery Plan,” The 
Office of the President-Elect, December 6, 2008, 
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/the_key_parts_of_the_jobs_plan/. 
2 Lance Whitney, “Obama dines with Jobs, Zuckerberg, other tech honchos,” CNET, February 18, 2011, 
http://www.cnet.com/news/obama-dines-with-jobs-zuckerberg-other-tech-honchos/. 
3 Marxist theory defines accumulation as the process of converting surplus value into production in order to 
generate more surplus.  
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package in 2009 – funneled billions of dollars to incorporate and expand new Internet-
based technologies into medicine, education, energy, transportation, federal IT 
infrastructure, and manufacturing industries in order to extend and open up vast new 
information businesses for capital with the promise of economic recovery, prosperity, 
creation of quality jobs, transparency, and a more democratic society.4  
Under the stimulus, the administration orchestrated a series of “public and 
private” initiatives to enlarge the Internet sector – including a project called Digital 
Promise backed by the Department of Education, academia and the tech industry to 
create “smart demand” to move the education system further toward being an appendage 
of the market;5 electronic medical records being mandated by the federal government to 
open up a new billion dollar health IT market;6 promoting a smart grid by the Department 
of Energy for trade and investment around the world; and, all in the name of 
transparency, the White House pushed its open data policy, requiring government 
agencies to release government data and in effect turning over valuable government data 
like weather, climate, health, and geographic data collected at tax payer expense to the 
information market.   
The US has been aggressively reorienting its domestic economy to aid digital 
capital enlarging in restructuring the Internet as a transnational economic platform. The 
Obama Administration has placed an unprecedented emphasis on “digital trade” – 
commerce over the Internet – and mobilized major government agencies including the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Office of the President of the United States, “Issues: Technology,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology. 
5 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “White House to Launch Digital Promise Initiative,” 
September 16, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/white-house-launch-digital-
promise-initiative. 
6 Nicole Freeman, “Electronic medical records market to expand by 2017,” February 6, 2014,  
http://ehrintelligence.com/2014/02/06/electronic-medical-records-market-to-expand-by-2017/. 
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Department of State, Department of Commerce, and International Trade Commission in 
order to remove a range of obstacles for US digital capital to reach global markets over 
the Internet. The US search engine industry is playing a leading role in organizing the 
Internet as an economic growth zone and in expanding digital capital across industries 
and geographical territories.  
The search engine has evolved beyond the simple information retrieval system, 
positioning itself strategically within the complex and dynamic territory of the Internet. 
And Google is the globally dominant force within search.  As journalist Ken Auletta has 
stated, search engine giant Google “encroaches on every media industry from telephone 
to television to advertising to newspapers to magazine to book publishers to Hollywood 
studios to digital companies like Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple.”7 As Google weaves 
itself inexorably into the Internet “ecosystem,” the company is playing a significant role 
in reconfiguring the existing information industry as a whole, and at the same time 
affecting the setting of a wide range of technical standards and information policies 
surrounding the Internet: search algorithms, e-books, intellectual property, privacy, net 
neutrality, broadband, wireless, labor policy and beyond.  
Google alone generated almost $60 billion in revenue in 2013, with over 90% of 
its revenue from online advertising. If Google were compared to a country, based on its 
revenue, it would rank 71st in the world in terms of GDP – ahead of countries such as 
Uruguay and Costa Rica. Google operates in more than 115 countries, and offers its 
services in more than 114 languages, while Yahoo! and Bing operate in 35 countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ken Auletta, Googled: The End of the World As We Know it (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), xii. 
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Google accounts for nearly 25 percent of Internet traffic in North America – bigger than 
Facebook, Netflix and Twitter combined.8  
While Google’s market share in the US hovers around 66%, its market share in 
many big European markets and Latin America is over 90%. As of 2013, 58% of 
Google’s revenue comes from the international market.9 Google controls over 33% of 
global online ad revenues, and combined, Google, Bing, Yahoo!, AOL and Facebook 
control 68% of global online marketing while Google, Bing and Yahoo! control almost 
72% of the global desktop search market. Google takes half of all global mobile Internet 
ads revenue.10 According to a 2011 report by the management consulting firm McKinsey 
& Company, global search activity reached an annual value of $780 billion in 2009 – 
equivalent to the GDP of the Netherlands or Turkey.11 This number actually is considered 
a relatively conservative estimate given that the research only looked at nine sources of 
value for 11 constituencies in five countries.12 While this kind of research does not offer 
an accurate accounting, it provides some idea of the actual size of the industry. Not only 
have search engines become multi-billion dollar global businesses, but they are actually 
changing our social and cultural practices. And this new, immensely lucrative 
information market is dominated by US-based search engines Google, Bing, and Yahoo!.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chris Boyette, “Google makes up 25% of Internet Traffic,” CNN, July 23, 2013, 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/23/technology/google-internet/index.html. 
9  “Google’s 2014 income statement information,” https://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html. 
10 “Google Takes Home Half of Worldwide Mobile Internet Ad Revenues,” eMarketer, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Google-Takes-Home-Half-of-Worldwide-Mobile-Internet-Ad-
Revenues/1009966. 
11 Jacques Bughin and Laura Corb, “The Impact of Internet Technologies: Search,” McKinsey & Company, 
July 2011, http://www.paleycenter.org/assets/international-council/IC-2011-LA/Mobile-App/2011-08-18-
Impact-of-Internet-technologies-Search.pdf. 
12 The nine sources of search value are included in the research are: better matching, time saved, Raised 
awareness, price transparency, long tail offering, people matching, problem solving, new business models, 
and entertainment. Constituencies include advertisers, retailers, entrepreneurs, content creators, enterprise, 
consumers, individual content creators, individual information seekers, health care, education and 
government.  
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 This new wave of US information industry is expanding its business profile around 
the globe. The US search engine industry, and in particular Google, has transformed the 
search function on the Internet into an ever more powerful extraterritorial information 
system and information infrastructure, and has deepened the information market on a 
transnational scale. However, this US-centered system is heavily contested and resisted 
by social and political forces as it collides with other states and rival units of capital. As 
Dan Schiller puts it, the construction of extraterritorial information networks is pivotal in 
expansion of capital and capitalist economy, but its processes are complex and conflicted 
given that they are involved with various interests of stakeholders – geopolitical rivals, 
domestic and foreign capital, corporate users and other social and political actors.13 
Thus, behind the seemingly clean and simple interface of the search box, there is 
an immense and swiftly changing political economy of information provision; however, 
there is little scrutiny on how the global search engine industry is organized, structured, 
and under what principles it operates across territories. This emergence of transnational 
search engine services cannot simply be explained by reference to a natural technological 
progression. 
Given this context, this dissertation draws from the tradition of Critical Political 
Economy of Information (PEI) and attempts to offer a full political economy of search, to 
uncover important ongoing structural changes within a rapidly evolving system of 
information provision. To that end, critical questions demand scrutiny: how did the 
search engine – which interacts with a basic human activity – evolve into an ubiquitous 
commercial service and a key component of today’s “new economy,” a dynamic global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Dan Schiller, “Geopolitical-economic conflict and network infrastructures,” Chinese Journal of 
Communication 1, no.1 (2011): 90.  
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information business that is in the process of restructuring both the wider information 
industry and our very social lives?  How has this occurred? How is search technology 
being used and designed, for what purposes, by whom and for what? Who is actually 
laboring behind this enormously profitable information industry? Can the US continue to 
hold its supremacy over this newfound economic growth zone?  
To engage these fundamental questions, the project provides a systematic critical 
analysis of the political economy of the global search industry, specifically, 
commodification, commercialization, technical infrastructure, labor and geopolitical 
aspects of information in order to understand capital logics, accumulation strategies, and 
various social and political actors, and their relationships to each other in the 
development and expansion of global search engine industry. Specifically by looking at 
the search engine industry in the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
and the European Union – global political economic power centers – this dissertation 
attempts to reveal characteristics of social, and political struggles around the new 
economic growth zone of search and their relationship to the changing dynamic of US-
led transnational capitalism. 
Literature Review 
As the search engine has become the major gateway to information, there has 
been a growing interest among scholars from a range of fields beginning to recognize the 
implications of its social, political and technical functions. A number of scholars rightly 
question and refute the popular belief of the search engine as a neutral medium or a new 
democratizing alternative medium providing diverse voices.14 Rather, they point out that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University  
Press, 2009); Lucas Introna, and Helen Nissenbaum, “Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search  
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search engines often reinforce dominant cultures and social hierarchies. These critiques 
are useful in drawing attention to the growing power of the search engine, and how it 
functions in and has consequences on our social, cultural and political lives.  
However, there has been little scholarship that directly addresses the political 
economy of search, though there are many journalistic accounts of the search engine 
industry.15 The exception is Elizabeth Van Couvering, who offers the first political 
economy of the search industry, locating the industry within the larger media and 
communication industry and identifying a search industry that sells Web traffic rather 
than access to audience attention as traditional media industry does.16 She examines the 
history, ownership structure and the development of business models of the search engine 
industry. Her analysis extends to four different countries: China, Japan, Germany, and 
South Africa, and illustrates the dominance of US-based search companies worldwide as 
well as the existence of local companies – particularly in China – countering this US-
based dominance. Tim Wu’s Master Switch focuses on the US side of the equation, and 
more specifically on Google, and argues that information industries tend to go through 
open and closed restructuring cycles; so, according to Wu, the current dominance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Engines Matter,” The Information Society 16, no. 3 (2000): 169 –185; Eszter Hargittai, “ Do You 'Google'? 
Understanding Search Engine Use Beyond the Hype,” First Monday 9, no. 3 (2003), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1127/1047; Alexander Halavais, 
Search Engine Society (Cambridge: Polity, 2009); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything: 
(and Why We Should Worry) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
15 Auletta, Googled; John Battelle, The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business 
and Transformed Our Culture (New York: Portfolio, 2005); Jeff Jarvis, What Would Google Do? (New 
York: Collins Business, 2009); Steven Levy, In the Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our 
Lives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).  
16  Elizabeth Van Couvering, “Navigational Media: The Political Economy of Online Traffic” in The 
Political Economy of Media, ed. Dwayne Winseck & Dal Yong Jin (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2011): 183-200; Elizabeth Van Couvering, “Search engine bias: the structuration of traffic on the World-
Wide Web” (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2010); Elizabeth Van Couvering, “New media? The 
Political Economy of Internet Search Engines” (paper presented at Annual Conference of the International 
Association of Media & Communications Researchers, Porto Alegre, Brazil, 2004). 
	  8	  
Google (closed) is not permanent but part of the recurring “Cycle.”17 For Wu, monopoly 
is an inevitable part of the business cycle and it is only a matter of how long this cycle 
will last. He perceives the problem of the current political economy of search as a matter 
of Google’s monopolistic business practices and an uncompetitive market environment.  
While scholarly works on the political economy of search have so far been under-
developed, there is a long and rich tradition of scholarship on critical political economy 
of information (PEI) from which my analytical approach draws. Critical PEI focuses 
specifically on the relationship between information and the overall process of global 
capitalist development and of democracy by looking at structural changes in ownership, 
market structure, division of labor, geopolitics of information, commodification of 
information, privatization and commercialization of information, and government 
policies. PEI’s primary concern is providing an understanding of the role of information 
and its relationship with political economic system within which it operates.  
Grounded in PEI tradition, Dan Schiller’s Digital Capitalism provides historical 
context for the development of the Internet into a marketplace. He introduces the concept 
of digital capitalism in which information and communication is the linchpin of the 
changing capitalist political economy, and shows how the Internet developed by the US 
government has been rapidly colonized by corporate interests and market logics, 
interlocking with neoliberal policy.18 Schiller’s work, How to Think about Information, 
offers the entry point for this project as his work provides an alternative theory of 
information – information as commodity which is produced, distributed and controlled by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2010). 
18 Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1999).  
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profit-making entities within particular historical conditions rather than having inherently 
economic value.19 He posits that information is central to capitalist development and that 
the “information commodity has become the prime site of contemporary expansion 
within and for the world market system.”20 Information as a commodity form masks the 
labor that produced the commodity, one of the key underlying dimensions for critical PEI 
and central to my study of search.  
Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital provides the first critical and 
systematic analysis of changing labor processes with the growth of service sectors under 
the capitalist mode of production.21 He refutes the common claim that modern work due 
to deployment of science-based technology and automation would result in more “white-
collar” jobs that require higher levels of education and training and exercise more intense 
intellectual work by workers while diminishing low-skilled production jobs. On the 
contrary, he demonstrates that there has been a strong tendency for mechanization to 
bring a systematic deskilling and degrading of many working class- as well as “white-
collar” jobs. Braverman states that under capitalism “a structure is given to all labor 
processes that at its extreme polarizes those whose time is infinitely valuable and those 
whose time is worth almost nothing.”22 Along with Braverman, David Noble’s work 
America by Design is relevant to understanding the division of labor in Internet firms. 
Observing the emergence of an engineer class that obtained control over scientific 
knowledge in the late 19th century,23 Noble notes that professional engineers hired by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Dan Schiller, How to Think about Information (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
20 Ibid., 41.  
21 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).  
22 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 58. 
23 David Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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corporations became major agents of corporate capital, showing how new technologies 
are situated in social processes. Noble links the growth of engineers/managers and 
science and technology to the building of US corporate capitalism. He demonstrates that 
professional engineers under corporations promote scientific management as well as 
automation of production processes with the promise of more control of production and 
reduced dependence on a work force.  
Building on Braverman, Ursula Huws’ The Making of a Cybertariat theorizes the 
impact of information technologies on labor processes in domestic work.24 Huws 
documents how household technologies such as the washing machine and stove cleaner 
were promoted to “save” domestic labor; yet, they did not result in liberating women 
from domestic labor as they had promised. She draws attention to the relationship 
between domestic work and the adoption of new technologies in the service sector. Huws 
points out that automation and routinization of service industries to increase productivity 
and reduce labor cost led to the transfer of work to consumers, a large proportion of 
which are often women.   
Huws’ more recent work, The Underpinnings of Class in the Digital Age; Living, 
Labour and Value, extends her labor theory to conceptualize “digital labor.”25 Resonating 
with Dan Schiller’s work on labor theory in How to Think About Information, Huws 
challenges the distinction between “mental” and “manual labor” in a digital-based 
economy, and argues that, “digital labor cannot be regarded as a discrete form of labor, 
separated hermetically from the rest of the economy.”26 Rather than dividing “mental” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ursula Huws, The Making of a Cybertariat: Virtual Work in a Real World (London: Merlin, 2003). 
25 Ursula Huws, “The Underpinnings of Class in the Digital Age; Living, Labour and Value,” Socialist 
Register 50 (2014): 80-106.  
26 Ibid., 86. 
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and “manual” labor, she sees that increasing deployment of information technologies 
generates an ever more complex social division of labor, and posits that growing “digital” 
or “virtual” labor facilitated by information and communication technologies depends on 
a material and physical infrastructure. This view challenges autonomist Marxist scholars 
such as Maurizio Lazzarato, Nick Dyer-Witheford, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri 
who deploy a concept of immaterial labor, considered one of the characteristics of a post-
industrial society and distinguished from “physical” labor that produces material goods.27 
In particular, Tiziana Terenova, in her article titled Free Labor: Producing Culture for 
the Digital Economy,28 associates immaterial labor with free labor on the Web as a 
distinctive form of labor in the digital economy that builds websites, produces content, 
offers feedback etc. and is appropriated for creating value for capital.   
Richard Gillespie’s Manufacturing Knowledge and Stanford Jacoby’s work 
Modern Manors are valuable to contextualize labor management within historical 
development as this dissertation situates current labor control practices within a longer 
historical trajectory.29 Stanford Jacoby provides detailed accounts on the development of 
corporate welfare capitalism – corporations providing private welfare programs as a 
corporate management strategy to counter the rise of labor unions in the 20th century – 
and shows how it managed to survive over time. In the same historical period, Gillespie’s 
work Manufactured Knowledge shows that at the peak of welfare capitalism, social and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor,” in Radical Thought In Italy: A Potential Politics, ed. Paolo 
Virno et al. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 133-149; Nick Dyer-Witheford, 
“Empire, Immaterial Labor, the New Combinations,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, 
Culture & Society 13, no. 3-4 (2001): 70-80; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).  
28 Tiziana Terranova, “Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,” Social Text 63 18, no. 2 
(2000): 33-58. 
29 Richard Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A History of the Hawthorne Experiments (Cambridge 
[England]: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Jacoby, Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare 
Capitalism Since the New Deal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
	  12	  
behavior science were introduced to reduce conflict between labor and capital. The 
scientific knowledge generated by social scientists on the factory floor presumed its 
objectivity and became largely accepted by industrial capitalists as “science.” However, 
Gillespie demonstrates that the experiments were constructed and manufactured by 
paternalist capitalist management ideology, and ignored the power relations between 
capital and workers.  These precedents, I will show, possess a contemporary significance 
in the Internet industry.  
 Shifting to the geopolitical dimension of information, Herbert Schiller’s Who 
Knows: Information in the Age of the Fortune 500 illuminates how information 
technologies had become central in the global political economy, and notes that, “the 
information industrial power has become a vital determinant of existing and future power 
relations within and between nations.”30 His work illustrates how, already by the late 
1970s, the US had begun to exert political power to privilege US-based information 
industries in a bid to restore declining US global political economic power.  
Anthony Smith’s Geopolitics of Information reaffirms the idea that information 
cannot be separated from other political economic conflicts.31 While witnessing the 
movement for a New International Information Order (NIIO), Smith warned that new 
electronics could be a greater threat to national sovereignty of developing countries than 
colonialism itself. Taking into account that Smith was writing 30 years ago, geopolitics 
and global political economy have changed. Yet, the geopolitical and economic aspects 
of information have been heightened today with the emergence of the Internet as a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Herbert, Schiller, Who Knows: Information In the Age of the Fortune 500 (Norwood, N.J.: ABLEX Pub. 
Corp., 1981), 7. 
31 Anthony Smith, The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1980). 
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marketplace, new information domains built over the Internet such as search engines, 
social media, e-commerce, and mobile phones, and the current global economic crisis. In 
Information and the Crisis Economy, Herbert Schiller offers an extremely germane 
insight for today in understanding the role of information as the current economic crisis is 
in the process of restructuring global capitalism.32 Schiller highlighted how information 
technologies were utilized and reconfigured to overcome economic crisis and stimulate 
and revive capitalism by Western nations in the 1980s. As a response to the crisis, there 
was a rise of conflicts among nations as countries opened up to transnational capital to 
privatize and commercialize information systems. In the 1980s, Schiller forecasted that 
the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) would be accelerated in the development of 
information systems.  
Since this scholarship in the political economy of information noted above, there 
has been a radical transformation of information technologies and international 
information provision – one which is still taking shape as the Internet has begun to more 
fully unleash its explosive potential for capital. My dissertation builds on the existing 
literature and contributes to scholarship on the political economy of information.  
Chapter Outline 
Chapter one sets the stage by situating search within a broader system of 
information provision, and illustrates how digital capital ceaselessly seeks to enlarge 
information markets around the Internet and through the search engine industry. This 
chapter shows how search engine firms, and in particular Google, were able to establish a 
point of control on the Internet by examining their accumulation strategies in response to 
other major dynamic information domains – social media, ecommerce and the mobile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Herbert Schiller, Information and the Crisis Economy (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Pub. Corp., 1984). 
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Internet. Internet firms are moving into each other’s information domains to wrest control 
over the Internet as they compete and ally to extend their positions of control. The 
chapter explains that search is at the forefront in the deepening information market, 
commercializing and commodifying information around the Internet.  
While the first chapter describes the current information landscape, the second 
chapter takes the reader through the history of search engines by tracing the evolution of 
search business model and search technology. Today, the search engine industry is 
supported mainly by advertising; however, search engine technology itself did not 
inherently have economic value. Initially, search technologies developed in non-
commercial spaces, and users vehemently resisted the idea of ads-based search engines, 
believing that search results should not be influenced by commerce. How then has this 
shift occurred? Chapter two illustrates digital capital’s efforts to construct advertising 
systems that could convert search activities into profit-making businesses. It argues that 
Google’s success is not purely about its superior search algorithm, rather it is capital’s 
process of converting search results into a profit-making project.  
Chapters three and four proceed to examine labor processes behind search 
technologies. Chapter three offers an analysis of the emerging division of labor in the 
search business. It sketches out three distinctive categories of work – highly skilled, low-
waged, and unwaged labor – and demonstrates how this highly automated search engine 
industry has resulted in the generation of a large number of low-paid contingent workers, 
and an army of unwaged workers in the form of Internet users. In particular, the chapter 
illustrates capital’s long and persistent effort to incorporate diverse forms of unwaged 
labor into capitalist accumulation projects. 
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 While chapter three illuminates the labor structure behind search technologies, 
chapter four extends to an analysis of the labor process and an examination of the 
methods of labor management for both waged and unwaged workers. Google is known 
for its unusual working environment where its highly paid workers are given 
unprecedented freedom, voice within the company, and employee benefits, and unwaged 
workers are given an array of “free” information utilities. On the surface, Google seems 
to defy the traditional capital and labor relations and go against capital logic; however, 
the chapter demonstrates that Google’s current labor control techniques are corporate 
management strategies that stem from an earlier era of industrial economy.  
Finally, chapter five explicates the role of geopolitics in organizing the search 
engine industry and in animating transnational capitalist dynamics. Specifically, this 
chapter examines the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union where 
US-based digital capital is facing serious opposition. China constitutes an especially 
significant exception to Google’s market dominance, because it is not only the world’s 
largest Internet market by number of subscribers, and its most significant economic 
growth zone, but also because its reentry into the US-led global capitalist system is 
changing the geopolitical landscape. Meanwhile, Europe has been attempting to bolster 
its information economy, and the tension over the control over information has once 
again reignited with the emergence of the Internet. Further, Edward Snowden’s 
revelations of US global surveillance programs have renewed deep-seated fears in Europe 
of US domination. By analyzing these two different conflict zones, the chapter 
illuminates the role of geopolitics in dynamics of today’s transnational capitalism – and, 
in particular, with respect to the information industry.  
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Methods & Sources 
This project is rooted within the tradition of critical political economy of 
information (PEI). PEI tries to clarify social changes caused by the growth and global 
expansion of information industries in terms of the ways in which power is used to 
“shape the production, distribution, and use of information as a commodity.”33 PEI is 
distinguished from mainstream economics, in as much as it is historical, and engages 
with the questions of social justice, equality, and public good.34 Vincent Mosco describes 
the four central characteristics of the political economic approach: 1) to understand social 
and historical changes; 2) to investigate society as a whole or “totality of social relations” 
including economic, social and cultural dimension of life; 3) to discuss social and moral 
issues; and 4) to attempt to create social change by transcending the space between theory 
and practice.35 Grounded in this intellectual tradition, this dissertation deploys a 
multilayered historical, political, and international analysis to understand the political 
economy of search.  
This project draws on a wide range of scholarly and journalistic works, 
government documents, trade/technology journals, major newspapers, industry reports, 
and technology blogs. The archival trade press related to information industry is an 
indispensable source to trace the evolution of the business model of search. It offers 
insight into the interests of different stakeholders, contestations and agreement among 
them, and policy issues. Given that search engines have evolved into an advertising 
platform, advertising trade press and reports from trade associations like the Digital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Vincent Mosco, “Information in the Pay-per view Society,” in The Political Economy of Information, ed. 
Vincent Mosco et al. (University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 3.  
34 Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009): 22-36. 
35 Ibid., 2-5; Janet Wasko, “Studying the Political Economy of Media and Information,” Comunicação e 
Sociedade 7 (2005):  26-27.  
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Advertising Alliance, and Interactive Advertising Bureau also provide an avenue to peer 
into the dynamics between advertisers and publishers, search engine firms, and into 
technical and policy issues in the early days of online advertising.  
Alongside the trade press, search engine news/blogs such as John Battelle’s 
Search Blog, Pandia Search World, Search Engine Round Table, Search Engine Land, 
and Search Engine Watch are invaluable because they not only specifically document 
search technologies, search engine marketing strategies, and the industry’s responses to 
users but also other Internet industries that intersect with search such as social media, 
mobile, and e-commerce. Meanwhile, market reports, industry forecasts, company 
profiles, financial filings, search engine market data, and statistics indexed in 
business/industry databases such as Data Monitor, Business Monitor Online, 
Marketresearch.com, Forrest Research, Gartner Research, and Mintel present data on 
specific search engine firm profiles, mergers & acquisitions, revenue sources, regulatory 
issues, labor markets, market share, market expansion, and political risk in different 
regions of the world. Additionally, company filings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) contain dense information on financial flows, revenues, competitors, 
investment, shareholders, foreign ownership, corporate structure, and market size. These 
industry resources assist in building the historical groundwork for pinpointing the 
emergence and expansion of search as a business. They do not provide uniform narratives 
about the development of search; rather, they open analysis to contradictions and 
negotiations among various stakeholders and in adjacent industries.   
To take into account the changing IT labor structure, National Science Board’s 
Science and Engineering Indicators, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Silicon 
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Valley Index by Joint Venture Silicon Valley and Silicon Valley Community Foundation, 
OECD’s Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, and reports on the Silicon Valley 
workforce from NOVA, a nonprofit, federally funded employment and training agency 
are extensively examined to collect data on labor force, wage and income, and types of 
work for the technology industry. This ensemble of resources offers an overarching 
picture of the labor force and in general the broader trends in the IT workforce within 
which the search engine industry is located. However, they are limited to identifying 
specific data on the workforce in the search engine industry. To fill this gap, professional 
career sites like LinkedIn, Glassdoor, Payscale.com, Indeed.com and companies’ human 
resource pages have been utilized to find out the number of employees including contract 
workers, types of jobs, and salaries. These databases do not offer accurate data, but they 
are used as general indicators.   
While resources around the US search engine market are easily accessible, 
materials on the search engine industry in China and Europe are limited because of 
language barriers, particularly in the Chinese case. Despite this limitation, the English 
versions of Chinese news sources such as Xinhua, China Daily, Asian Business daily, 
China Digital Times, and China Economic Review are foundational to tracing the overall 
economic conditions and information industry in general. In addition, Chinese Internet-
related Websites such as China Online Marketing, China Internet Watch, and China 
TechNews are valuable to locate information on business strategies, market 
developments, as well as news on regulatory changes related to the Internet in China.  
For the European Union market, JRC Information Society Unit, European 
Commission publications and press release, European Commission’s Digital Agenda 
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give political context to understanding information policy, regulations, and the economic 
role of the European ICT industry. Major European news sources and reports from IT 
lobbying groups like Competitive Online Marketplace and Fair Search also help to 
investigate transnational capitalist rivalries and track on public policy shifts related to the 
industry. Finally, US government documents from Department of Commerce, Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of 
State, Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and U.S. China 
Economic and Security Review Commission are examined to understand the role of states 































 The first chapter begins by situating the search engine industry within a broader 
changing online information landscape in order to call attention to the larger process of 
commodification in and around the Internet. It shows that the scope of search business is 
expanding, as search engine firms – in particular Google – are no longer merely trying to 
control this one domain. To maintain its dominance as well as to expand control over the 
Internet, search engine giant Google is extending its profit-making endeavors across the 
Internet, and opening up new “territories of profit” to use Gary Fields’ term.36  
 Two decades after the US government relinquished its publicly-funded Internet 
backbone to private sector corporations, the Internet continues to be radically 
reconstructed as a consumer medium and global market at the public’s expense.37 But, 
there is still no shortage of stories exalting the promise of the Internet to lift the human 
condition, from remote Africa to poverty-stricken rural India to the Amazonian jungle to 
war-torn Afghanistan to Cairo’s Tahrir Square to inner-city America to homeless camps 
in Silicon Valley. The pretext of promotion of Internet technologies in every part of our 
lives rests persistently in reducing economic inequality, increasing political participation, 
and enhancing education, health and democracy. The premise is that if we are all 
connected to the Web, well-armed and skilled with information technologies, then society 
could make the shift to becoming more just and equitable. If this utopian ideology is to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Gary Fields, Territories of Profit: Communications, Capitalist Development, and the Innovation of G.F. 
Swift and Dell Computer (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
37 Vincent Mosco, The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
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believed, Internet technologies as a transformative force are supposed to empower the 
oppressed, challenge oppressors, facilitate the expansion of public goods and deliver a 
better world.  
 Despite this persistent mainstream rhetoric, the structural changes that are occurring 
in the information sphere today are leading in completely opposite directions. Far from 
moving away from a market economy, the Internet is at the center of economic 
development in which market logics prevail in determining the shape of the information 
landscape. Instead of delivering an alternative space to capitalist society where public 
interests are protected, commons are expanded, and democratic ideals are exercised, the 
Internet has been turned into a battleground of labor conflict and units of capital for 
control of new markets. The search engine industry, and in particular Google, is at the 
fulcrum of this battle.  
A Point of Control  
 The popular notion is that the Internet embodies a decentralized mode of provision; 
thus, no one entity can control it. In the widely-cited book The Wealth of Networks, 
Yochai Benkler celebrates this technical architecture of the Internet, posits how the 
networked information economy is different from the industrial economy of the pre-
Internet era, and promotes a new mode of production that is outside of the market 
economy.38 Yet, contrary to Benkler’s optimism, capital has a firm grip over the Internet 
while democratic information activities are mainly marginal. Google’s Executive 
Chairman Eric Schmidt at the D9 conference in 2011 said that the “Internet is now ruled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
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by Google, Amazon, Apple and Facebook.”39 Along these lines, in 2012, cyberpunk 
author Bruce Sterling wrote:  “it made less and less sense to talk about ‘the Internet,’ ‘the 
PC business,’ ‘telephones,’ ‘Silicon Valley,’ or ‘the media,’ and much more sense to just 
study Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.”40  
 These descriptions are limited because participation in the full Internet political 
economy is wider transnationally and multi-sectionally; however, they offer an entry 
point to situate search industry within the larger information landscape. On the one hand, 
these most dynamic information domains – search, social media, e-commerce, operating 
systems, handheld devices – appear on the surface to be separate information spheres. 
Yet, they are each moving into each other’s territories in order to defend their existing 
profit centers and to cultivate new profit opportunities. They constitute centers of gravity 
facing new major competitors and ever-changing alliances. The search industry therefore 
takes us to the heart of the overall domain. 
 The search engine industry, as described by Van Couvering, started its core 
business of navigation services predicated on media platforms that mediate between the 
user and content in the networked environment.41 The industry is an intermediary, based 
on creating and exploiting Web traffic as its primary asset or saleable good. Considering 
this position strictly within the Internet “ecosystem,” the search business was technically 
vulnerable. Whoever controlled the network infrastructure level – i.e., AT&T, Comcast 
or other telecommunication companies – might attain leverage over search functions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Rafe Needeman, “Eric Schmidt: 'Gang of four' rules tech,” CNET, May 13, 2011, 
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40 Jon Evans, “The Internet: We’re Doing It Wrong, 2013,” Tech Crunch, August 18, 2013, 
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themselves.42 Yet, contrary to the limitation of technical structure, Google and the search 
engine industry – extending to Yahoo! and Bing – without owning the backbone and its 
own content were initially able to establish a new point of control on the Web by 
focusing on the information discovery function.  
 By situating itself between users and the Internet, the search engine industry 
established a critical point of control over information access. Tim Wu describes Google 
as controlling the “Master Switch” on the Web in similar fashion to telephone girls at 
switchboards in the past, who made connections between parties, and to the switch that 
can determine who and what to connect.43 This rise of the search engines, in particular 
Google, as an access point to the Internet has shifted the dynamics of and destabilized the 
information landscape – and spurred the creation of Search Engine Optimization (SEO), 
an entirely new parasitic multi-billion dollar marketing industry. The content industries 
now have to rely on the search engine to reach potential audiences on the Web. Google’s 
ongoing disputes with publishing, newspaper, music, and film industries over copyright 
issues and privacy, computer and mobile industry over patents and antitrust cases and 
telecommunication industry over “net neutrality” around the world are showing the battle 
to be between different units of capital and the growing power of the search engine 
industry over the Internet. How was it that Google and the other search engines, which 
owned neither network nor content, were able to establish such a point of control on the 
Web? 
 Traditionally, a search engine’s function is to point to content. Echoing this notion, 
Google touted its success that it “…may be the only company in the world whose stated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Wu, The Master Switch, 284. 
43 Ibid. 
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goal is to have users leave its Website as quickly as possible.”44 In 2010, Eric Schmidt 
reiterated this point once again and said Google would not create content but simply be a 
conduit for it; he was “careful to define a line where we don't cross into content” and 
wanted to remain a “neutral platform for content and applications.” Yet, search engine 
firms are no longer merely pointing to information; rather, increasingly they own, 
manage, host, store, digitize and duplicate information to maintain and extend their 
marketplace and to pre-empt potential high profit functions and services.  
 Search engine firms are increasingly expanding their ownership of Web properties 
by creating “free” services, offering a wide range of data, content, services and 
applications, and incorporating them into their domain of profit. As against Schmidt’s 
claim that Google is merely a conduit to information, it is actually weaving through the 
entire Internet commodity chain to extend its profit territories. The company has indeed 
expanded its focus to encompassing the Internet backbone, hardware, content, services 
and applications. 
 Google’s 2013 annual report corroborates that its business is no longer limited to 
search. It reports that Google’s core businesses are search and display advertising, the 
Android operating system platform, consumer content through Google Play, Enterprise, 
Commerce and hardware products.45 The company competes with any companies that 
“seek to connect people with information on the Web and provide them with relevant 
advertising.”46 Google is undoubtedly one of the major players on the Internet; however, 
its position of control on the Internet is far from secure given the Internet industry’s 
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dynamism and volatility. Rather, the search giant is battling to keep its position as the 
main gateway for consumers to the Internet as it tries to defend its core ads business as 
well as diversifying into new markets to enlarge its profit territories – which lead it to 
engagement in multipoint competition and strategic alliances across markets.  
Unfinished Battle  
 Since early 2000, Google has been the unquestioned leader of the global search 
engine market. This makes it seem as if the search market is fully stabilized; yet, in 
reality, it is far from stable. Besides emerging competitors Baidu in China and Yandex in 
Russia, Google’s major domestic search rivals Yahoo! and Bing are still in the game with 
10.0% and 19.3% market share respectively in the US.47  
 While they have sustained a foothold, Yahoo! and Bing have not been able to earn a 
bigger market share in search. Thus, in 2009, the two companies built a strategic alliance 
to combat Google by striking a 10-year deal where Microsoft agreed to provide search 
results on Yahoo!. In return, Yahoo! would be responsible for ads sales and for attracting 
premium ads. Under the agreement, Microsoft will pay Yahoo! 88% of the revenue it 
gains from search on Yahoo!’s site48 while it integrates Yahoo!’s search technology into 
its own existing Web search platforms.49 For this deal, Yahoo! gave up its search 
technologies and outsourced to Bing. Yet, the alliance did not bear the fruit that they 
anticipated, and so far Yahoo! has been earning very little under Bing-powered search.50 
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In 2013, according to the Wall Street Journal, Yahoo!’s ad revenue from search dropped 
10%, and its display-ad revenue, about 40% of the company’s sales, dropped 11% from 
the previous year.51 Today, most of Yahoo!’s profits come from China-based e-
commerce giant Alibaba, where Yahoo! still holds a 24% stake after selling back 16% to 
Alibaba. Yahoo! received $7.6 billion in cash and stock to sell half of its holdings.52 
 With cash from its Alibaba holding, Yahoo! purchased the Tumblr social network 
for $1.1 billion as well as nearly 40 other start-ups. After these acquisitions, many of the 
products were shut down; Yahoo!’s intention was to obtain engineers. Since CEO 
Marissa Mayer, a former Google executive, took over the company in 2012, Yahoo! has 
been trying to revive its sagging business by focusing on the mobile market. Yahoo! 
Senior Vice President of Mobile and Emerging Products Adam Cahan said, “we used 
talent acquisition as one of those ways of getting us to scale … The vast majority have 
been, by the numbers, talent deals.”53 Because of its acquisition spree, the number of 
mobile engineers at Yahoo! increased from about 37 in 2012 to more than 500 in 2014.54 
In 2012, the company formed its mobile unit and has reorganized most of its existing 
Web properties, including Weather, Finance, Flickr etc., to make them compatible with 
smartphones and tablets. As Yahoo! pushes for a mobile-first strategy, the company is 
also beefing up its content business by launching a mobile-friendly digital magazine 
platform and producing original content to host Yahoo!’s expansive native advertising. 
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 With 400 million monthly mobile users, Yahoo! is searching for new business 
alliances since the company does not own the phone, operating system, browser or a 
massive user base like Apple, Google or Facebook. Yahoo! CEO Mayer stated that the 
company had to rely on strong partnerships with other Internet firms as Yahoo! aims to 
increase its presence in mobile business. In particular, Yahoo! has been seeking a deeper 
strategic alliance with Apple; Apple has captured the largest smartphone share and 60% 
of all smartphone profits in the US,55 and Yahoo! is already supplying data to power 
Apple’s voice-activated search Siri, and Yahoo!’s Finance and weather sites are 
preloaded in iPhones and iPads.56 Through this strategic partnership with Apple, Yahoo! 
intends to increase its Web traffic and turn into a bigger mobile player. Apple’s 
partnership with Yahoo! is not altruistic or sympathetic toward struggling Yahoo!. It is a 
way to push against Google, and to seek an alternative to Google’s content and services, 
given Apple still uses Google’s search service as the default on Apple’s mobile devices.57 
For Apple, Yahoo! is a perfect partner as there are no overlapping business interests 
between them since Yahoo! owns neither hardware, operating system nor mobile app 
store.58  
 Meanwhile, despite its struggles to gain search market share, Microsoft has so far 
held onto its search engine Bing. As of 2014, Bing has 18.2 percent of all searches – an 
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all-time high – and a gain from 16.3 percent in December 2012.59 Yet, even after allying 
with Yahoo!, Bing hasn’t made a dent in Google’s search market dominance. Microsoft’s 
Online Services Division is one of its most expensive operations, having lost around $11 
billion since 2005.60 It is revealing that Microsoft apparently believes that it cannot afford 
to ground its costly albatross Bing.  
 Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates sees search as a fundamental technology and core 
business for Microsoft.61 Bing is integrated into various Microsoft products and services 
including Windows Phone 7, streaming video, live TV on the Xbox, and Windows 8.62 
Thus, it’s hard to untangle; but more importantly search is also a key strategic piece to 
expand into the mobile sector. In 2013, Microsoft acquired Nokia’s smartphone business 
and spent another $2.2 billion to license the company's intellectual property. By obtaining 
a phone manufacturer, Microsoft is trying to follow Apple’s accumulation strategy model 
that deeply integrates hardware, software, and services. Nokia is still the second biggest 
phone maker in the world behind Samsung; thus, with this acquisition, Microsoft is now 
the world's second largest cell phone manufacturer by sales. By leveraging its Nokia 
market power, Microsoft is betting on a global mobile search engine to power its mobile 
services. Yet, there is another reason for Microsoft to keep Bing, whose growth hinges on 
the international market. Given global Internet penetration is still roughly 35%, there are 
many countries where the search market has not been developed or occupied by Google 	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or other search engine firms. Microsoft seeks its future growth in this still expansionary 
international market.  
Defending the Core  
 While Yahoo! and Bing are trying to maintain their footing in the search market, 
Google is busy defending its core business – advertising. Google’s search ads remain its 
essential profit source. However, as the nature of search shifts and people increasingly 
use mobile devices to find what they want to buy, eat, entertain and learn, Google’s 
desktop search ads are expected to decline. To mitigate future losses in desktop search 
ads revenue, Google is looking for new ads venues for a bigger piece of the advertising 
pie. And it has been turning its attention to display ads for brand advertising in which 
Yahoo! was once the main player.63 Google sees display as one of the next big drivers of 
its revenue growth, and it is readying itself to conquer this space. According to the Wall 
Street Journal, approximately 1,000 of Google’s engineers have been deployed to work 
on display technology.64 Due to the rise of online video, social media and mobile, the 
online display ad market has been growing at 21% annually – opposed to 13 percent 
annual growth for paid search – and is expected to reach $74.4 billion in 2016.65 Display 
advertising across all platforms grew by 32.4% globally in 2013 – the greatest increase of 
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any segment in the ad market, but still only 4.5% share of the total.66 According to 
ZenithOptimedia, spending on display advertising will soon overtake paid search.67 
 Google’s $3.1 billion acquisition of display ads company DoubleClick in 2007 was 
a milestone in its efforts to extend its business beyond search ads.68 Google’s road to 
display ads was paved by the state as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cleared the 
merger between DoubleClick and Google despite opposition from privacy advocates who 
pointed out that the deal would lead to the control of more private data by one single 
company. DoubleClick had been the long-standing leader in behavioral advertising, 
having built its business through consumer profiling during the dotcom era of the 
1990s.69 By integrating DoubleClick into its massive advertising infrastructure, Google 
was able to build the world’s largest display ads platform. With the acquisition of 
DoubleClick, Google quickly captured 12.6 percent of the US display ads market.70  
 Google sells display ads on its own Websites, mainly on YouTube as well as 
through more than two million Web publishers using an automated marketplace in 
Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange.71 In particular, Google is augmenting YouTube 
content and repackaging it to appease TV advertisers, given TV advertising revenue is 	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still the largest advertising segment. Google quickly realized that in order to attract more 
premium advertisers, YouTube had to have high-quality, professionally produced content 
to spur advertisers to spend premium ad dollars on branded programming.72 
 Hence, in an effort to enrich its content inventory, Google has even begun to invest 
in content production to lure future advertisers. In 2011 – 2012, Google invested over 100 
million dollars to produce and distribute professional quality video on its 100+ original 
channels exclusively to its YouTube platform.73 Yet, this did not increase viewership as 
the company had expected; so now Google is taking a different approach to be closer to 
the content that can draw viewers. This time they’re doing that with physical production 
spaces.  
 Google has been opening up studio space to provide creators with needed 
production space and resources. The company has physical production sites in London, 
Los Angeles, Tokyo, and New York where content creators can use the YouTube video 
production facility free of charge. But then the question remains: Why is Google involved 
in the movie Studio business and offering the space to content creators for free? This is 
Google’s consistent business strategy. It offers “free” services in order to attain a 
privileged market position; with this long view in mind, Google is betting that there is big 
potential profit for the company by backing creators with “free” production resources. 
 Ultimately, Google’s aim is to generate more premium YouTube content, which it 
hopes will lead to larger audiences, more ad revenues and diversified revenue sources.74 
Google publicizes the studio as “free” space, but content creators must apply to use the 	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facility. In order to qualify, content creators must have YouTube channels with at least 
10,000 subscribers and 100,000 views per month. While Google does not claim 
ownership of the content, its strategy is to improve the quality of YouTube channel 
programs to draw premium advertising and to expand its paid channels by investing in 
resources. Paralleling the building of studio spaces, the company is boosting up its 
content efforts by bringing in major partners including Fuji TV, TBS, Vicom and 
Crypton Future Media, Dentsu and manga publisher Shuseisha to produce YouTube 
channels and investing $35 million in Machinima, one of YouTube’s most popular 
networks.75 
 Google, of course, isn’t the only company chasing after this growing display ads 
market.76 Although Google pulled down $4 billion in the US display ad space in 2013, 
players like AOL, Amazon and Facebook are closing the gap.77 In particular, social 
media giant Facebook has been directly going after Google’s main ads revenue sources. 
Facebook has been drawing on its massive user base and hoarding “intent data” which is 
at the core of the search engine industry.78 As of 2013, Facebook had over 1.23 billion 
active users who generate content, and data in interaction with each other.79 Facebook 
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challenges Google’s most lucrative business as it offers information through social 
engagement within the Facebook platform, bypassing users’ need for Google. In 
response, Google launched its own social media platform Google Plus (Google+) and has 
been trying its hand in the social media market. It has not been able to combat Facebook, 
and in July 2014 Google announced that its first social networking site Orkut – which had 
been popular in Brazil and India – would be shutting down after years of struggling 
against Facebook.   
 Facebook is now the second most visited Website in the world after Google, and 
gets about 82% of its revenue from advertising, with the rest coming from fees resulting 
from its Credit Platform, which provide payment services to gaming partners like Zynga. 
It pulled in $7.8 billion in revenue in 2013, far behind Google’s $50+ billion revenue. 
After its IPO in 2012, Facebook’s viability was questioned by its investors, as the 
company had not been able to fully monetize its user traffic. This is rapidly changing, 
particularly in the mobile space, which will be illustrated in more detail in a later section. 
Facebook is turning into a mobile company with the potential to take a significant amount 
of advertising dollars away from Google.  
 From a different direction, Amazon, Google’s biggest advertiser, is also threatening 
Google’s core business. As more Internet users begin their searches on Amazon's 
marketplace and bypass Google, Google loses an opportunity to show them ads.80 Over 
the years, Amazon has become the search engine for e-commerce, which also cuts into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Rolfe Winker, “Amazon vs. Google: It's A War for the Shopping Search,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 20, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304173704579265421113585650. 
	  34	  
Google’s core function and pulls away searchers from Google’s own Web properties.81 If 
Google has built its advertising business by transforming the Internet into an ads 
platform, Amazon, the modern day Sears catalog, has built its business by organizing the 
Internet as a vehicle for retail business. Since Google is selling ads and Amazon is selling 
products, they would seem to be in two different business areas. However, since the same 
companies who buy ads on Google are the companies who sell products on Amazon, if 
searchers are going directly to Amazon and bypassing Google to find products to 
purchase then those companies might pull or reduce ads spending on Google. So far, 
Google has not lost traffic due to Amazon, but to defend if not extend its core business, 
the company wants to deter searchers going straight to Amazon by becoming a  
destination site, not just to offer information about products, but to sell them.82  
 Thus, Google is now moving into Amazon’s e-commerce domain. Google’s interest 
in e-commerce goes back to 2000 when its shopping search engine was called Froogle, 
but it remained a peripheral business. At that time, Google merely crawled and indexed 
product data from vendors’ Websites and monetized it using AdWords ads platform.83 
But in 2007, Froogle was renamed Google Product Search and was integrated into 
Google Search; listings from the service appeared in Web search results. Google Product 
Search was not even listed on the main home page and was under “More” options.84 
However, by 2012, Google had fully engaged in the e-commerce business as it again 
revamped and rebranded its product as Google Shopping. Google changed the service 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Marcus Wohlsen, “Google’s Plan to Snatch Shopping From Amazon Is Working,” Wired, 
http://www.wired.com/2013/01/google-takes-on-amazon/. 
82 Ibid.   
83 Wikpedia, “Google Shopping,” Wikipedia,” last modified August 24, 2014, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Shopping. 
84 Danny Sullivan, “Goodbye Froogle, Hello Google Product Search!” Search Engine Land, April 18, 2007, 
http://searchengineland.com/goodbye-froogle-hello-google-product-search-11001. 
	  35	  
from a free- to paid-for inclusion model in which merchants paid Google to list their 
products, services and display images of said products on Google search results pages.  
 Google’s move to paid listings is a radical change from its original business 
principles. Google distinguished itself from early paid search engines like GoTo.com in 
which businesses had to pay in order to be included in search results. Google denounced 
paid listings, saying it would never implement this practice. As Danny Sullivan, a 
Founding Editor of Search Engine Land, quickly pointed out, when Google filed its IPO 
in 2004, it specifically indicated that paid inclusion should be condemned, saying this 
under the “Don’t Be Evil” section of the founders letter:85 
Google users trust our systems to help them with important decisions: medical, 
financial and many others. Our search results are the best we know how to produce. 
They are unbiased and objective, and we do not accept payment for them or for 
inclusion or more frequent updating.86 
 
At that time, Google’s firm stand against paid listing even pressured Microsoft and 
ASK.com to drop their paid inclusion programs, and Yahoo! finally dropped its program 
in 2009.87 Why then did Google bring back the paid inclusion model that the company 
had so vehemently denounced? 
 Google is waging a war against Amazon, which currently dominates Internet retail 
and is threatening Google’s search business. In 2012, the Forrest Report claimed that 
30% of all online shoppers started their product search at Amazon, which constitutes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Danny Sullivan, “ Once Deemed Evil, Google Now Embraces ‘Paid Inclusion’,” Marketing Land, March 
30, 2012, http://marketingland.com/once-deemed-evil-google-now-embraces-paid-inclusion-13138. 
86 Ibid.   
87  Danny Sullivan, “Google “Comparison” Units Get New Look; Change Highlights Paid Inclusion In 




direct threat for Google’s core business.88 By incorporating retail business into Google’s 
business domain, the company is trying to protect its search business as well as move into 
the lucrative adjacent e-commerce market, which reached $225 billion in 2013 according 
to the U.S. Department of Commerce.89   
 By leveraging its dominance in search, Google is today determined to take a bigger 
piece of the e-commerce market as well. Google’s e-commerce ambition shows in 
displays on its search results.90 For a long time, Google insisted that advertisers use only 
small text ads, but now Google’s Product Listing Ads (PLA) first served up images along 
with price at the top premium area on search results, then on top of ads results on the side 
when users conducted searches for related products. In fact, Google’s product-listing ads 
have been attracting advertisers, and Walmart and eBay Inc. are the top buyers of 
Google’s product ads.91 It even launched Google Shopping Express same-day delivery in 
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York City after Amazon announced it was offering 
same-day shipping in 12 cities. Google wants to make sure that they are in every path of 
users’ information activities from search to delivery of actual products direct to 
consumers’ doors.  
 While both are profiting off Internet consumers, Amazon as a retailer generates its 
profit directly through transactions while Google profits by sending traffic to merchants. 
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This is the key difference in accumulation strategies. Google doesn’t have Amazon’s 
inventory nor an industrial-sized infrastructure by way of Amazon’s regional distribution 
centers; instead, it relies on third-party retailers that consumers access through the 
Google search engine.92 Amazon’s growth has come at massive capital cost with thin 
profit margins,93 but Google, with its deep pockets and profitable ads business, 
is enhancing its e-commerce business and at the same time protecting its advertising 
business from Amazon. 
 Meanwhile, Amazon is also eyeing Google’s turf in online advertising as the 
company is trying to diversify its revenue sources. Amazon has 237 million active 
customers’ data collected over decades. It’s not merely clickstream data and payment 
information, but also detailed shopping data of what people searched for.94 Madison 
Avenue calls this “intent” data, which are used by marketers to target sales along with 
demographics, geography, lifestyle, and purchasing patterns. Jeff Lanctot, the chief 
media officer for Razorfish, the Seattle-based digital marketing agency, said, “Amazon 
understands better than anyone else what consumers want.”95 Advertisers have been 
demanding that Amazon disclose their consumers’ behavioral data, while Wall Street 
would look to Amazon to generate profit from advertisers. Increased profit margins from 
ad sales could help mitigate Amazon’s high capital costs and thin profit margin retail 
strategy. Amazon has been experimenting with ad platforms, searching for advertising 
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strategies that won’t repel its customers, and developing ads for Amazon Prime Instant 
and Kindle devices. Amazon incentivizes consumers to get used to its ads by offering 
subsidized rates for devices with ads. While Amazon’s $1 billion ad revenue is still 
merely 1% of their annual revenue in 2013, and nothing close to a threat for Google, it 
has already increased its ads revenue higher than Twitter, Pandora and LinkedIn.96 
 An Economist article once equated the current battle over the Internet by major 
Internet firms to George R.R. Martin’s fantasy novel Game of Thrones, complete with 
power plays in fractious and rapidly changing landscapes.97 The battle here is among big 
units of digital capital as they seek to control their own domains while extending and 
searching for new territories to conquer.  
Going Mobile 
 Google’s chief business officer Nikesh Arora once stated, “The fundamental tenet 
is not to speak about mobile, mobile, mobile. It’s really about living with the users.”98 
That is, the tenet of digital capital is not just maintaining dominance over one’s own 
domain; rather, its aim is to organize and reorganize every inch of people’s social lives 
into the profit domain. Given this expansionist ambition, mobile Internet is a vital 
platform for digital capital, the goal to live with users and their always-on mobile devices 
tied to an individual identification that can be tracked and monitored. The integration of 
mobile phone and Internet connectivity allows for digital capital to overcome physical 
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obstacles to reach consumers 24/7 and to expand space and time for capitalist production 
in previously untapped markets.  
 By the early 2000s, Google had begun to test mobile services such as Google 
search service over Google SMS service, maps and Gmail. Yet, its real mobile strategy 
was revealed when it acquired mobile-phone software startup Android – which had been 
founded by Andy Rubin, a former Apple hardware designer. And in 2007, Google 
unveiled its Android mobile operating system shortly after Apple released its first iPhone 
while Google was still an app partner for iPhone. Google’s introduction of Android was a 
shot across Apple’s bow and into its mobile business turf.  
 These two firms have taken entirely different accumulation strategies – Android is 
an open-source system while Apple is a closed system, a walled garden. Apple took a 
closed system approach, allowing only Apple-approved applications on its devices; by 
contrast, Google’s open-source approach gives Android OS away to be installed on as 
many phone models as possible including Samsung, LG, HTC, Sony, and Motorola. Eric 
Schmidt declared, “Android is by far the primary vehicle by which people are going to 
see smartphones … Our goal is to reach everybody.”99 Google’s open source strategy is 
able to reach mobile users widely, but the question remaining – whether open or closed 
source – is how to generate revenue?  
 Since Android is free to device makers, Google couldn’t make money from the 
devices themselves. So the options for Google’s mobile business were advertising and/or 
subscriptions for Google services. Google’s choice took its most familiar route – 
advertising. Google has been extending its ads business into the mobile space, all the 	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while not excluding other sources of revenue. Compared to Apple, which generates its 
revenues from selling its hardware, Google’s revenue has been concentrated in mobile 
ads placed on Google’s services that are preloaded on Android phones and Android 
mobile apps.  
 In 2008, Google introduced AdSense for display ads on mobile phones,100 which is 
similar to Google’s AdSense program that places ads on traditional Websites. Yet, 
Google shortly thereafter acquired AdMob for $3.2 billion – the mobile ad platform 
which offers advertising on mobile Websites as well as inside mobile apps.101 Google’s 
AdMob deploys a platform-agnostic approach, allowing developers to place ads on 
Android, iOS, and Windows phones. To compete against Google’s AdMob, Apple 
launched iAds, its mobile ads platform, integrating advertisements into applications sold 
only on its iOS App Store. Apple has been trying hard to chip away at Google AdMob’s 
lead in mobile advertising and expanding its revenue sources. In 2012, Apple even 
reduced prices for developers for iAd, dropping the minimum spending from $500,000 to 
$100,000 and boosting developers’ ad revenue from 60% to 70%.102 Yet, Google still 
remains in the dominant position in the global mobile ads market with 49.3%, even 
though its market share has slightly declined from its 53% share in 2012.103 In the mobile 
ads market, Google is increasingly facing off with Facebook – not Apple – on a number 
of mobile advertising fronts.  
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 As late as 2011, Facebook had no mobile ad revenue. At the time of Facebook’s 
IPO, Wall Street was still questioning whether the company would be able to monetize 
millions of users’ activities. After Facebook’s IPO in 2012, the company was under 
intense pressure from shareholders to make a profit off of its mountain of personal data 
from 1 in 9 people on Earth.104 Today it is the second largest player in the mobile space 
and has reached nearly 22% of mobile ads market share. This is more than triple its share 
from 2012 to 2013, and Facebook now generates 59% of its ad revenue from mobile.105 
The increased ads revenue provides financial resources for Facebook to expand its mobile 
properties through acquisitions. Facebook acquired photo and video sharing service 
Instagram for $1 billion in 2000. Before being acquired by Facebook, Instagram was 
running on Amazon’s cloud computing service, but soon moved to Facebook’s data 
center. Facebook claimed it would keep Instagram’s 20 billion-strong user data separate 
from Facebook data to protect the privacy of Instagram users. Yet, soon after its 
migration, Facebook changed its privacy policy to share data between Instagram and 
Facebook. It has already begun to display ads on Instagram, and is building its mobile 
brand advertising campaign platform. In 2014, the company also acquired the messaging 
app WhatsApp for $19 billion, which had 450 million users, and added 50 million users in 
the first few months after its Facebook acquisition.106  
 Facebook released its own ads network Audience Network, putting it into 
competition with Google and Apple, and deployed a new Web profiling tool to gather 
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Web surfing data on users for advertisers. Ads on Facebook were usually based on users’ 
own activity data and interests listed in personal profiles within the social media network, 
but now it is more far reaching and aggressive in user data collection including users’ 
PCs and phone surfing data. Facebook even refused to honor the do-not-track setting on 
Web browsers, reasoning that there is no industry consensus. Social-media competitors 
Twitter and Pinterest have kept the do-not-track setting while Google and Yahoo! have 
not.107 Advertisers still consider users’ search data as the closest link between a consumer 
and actual sales. Facebook is trying to provide to advertisers the evidence that its new 
Web tracking tool is effective, and helps move Facebook users toward actual purchases. 
 Google’s competition in the mobile space does not just come from Facebook and 
Apple. Ironically it also comes from its main Android manufacturer Samsung, which 
makes 65 percent of Android devices.108 Google’s original strategy for open source OS 
was to rely on a number of different hardware companies to distribute Android and avoid 
one company getting too big. But since Samsung is now selling the majority of Android 
phones, Google could simply lose control over the mobile market if Samsung leverages 
its market power against Google. Samsung recognizes that its devices are delivering more 
consumers to Google and Google’s ads revenue growth and the company is reevaluating 
its close links with Google and Android OS.109 Samsung is experimenting to see if the 
company can ditch Android, and instead use its own OS. The company introduced its 
own mobile OS Tizen and has even started paying developers to write apps for it. So far, 	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Google has been able to maintain its control over device manufacturers by closely 
controlling its own closed-source Google apps platform.110 Android is free, but Gmail, 
Play, and Maps can only be obtained through Google’s stringent and complicated 
approval processes. Google can exercise its power to reject services in Android that 
compromise its self-interest. For example when the mobile location service Skyhook was 
chosen to be the provider of location to pre-Google owned Motorola and Samsung 
Android phones, Samsung was forced to dump Skyhook mobile location service and to 
use Google’s own system instead. Yet, Samsung’s strong market share in mobile devices 
could shift the future direction of the Android “ecosystem” and weaken Google’s control 
over Android phone. 
 Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion in 2012 – which makes 
Android-based smartphones and tablets – was a way to prevent hardware manufacturers 
like Samsung having too much control over Android.111 Yet, the acquisition did not turn 
out as Google had expected and Google sold Motorola Mobility to the Chinese firm 
Lenovo less than a year later – with Google keeping the majority of Motorola’s patents. 
Giving up on its mobile phone manufacturing business has forced Google to strengthen 
its partnership with Samsung for now. Recently, the two companies struck a licensing 
deal that allows them to share key patents – an indication of their continuing alliance. 
 Meanwhile, Samsung’s increasing market power has also been a threat to Google’s 
and Samsung’s competitor Apple, which has sued Samsung for patent infringement on 
several occasions. As the competition within the Internet industry intensifies, patents 	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have been increasingly used to monopolize power to shift market dynamics. Perversely, 
the ongoing patent lawsuit between Samsung and Apple is considered to be Google’s 
proxy war against Apple.112 In 2012, Apple argued that Samsung had copied its designs 
of the iPhone and iPad and the court found Samsung guilty of infringing on Apple’s 
design patents for smartphones, but not for tablets. In a second law suit, Apple alleged 
that Samsung had sold phones and tablets violating five of its mobile software patents 
while Samsung alleged that Apple had violated two patents related to photo albums and 
videoconferencing.113 Tellingly, the majority of Apple’s patent-infringement claims 
against Samsung were related to Android functions on its Android-based Galaxy S5.114 
That meant that if Apple had won, Google would have had to make changes to those 
Android features that Apple claimed to be patent infringements and Samsung and other 
Android phone makers might have had to modify their phone software as well. Thus, 
Google had a significant stake on this legal case between Apple and Samsung, and 
Google engineers went so far as to take the stand to testify in Samsung’s defense. In fact, 
Google has Mobile Application Distribution Agreements with all Android vendors 
promising technical support, and other assistance to partners facing lawsuits.115 The court 
found Samsung guilty of infringing on two other Apple patents, and awarded Apple just 
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$119.6 million – only 5.5 percent of the $2.2B that Apple had demanded. This was 
considered a partial victory for Samsung as well as for Google. 
 In this brutally competitive mobile market, Amazon jumped in with the Fire Phone, 
which runs its own Fire OS.  The OS is modified (forked) so that it doesn’t include any of 
the popular Google apps like Play Store, Gmail, or Google Maps; instead, it is loaded 
with Amazon’s app store, cloud storage, streaming video content, and, streaming music 
service.116 One of Firefly’s distinctive features is a barcode scanner and product-
recognition app, which allows users to identify and compare prices of more than 70 
million products and order them direct from Amazon.117 Firefly is at the core of why 
Amazon released its smartphone118 to defend and expand its core retail business into the 
mobile space.119 The Fire Phone seems to have failed as of September, 2014 – Amazon 
recently dropped the price to $.99 – but this should be seen only as a setback as Amazon 
will no doubt continue its attempts to push into the mobile market. 
 While competition over the mobile space has been intensifying among major 
Internet firms from multiple fronts, capital is concurrently extending its mobile business 
by building and deploying cloud infrastructures, which provide computing resources to 
data-limited mobile devices. 
To the Cloud  
 The combination of mobile devices and the Internet provides capital a giant step 
toward marketplace ubiquity; however, there are technical barriers. Mobile devices have 	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limitations in terms of processing power, battery life and data storage to live with users so 
it is difficult to emulate all of the critical PC functions. Capital’s solution for these 
technical constraints is deploying cloud computing where both the data storage and the 
data processing happen outside of the mobile device. As centralized servers perform 
computing-intensive tasks and store massive amounts of data, mobile devices can be 
turned into data terminals rather than standalone machines.  
 Google’s profit-making mechanism for the mobile space goes hand in hand with its 
cloud computing which allows for Google to transfer its services to mobile devices since 
the applications do not reside on the devices, but on Google’s servers. In 2010 during his 
first keynote address at the Mobile World Congress, Eric Schmidt announced Google’s 
mobile first strategy and said, “If you don’t use the power of the cloud you will fail.”120 
Google built its Android based on cloud services for many of its features. Deploying 
cloud computing in parallel with mobile devices is a way for Google to extend the full 
spectrum of its business beyond PCs.  
 In response, Apple has scrambled to integrate cloud features into its mobile 
business. Apple’s urgency resonated in an email from then-Apple CEO Steve Jobs in 
2010 as the company had fallen behind its competitors in cloud services. Jobs sent out an 
email to the company urging Apple to get on the leading edge of this trend to “further 
lock customers into our ecosystem.”121 Jobs even publicly announced that the Mac is 
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merely another device, and said, “We’re going to demote the PC and the Mac to just be a 
device. We’re going to move your hub, the center of your digital life, into the cloud.”122  
 When Apple launched its cloud business iCloud, it was already late in the game. 
iCloud worked as more of a backup system within Apple's closed ecosystem, yet it had 
neither a comprehensive online storage service nor email service to compete with Google 
or Microsoft.123 Apple has FaceTime video chat, but it’s only available to iOS users and 
doesn’t have cross-platform services in the same way that Google and Microsoft do.124 
Apple’s iTunes has been one of its most profitable cross-platform businesses, but now 
new popular music streaming services Pandora and Spotify are pulling users away from 
iTunes.125 Apple recently decided to buy Beats Music and Beats Electronics for $3.2 
billion, not for its famous hip-hop headphones, but for the fact that it could provide its 
own cloud-based music streaming service.126 Apple has forged a partnership with IBM 
that gives Apple inroads into enterprise cloud services while giving IBM access to 
popular devices and more leverage to compete with other cloud businesses. As long as 
Google’s Android remains the main competitor, Apple will face intense pressure to have 
an array of cloud services as its Mac-PC sales slow down and users increasingly shift to 
mobile devices. 
 While cloud computing is utilized by capital to extend mobile Internet business, it 
is also becoming a key source of profit for the Internet industry as a whole and promoted 
by information industries and governments, brushing off labor, environmental, security 
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and privacy issues.127 Cloud business is generally categorized into three different types. 
First is infrastructure as a service (IaaS) where a service provider offers computer 
resources including processor, storage, operating system, applications and network 
capability. Second is Platform as a Service (PaaS) where a service provider offers more 
than infrastructure, providing a set of application software that allows for a developer to 
build an application to run in their cloud. Third is software as a service (SaaS) where a 
service provider centrally hosts software and delivers to consumers on a subscription 
basis. Each category of services is a market for Internet firms, which are engaged more or 
less on all levels.  
 In particular, the Internet industry is aiming at business users for cloud computing 
services, promoting it as a way to increase productivity and decrease costs by leveraging 
and automating corporate technical infrastructure. In 2014, global business spending for 
infrastructure and services related to the cloud is expected to reach an estimated $174.2 
billion. And by 2017, enterprise spending on cloud computing will balloon to $235.1 
billion, triple the $78.2 billion spent in 2011.128 
 Google is eager to take a piece of this growing market, and it is already enticing 
app developers and corporations to shift to renting their IT infrastructure from Google 
with its mega-data storage and computing power. As the company enters more deeply 
into the cloud space, Google is facing off with Amazon, which has built strongly 
positioned cloud services. 
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 In 2006, Amazon launched its cloud computing platform Amazon Web Service 
(AWS), and currently has between 80% to 85% of the cloud market share in terms of 
providing platform as a service (PaaS). In PaaS, Amazon rents hardware, operating 
systems, server-software, storage, and network infrastructure over the Internet as a 
service to developers and business. Internet users may not be familiar with AWS, but 
they are using its service as they watch movies on Netflix, book rooms on Airbnb, stream 
music via Spotify, and click through Pinterest.129 Amazon has been selling its data 
storage and processing power to companies around the world like Netflix and Shell, 
Fortune 500 companies including Unilever and GE, as well as to government agencies 
like the CIA and the US Navy.130 For years, AWS has been the leader in enterprise cloud 
computing.131 Amazon’s cloud business generated an estimated $3.2 billion in revenue in 
2013, and Amazon expects it to one day become even bigger than its core retail 
operation.132 
 Google is trying to catch up to Amazon, and it is a threat to Amazon. For Google, 
cloud computing is not new territory. Google’s most popular products like search, Gmail, 
Google Docs, Google Maps, Google calendar, Google now, Google drive etc. are all 
running on Google’s infrastructure where users’ information activity data are stored and 
managed. All along Google has been running the biggest cloud-computing operation in 
the world – but just with a different purpose.133 Google is already flexing its muscles in 
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consumer cloud storage business with Google Drive by offering larger amounts of free 
storage space than its competitors. Google’s strategy has been consistent – free to control. 
Google, aiming to increase its user base, raised the free limit from 5GB to 15GB 
compared to 2GB for Dropbox and 10GB for Box respectively. In June 2014, Apple also 
unveiled its new cloud-based storage system called iCloud Drive similar to Dropbox; but 
iCloud only offers 5GB of free storage. The more data you upload to the Google cloud, 
the less chance that users will want to move to another cloud service. Jeffrey Mann, Vice 
President for research at Gartner said, “storage is where the stickiness is” and “It’s how 
they hold a customer. If they store your stuff, they get to know you better.”134 In 2013, 
Google disclosed that there were 120 million Google Drive accounts.135 
 Building on its consumer cloud services, Google packages a host of enterprise 
cloud services (Google Apps) and sells them as Software as a Service (SaaS) to 
corporations, government and educational institutions and is actively trying to gobble up 
the enterprise business. Google Apps consists of cloud applications for document writing, 
collaboration, text and video, so that no one ever needs to install software on their own 
machines. It is a direct attack on Microsoft’s office products that has long commanded 
the enterprise market – and caused Microsoft to recently form a partnership with 
Dropbox.136 As of 2013, there are over 5 million organizations on Google Apps with 50 
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million users.137 Google is gradually making inroads in the cloud-based enterprise market 
as Google Apps has grown from 10 percent of the cloud-office market in 2007 to 50 
percent in 2012.138   
 In particular, Google has long been aiming at one of the largest organizations in the 
enterprise market – the US federal government. While corporations had been hesitant to 
move their IT operations to the cloud, the US government became a leading cheerleader 
in stimulating cloud computing and generating demand. The US government has been 
facilitating the expansion of cloud computing by mandating the implementation of cloud 
computing for federal agencies. The Obama Administration launched its “Cloud First 
Policy” to shift federal IT infrastructure into cloud computing and endorsed cloud 
computing in its 2010 budget request.139 According to the market research firm 
MarketsandMarkets, government agencies will invest $18.48 billion dollars in cloud 
computing by 2018.140 
 In 2010, Google won a major US General Services Administration (GSA) contract 
to provide Google Apps including Gmail for the entire agency. Since then, Google has 
scored 23 out of 42 US government contracts to adopt Google Apps compared to 10 for 
Microsoft.141 Microsoft quickly countered Google with its own cloud-based enterprise 
Office 365 suite, which is a hybrid cloud and conventional server service.  Microsoft is 
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still the largest player and claims that its Office suite is installed on more than 1 billion 
machines,142 but Google Apps is trying to swallow up the enterprise market by becoming 
the standard for tech startups, small businesses and newer large companies. 
 To further extend into the cloud market, Google is now going after app developers 
to draw them into Google’s infrastructure by launching a host of cloud services including 
Platform as a service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) on Google’s 
infrastructure. Google and Amazon are certainly not the only players in this space. 
Windows Azure cloud, AT&T, Verizon, Rackspace, IBM, Cisco, Virtustream, GoGrid, 
and Softlayer are all throwing their hats into the cloud ring and a host of smaller web-
hosting companies are also offering various cloud services as well.143 As the cloud war 
has heated up, Google kicked off the price war to expand its user base by slashing prices 
as much as 90% for some of its “Compute Engine” cloud computing facilities which has 
pressured its competitors Microsoft and Amazon to cut their prices as well.144 Compute 
engines allow developers to build faster services by having their data and virtual servers 
in proximity. Compute engines are generally divided into geographic zones that map 
close to data centers. To attract more developers, Google has recently offered 2 new 
Compute Engine zones in the US and Asia-Pacific markets. However, they still trail 
Amazon and Microsoft. Amazon offers three different cloud-based enterprise zones in the 
US alone, has data centers in Ireland, Frankfurt, Singapore, Tokyo, Sydney, Sao Paulo 
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and Beijing.145 Microsoft currently has thirteen different zones around the world, 
including six in the US.146 The battle between and among these Internet giants is aimed at 
taking a bigger portion of the total corporate IT spending which will be worth almost $1.4 
trillion in 2014.147  
 For years, Google did not consider cloud computing part of its core business, but 
now the company is looking to this space as a major source of profit. Urs Hölzle, a senior 
vice president of technical infrastructure at Google, in an interview with Wired magazine, 
said that the revenues from the cloud could exceed the revenue that the company 
generates from online advertising.148 The resulting battle is set to be huge and protracted, 
and will give rise to conflict over controlling the Internet infrastructure itself.  
Internal Infrastructure  
 This battle over the Internet can be seen in the physical infrastructure of the Internet 
firms. Since its Internet services hinge on networks, Google has overseen a massive 
build-out of its Internet infrastructure. By 2013, Google had invested about $23 billion in 
data centers which all require high-capacity backbones to transport data quickly and 
efficiently.149 The company invested  $2.35 billion on infrastructure in the first quarter of 
2014 alone, increased from $2.26 billion in the previous year’s fourth quarter and almost 
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double the $1.2 billion in the first quarter of 2013.150 The majority of its capital 
investments have been for data centers, servers, networking equipment, and property. 
While it is invisible, Internet services rely on network infrastructure to compute and 
transfer massive amounts of data back and forth. Early on, Google understood the 
importance of network infrastructure in order for them to process the oceans of data that 
the company handles on a daily basis. Since 2005, Google has been acquiring “dark 
fiber,” the unused underground cable left dormant by the dot-com crash of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.151 In 2007, Om Malik from GigaOM pointed out that Google builds its 
own network, data centers, servers and storage systems to deliver it services as fast and at 
the lowest cost possible. He said, “Google’s gigantic infrastructure is the big barrier to 
entry for its rivals.”152  
 Currently Google has 13 mega data centers, with 6 in the US and 7 across the globe 
– Taiwan, Singapore, Chile, Finland, Belgium, Ireland, and Netherlands – and an 
unknown number of collocation centers where Google rents data center space. Large-
scale data centers – sometimes called “server farms” – are centralized facilities that 
primarily contain large numbers of servers and computer equipment used for data 
processing, data storage, and high-speed telecommunications. There is a growing arms 
race among leading Internet companies – Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook etc. – in 
building out these global large-scale data centers. In all, Google supposedly operated 	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more than 1 million servers across its data centers in 2010 – more than 2% of all servers 
in the world.153 By linking its numerous data centers together, Google operates one of the 
largest private Internet infrastructures. By 2010, Google had a much larger Internet 
infrastructure than Amazon or Microsoft and its global network was larger than all but 
one of the companies that provide the Internet backbone.154 Today, Google owns and 
controls more than 100,000 miles of fiber optic cable globally – compare that to Sprint, 
one of the largest global network operators, which controls less than 40,000 miles.155 
According to Craig Labovitz, founder of cloud and network infrastructure company 
Deepfield, “more than 62 percent of the smartphones, laptops, video streamers, and other 
devices that tap into the Internet from throughout North America connect to Google at 
least once a day.”156 To handle its growth, and speed up its content delivery process, 
Google has added thousands of servers – called Google Global Cache servers – to 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) around the world. These servers store the most popular 
content from Google’s network and then serve it directly from the ISP’s data center, 
rather than going through one of Google’s own data centers.157 
 While it is building out its own network infrastructure for its internal operations, 
Google is also laying out ultrafast fiber optic networks to speed up the “last-mile” 
Internet for users. This seems outwardly to be an extremely generous gesture, but 
Google’s motivation is its own corporate self-interest – the more people who have access 
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to high-speed Internet, the more Google is queried, the more YouTube video is viewed, 
the more Google Hangout is used, etc. which all mean more Google revenues.158 
 In 2012, Google launched its Google Fiber project to provide Internet access to 
consumers at one GB per second which is 100 times faster than the average US 
broadband service for $70 a month (and 5 Mbps fiber for free). Initially, the company 
rolled out the service in Kansas City, KS and Austin, TX, – all subsidized by the 
municipalities themselves – but the company recently announced plans to launch Fiber in 
34 cities. When Google Fiber was announced, many suspected that the idea behind 
Google’s venture was to spur the telecom and cable industries to improve their broadband 
offerings, and enhance broadband speeds and penetration – all of which are necessary for 
Google to expand its wide ranging services that require fast and wide-spread broadband 
infrastructure to incentivize their adoption and use.  Moreover, since Google Fiber is 
connected to users’ homes, this offers another data collection point for Google to monitor 
users’ information activities over the Internet. 
 Google fiber is fueling the broadband war. Google’s initial goal is succeeding, 
given that telecommunications behemoth AT&T is investing in infrastructure and also 
expanding ultra fast fiber services in 21 major metropolitan areas. AT&T recently 
announced that it planned to challenge Google’s Fiber initiative by expanding its own 
service to several important markets in the areas where Google is investing to build out 
its Google Fiber project. Whether or not Google will directly move into the ISP business 
still remains a question, but Google’s Fiber project is a direct challenge to telecom giants 
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like AT&T, Verizon and Comcast who have long battled over Internet services in an 
attempt to generate more profit out of their infrastructure.159  
 Moreover, to further Google’s reach and connect geographically dispersed markets, 
Google is going literally underwater, participating in the building of several submarine 
cables – Unity, a Trans-Pacific submarine communication cable between Japan and US, 
and Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC) system which connects China, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Brunei with Japan and its link to transpacific fiber that goes 
through the US. Recently, Google announced that it is joining FASTER, a new trans-
Pacific cable system that will connect Japan to two major West Coast cites in the US, 
with initial speeds of up to 60 Tb/s. The consortium building FASTER includes: China 
Mobile International, China Telecom Global, Global Transit, KDDI and SingTel with 
NEC as the system supplier. Google’s vice president for its technical infrastructure Urs 
Hölzle wrote that FASTER would guarantee that Google’s services and products are fast 
and reliable.160 
 By physically owning major fiber routes and not needing to rely on the telecom 
industry for Internet service, Google has more control over its services at various points, 
delivery of the whole spectrum of its services and products, and has built a giant barrier 
to entry for other companies. Dan Caruso, chief executive at Kayo Group – a company 
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that sells fiber lines to companies – explains that “the move by the tech giants to own 
Internet infrastructure is really about controlling their own destiny.”161 
Internet as life itself 
 Backed by this massive network infrastructure, Google has taken up its profit-
making business even beyond these familiar Internet sectors. By introducing Internet 
connectivity and Internet technologies into existing industries, Google and the other 
Internet firms are restructuring and to some extent absorbing them into their profit 
domain. The company is setting a trend as it weaves itself into major industrial and 
service industries including automobiles, manufacturing, energy, home electronics, health 
care, education, wearables and robotics.  
 Case in point: Google ambitiously delved into the automobile industry – one of the 
largest industrial sectors which revived capitalism from the Great Depression – and is 
reorganizing the industry to center it around information technologies. At the 2014 
Automotive World annual conference in Dearborn, Michigan, the head of Google’s 
global automotive unit Meredith Guerriero – not someone from GM or Ford – was the 
keynote speaker. She wooed the audience, speaking about fuel economy, eMobility and 
connected vehicles. Google is pursuing multiple fronts of the automobile sector to be 
extensions of its Internet business.  
 Since 2009, Google has been working on the self-driving car as part of Google X, 
the company’s semisecret R&D lab for long-term initiatives.162 This seemed to be one of 
Google’s moon-shot projects even a few years ago, but it is attempting to figure out ways 	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to commercialize new technologies. Google is talking to auto manufacturers to bring 
down costs and produce for the mass market, but as it did with the Android operating 
system, Google is considering whether to license its technologies to automakers and have 
the automakers then produce them.163 All of the major carmakers and automotive 
suppliers are working on their own driverless technologies as well; so if Google pushes 
its own self-driving car, GM product-development chief Mark Reuss asserts that this 
would be a “serious competitive threat” to the auto industry.  
 Moving the self-driving car into the commercial realm does not merely have 
technical- and scale issues, but there are also regulatory and legislative obstacles for 
Google to overcome. So far there are no concrete legal regulations around self-driving 
cars, which are considered neither legal nor illegal in a majority of states. Using this 
ambiguous legal space, Google was able to conduct more than 100,000 miles of test 
drives of its self-driving car before its official announcement of the project in 2010.164 
However, to further pursue the self-driving car business, Google first needed the 
government’s help to legalize the self-driving car on the highway, and early on Google 
brought the government to its side. Google’s lobbying machine has been taking on one 
state at a time to legalize the driverless car. As of the end of 2013, four States – Nevada, 
Florida, California, and Michigan – along with the District of Columbia had done so. In 
California, despite opposition from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the 
leading advocacy group for the auto industry, which includes 12 top auto makers such as 
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GM, BMW and Toyota, Google won by turning an autonomous-vehicle bill into law.165 
Google is slowly paving its own way for its future potential source of profit-making.  
 Besides ambition to build its own car, Google is integrating Android into 
automobiles to further the Android market beyond smartphones and tablets. The company 
created the Open Automotive Alliance (OAA) – similar to its Open Mobile Alliance  – as 
a group of automotive manufacturers and technology companies aimed at using Android 
in automobiles. It is the same tactic in the automobile industry, as Google has used for its 
smartphone, integrating Android software into automobiles manufactured by various 
automakers including Toyota, General Motors etc. In this way, Google could grab a large 
part of a growing automobile business without manufacturing actual cars in a capital-
intensive sector. At the same time, the auto industry is closely watching Google’s 
strategies and intensions as it seeks to protect its territory of profit.166   
 Apple has not been on the sidelines while Google has pursued the Internet car. 
Before Google, Apple had introduced CarPlay – an infotainment system for automobiles. 
CarPlay can sync a driver’s iPhone with a built-in dashboard featuring Siri voice control. 
In 2014, Apple’s CarPlay will deploy in select cars from Ferrari, Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, 
BMV, Jaguar, Hyundai etc. and is expected to reach more than 24 million vehicles by 
2016.167 Microsoft’s Nokia has also jumped in, developing auto technologies through its 
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venture capital arm Nokia Growth Partner, which manages $700 million for 
development.168 
 Meanwhile, Google is also swiftly linking its automobile business to the start-up 
company Uber to enhance its strategic accumulation options. Uber – one of the most 
popular ride-sharing networks – is financed by Google and Goldman Sachs, and relies on 
its mobile app to fetch customers. Uber doesn’t own or manage any cars, but simply 
deploys its app as the basis of its business. Drivers supply their own cars and pay Uber a 
20% commission on each fare in exchange for the use of Uber’s app and technical 
infrastructure. Under “flexible” options, Uber deploys a massive network of thousands of 
precarious workers who are potentially disposable at any time. Google’s involvement in 
Uber’s business seems a random venture to experiment with a new market; but it is part 
of Google’s long-term profit-making strategy by linking up with a transportation network 
that can deploy Google’s self-driving car. Uber chief Travis Kalanick has already alluded 
to that possibility and said, “driverless cars are the future and drivers are not.” When 
Google’s self-driving technology is ready, Google will have an infrastructure where 
Google simply can replace Ubers’ drivers with Google’s self-driving cars. 
 Google’s self-driving car is merely a glimpse of its wider deployment of robotics 
across a range of sectors. Google acquired eight robotics companies including Boston 
Dynamics, an engineering and robotic design company that has fashioned mobile 
research robots for the Pentagon, and set up a new robotics team.169  While Google has 
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into robotics and artificial intelligence that can be applied in a range of industries. While 
Foxconn – the world's largest contract electronics maker – is known as Apple’s supplier, 
Google is now working with Foxconn and its robotic team, headed by former Android 
executive Andy Rubin, to develop new manufacturing technologies to further automate 
the factory floor.170 This at a time when Foxconn is repressing workers who are 
demanding better working conditions and resisting against harsh exploitative labor 
practices. Google is assisting Foxconn as they face intense international criticism to 
replace workers with thousands of robots.171 Google’s partnership with Foxconn is 
signaling that the company is looking for expansion of its business in the manufacturing 
industry where it can appropriate internet technologies to reorganize labor processes and 
further the mechanization and automation processes. The US government is already on 
Google’s side as the Obama administration has been pushing aggressively to create 
“digital manufacturing cities” and mobilizing the academic industrial complex to focus 
on “high-tech” manufacturing design technologies. 
 Digital capital’s expansionary impulse is also moving into peoples’ homes, re-
altering them into a new marketplace. Google acquired Nest Labs, a home automation 
company and maker of high-tech thermostats and smoke detectors – as well as Nest’s 
large amount of private data on home energy use, temperature etc. – to expand its 
presence in consumers’ homes as it marches into the so-called “smart home” market over 
rivals such as Apple, Microsoft, Samsung, and IBM.172 Nest is part of a broader Google 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Ibid.  
171 Grant Brunner, “Foxconn is attempting to replace its human workers with thousands of robots,” Extreme 
Tech, July 8, 2014, http://www.extremetech.com/electronics/185960-foxconn-is-attempting-to-replace-its-
human-workers-with-thousands-of-robots. 
172 Rolfe Winker, “What Google Gains From Nest Labs,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579321043556056678. 
	  63	  
play in home entertainment as it expands its Chromecast device for streaming online 
content to televisions. Google is seeking end-to-end control from fiber going from the 
garage into the house, through the living room and kitchen, with links to Android 
powered automated systems with cloud data services.173 To this end, Google has 
appropriated Nest’s hardware unit, building hardware/software rather than operating 
systems for others to apply.174 Armed with a vast number of patents from its Motorola 
Mobility acquisition, Google is building its hardware team to embed Android into homes 
and enable devices such as locks, doorbells, baby monitors and humidity monitors. 
Google’s Nest Labs unit has already purchased Dropcam Inc., a video-monitoring and 
security firm, for $555 million, aiming for Android to become the dominant operating 
system for home and wearable devices.175 John Gapper from the Financial Times176 
equated Google to General Electric (GE) in the late 19th century when GE promoted 
futuristic homes with a range of home appliances and technologies as a way to expand its 
marketplace into homes. Today it’s not GE but Internet firms that are reentering into 
homes and reorganizing them into an emergent profit domain. Google’s competitor Apple 
has already intervened in the home by selling a platform HomeKit, allowing people to 
use their iPhones to control their houses. Samsung declared that the “smart” home is a 
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“growth engine” by launching its own open source OS Tizen to compete with Android 
and iOS.177  
 From automobile to home to museums and libraries, our everyday lives are no 
longer insulated from the market as digital capital is doing in other industries what it has 
already done by ravaging the fields of education and health – the most basic social 
domains that should be operated outside of commerce. Digital capital is going far beyond 
traditional computing devices, and is no longer limiting itself to smartphones and tablets. 
The Internet industry describes this as the “internet of things” which means powering and 
connecting billions of everyday objects to other objects and those objects to humans – 
and collecting all of that data. Google calls it “real life Internet.”178 Digital capital aims to 
engulf life itself.  
 This then is the scope of political economy of information industry within which 
search is situated. As demonstrated above, capital has a firm grip on the information 
sphere, so it’s hard to imagine search services outside the market. However, the origin of 
search technology was rooted in the public institutions where search engines functioned 
as more like a public utility. How then did search engine technologies shift to the 
marketplace? The next chapter traces the evolution of search function, business models 
and its development of technical infrastructure. It documents how the search function has 
emerged as one of the most profitable industries from technologies that were mainly 
developed in the academic, non-commercial domain, and explicates the evolution of the 
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business model and technical infrastructure behind search that are being organized to 
























Monetizing User Traffic: The Development of Search Advertising Systems 
 Initially, many search engine technologies were developed within noncommercial 
environments. Early pre-Web search engines were created in academic institutions. 
Archie, developed at McGill University in 1990, indexed files from FTP servers and is 
considered the Internet’s first search engine. Following Archie, Gopher was developed at 
the University of Minnesota in 1991. It was both a protocol and application to transport 
hierarchically organized text files. Gopher was widely used in universities and libraries. 
The rise of Gopher led to new search software Veronica and Jughead. Veronica came 
about in 1992 at the University of Nevada, Reno to index information on gopher servers; 
Jughead, from the University of Utah in 1993, was an alternative to Archie, and also 
searched for files on gopher servers. Whereas Veronica listed all server titles that fit the 
search criteria, Jughead searched a single server at a time. 
 The first Web search engine – WWW Wanderer developed by Matthew Gray at 
MIT in 1993 – was also the first Web crawler, actually designed to measure the growth of 
the Web. It lasted until 1995. One of the first full-text crawler search engines was 
Webcrawler in 1994 – created by Brian Pinkerton at the University of Washington – 
which allowed users to search for words on Web pages. Webcrawler was bought by 
America Online in 1995 and later sold to Excite. Lycos from Carnegie Mellon, Inktomi 
from University of California Berkeley, and Excite, Yahoo! and Google from Stanford – 
were all created in academic research institutions, and most often with public funding.   
In particular, Google’s algorithm PageRank was part of a Stanford Digital Library Project 
(SDLP), one of the first six awards of the multi-agency Digital Library Initiative (DLI) 
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financed by the National Science Foundation (NSF).179 Larry Page and Sergey Brin, 
supported by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, developed the initial PageRank 
algorithm as they were working on the SDLP project. At that time, the primary goal of 
the SDLP project was described thusly, “to develop the enabling technologies for a 
single, integrated and ‘universal’ library, proving uniform access to the large number of 
emerging networked information sources and collections.”180 Not accidently, this is quite 
similar to Google’s current mission – “to organize the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful.”  
Table 1. Search Engines/Directories between 1990 - 1995 
Year  Search Engines/Directories  



















Archie – McGill University 
Gopher – University of Minnesota 
Veronica – University of Nevada, Reno 
Jughead – University of Utah 
 
World Wide Web Virtual Library – CERN, Geneva, 
Switzerland 
 
World Wide Web Wanderer – MIT 
W3Catalog – University of Geneva 
AiWeb – Nextor 
JumpStation – University of Stirling, 
World Wide Web Worm – University of Colorado 
Yahoo! – Stanford University  
 
Web crawler – University of Washington 
Lycos – Carnegie Mellon University  
Infoseek – Steve Kirsch, Infoseek Corporation 
 
Open Text – University of Waterloo  
Magellan – Isabel & Christine Maxwell 
Excite – Stanford University 
AltaVista – Digital Equipment Corporation 
infoMarket Search – IBM 
Source: Michael Zimmer (2007) & Van Couvering (2010) 
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 The emergence of a number of new search engines and Web directories that grew 
out of academic institutions was in response to the rapid growth of the Web. In 1991, 
there was one Website, but by 1995, the Web grew to 23,000 pages and Web users 
reached 44,838,900. By January 1997, a year before Google released its PageRank, the 
Web grew to 650,000 pages and Web users reached 120,758,310.181 With a rapidly 
growing Web, search engine technology became a necessary utility to access information 
on the Internet. Given this necessity and growing scale, no longer could a few individuals 
build and manage a search engine, it soon required a large information infrastructure and 
investment. Combined with this, the function of the search engine as a gateway to 
information seemed to fall within the domain of public information provision. Libraries 
for instance, as existing public information infrastructure, early adopters of computers 
and key participants in early search engine development, could have built, with public 
funding, the public utility of search. With this in mind, the first question to ask must be: 
considering these initial search engine technology developments, which occurred outside 
of commercial transactions, how did search engine technologies shift from a public utility 
type of function to become billion dollar ads-based businesses?   
 Why did search engines not continue to be organized as public services when that 
was potentially their initial role? Search engine technologies made for uncertain 
businesses and few people predicted that search itself could be a business. Even major 
advertisers were skeptical about online ads as a viable market platform. The first Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) of Lycos, Ted Philip recalled, “there was no such thing as 
advertising on the Internet at that time...We had no business plan. All we had was a piece 	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of technology.”182 In 2000, Yahoo! cofounder Jerry Yang echoed a similar sentiment in a 
Forbes Interview, saying that in 1994, he and his partner were working on the Yahoo! 
directory as a hobby. He said, “We were looking for another start-up idea. We really 
didn't think Yahoo! could possibly be it. There was no real business model that fit it.” 183  
Search engines did not have intrinsic commercial value; rather they had to be enabled and 
organized in a particular way.  
Searching for a Business Model 
 Along with the privatization of the Internet, the rise of the search engine industry 
intersects with the dot-com bubble between 1995-2000 when large sums of venture 
capital fueled a host of Internet-based technology startups and when telecommunication 
and networking equipment companies attempted to organize the Internet as a commercial 
platform.184 The Internet bubble emerged after the recession in the early 1990s following 
the stock market crash of 1987 as capital was seeking a new site of accumulation to 
overcome the economic down-turn.185 In searching for a new high growth sector, massive 
amounts of financial capital flowed into Internet startups, which nurtured the Dot-com 
bubble. Goldfarb, Pfarrer, and Kirsch, in their 2005 study, estimated that from 1998-
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2002, 50,000 new ventures were formed in an effort to commercialize the Internet.186 
And these dot-com firms did not subscribe to traditional business models, rather they 
pursued intangible “mind share” or “eye balls” to build brand awareness while they were 
operating at a sustained loss.187 A host of venture capital funded initial start-ups intended 
to leverage the “eyeballs” that had garnered to other advertisers and were trying to 
expand their consumer base as fast as possible to build brand in order to increase their 
valuation – the idea was to “get big fast.”188  
 Search engine firms – once called eyeball aggregators – were at the center of this 
“get big fast” game.189 In 1998, Robert David, CEO of Lycos, echoed this business 
model, “our sole focus is audience size … Any place there are consumers, there are 
advertisers.”190 In the 1990s, betting on this eyeballs game, a slew of major venture 
capital firms such as Sequoia Capital, Softbank, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Buyers, 
Highland Capital Partners, Institutional Venture Partners (IVP), and Draper Fisher 
Juverton invested in search engine start ups like Yahoo!, Infoseek, Lycos, Excite, 
AltaVista, Ask Jeeves, Google, etc. Draper Fisher Juverton invested more than 30 million 
dollars in search services.191 Timothy Draper, a managing partner with the venture capital 
firm, said “Search is going to be hot as long as people continue to be frustrated.”192 
Draper Fisher Juverton was also one of the original US investors in Chinese search 
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engine Baidu which will be discussed in a later chapter. While looking for business 
models, search engine firms funded by venture capital spent the majority of their budgets 
in attracting lots of users to their sites because, without standard metrics for market share, 
Web metrics were centered around “traffic,” “hits,” and “eyeballs.” 
 To build brand recognition and draw user traffic, search engine firms launched 
extensive marketing campaigns on and offline, and poured the majority of venture capital 
money into brand building and advertising campaigns. Running up to its IPO, Yahoo! 
spent $5 million for the first national-scale ad campaign on television.193 This could be 
seen as a small amount of money for TV ads, but it was almost Yahoo!’s entire 
advertising budget for 1996.194 PR was not neglected then. Yahoo!’s PR agency 
generated 600 articles in 6 months in business and trade journals as well as mainstream 
publications.195 Shortly thereafter, Excite responded and launched its own $8 million 
nation-wide television campaign.196 From 1995 – 1998, Excite poured more than $65 
million into marketing to build its national brand.197 Ironically, search engine firms were 
sellers of online ads at the same time being among the largest advertising spenders as 
well. 
 Along with extensive marketing, search engine firms built partnerships with 
established Internet businesses to draw more user traffic. After rejecting an offer to be 
acquired by Netscape and AOL, Yahoo! began a strategic partnership with Netscape, then 
the most valuable property on the Net, which made Yahoo! one of the featured search 
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engines for Netscape’s browser users. Excite, then the number 2 search engine, made a 
strategic deal with Netscape, Microsoft and America Online (AOL), to expand the 
distribution of their search engine services.198 Infoseek also made a deal with Netscape in 
which it became a featured search provider on Netscape.  
Table 2. The Search Engine Market  
Product   Entry                                 Unique Users in Millions 
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Source: Neil Gandal, “The dynamics of competition in the Internet search engine market,” International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 1103-1117, (2001). 
 
 With extensive marketing campaigns, partnerships with other Internet firms and the 
increase in Web user population, leading search engines such as Yahoo!, Lycos, Infoseek, 
Excite, and AltaVista were able to draw millions of users by the late 1990s. And they all 
followed a textbook dot-com route: once big enough, companies pursued one of two 
lucrative exit strategies: 1) filed an IPO to raise more funding and to expose its brand; or 
2) sold themselves to a bigger company without a solid business model.  
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 The first search engine to go public was a Canadian company OpenText, which 
came out of research projects at the University of Waterloo.199 By the end of 1996, the 
top four at the time – Yahoo!, Excite, Lycos, and Infoseek – all had IPO’s and raised 
$162 million.200 While many search engines went the IPO route and raised millions of 
dollars during the dot-com boom, none of them had a working business model. Going for 
IPO without a specific revenue source was not uncommon for dot-com start-ups that 
relied on the “get big fast” principle in which companies with little revenue sources 
raised massive amounts of capital by pursuing a strategy of attracting “eyeballs.” By the 
mid 1990s, the major search engine firms had millions of users, but couldn’t figure out 
ways to monetize those “eye balls.”  
 In its IPO preparation, Yahoo!, then the leading search engine, was mulling over 
three possible revenue sources – licensing its directory, fee-based services, or advertising. 
Unlike other search engines, Yahoo! couldn’t license its search engine software since it 
started with a human-edited directory and outsourced its search technology to other 
search engine firms. Despite advertising being one of its options as a revenue source, 
Yahoo! was not at all sure if the ads business model would be viable given there were no 
precedents for online ads sponsored businesses. The company was unsure whether the 
Web could ever drive enough advertising revenue, and even if it did, there were hundreds 
of dot-com sites that were chasing after the same advertising dollars.201 Also, Yahoo! 
knew that users would not pay for its services when there were already plenty of free 
services available online. Tim Brady, Yahoo!’s marketing director argued that, “No one 	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pays for picking up the Yellow Pages…. I don't think it's going to happen online.”202 In 
the end, Yahoo! nonetheless went with its ads model because there was a surge of online 
ads demand from dot.com firms who wanted to build their brand quickly. Along with 
Yahoo!, the first generation of search engines like Excite and Lycos initially pursued 
advertising. 
 Search engines initially served banner ads, the main advertising format at that time. 
Banner ads were popularized by HotWired, the first commercial digital magazine on the 
Web and online version of Wired magazine, which first sold pictorial banners on Cost 
Per thousand Impressions (CPM) on a large scale in 1994.203 CPM meant that when an 
“impression” or “hit” happened, a banner ad would be displayed. Since there was no 
specific pricing model for online ads, Web publishers used the CPM model, borrowing 
from the models of traditional print publications and other media. With the CPM pricing 
model, whether or not users recognized the ads or interacted with them made no 
difference as long as the ads were displayed in front of users’ eyeballs. The CPM model 
offered no data on the actual effect of an advertisement. Thus, the major advertisers were 
hesitant to shift significant portions of their marketing budgets to a new platform that did 
not guarantee a Return On Investment (ROI). They were looking for more accountability 
and metrics from Web publishers, but there were no established standards or criteria for 
measuring Web audience. Fernando Bermejo, quoting a 1996 Advertising Age article, 
captured advertisers and marketers’ uncertainty about these new ads platforms, stating:  	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the lack of Internet standards is currently the single greatest impediment to the 
Web’s emergence as a viable long-term advertising medium. The void impacts 
everything from definitions to audience measurement to ad sizes and pricing.204  
 
In fact, advertisers pressured Web publishers to provide sophisticated audience 
measurements so they could see if ads were working and compare with traditional media 
programs.205 At the same time, mainstream advertisers and marketers were hedging their 
bets, afraid that they would be left behind, so they were experimenting with the Internet 
as a new ads platform.206 
 In 1996, Proctor & Gamble (P&G) made the first move. Demanding more 
accountability from Yahoo!, P&G struck a deal with the search engine to pay for 
advertisements on a Cost Per Click (CPC) basis rather than CPM.207 This meant that 
P&G paid only when a searcher actually clicked on an ad. Yahoo!, followed by search 
engine site LinkStar Communication, offered an option for CPC model. This opened a 
debate on how publishers should charge for ads and Web publishers were reluctant to 
adopt a CPC model.208 AOL rejected the P&G deal because leveraging its place as the 
largest ISP at that time, AOL touted that it would be able to deliver user traffic in the 
millions.209 Yet, the real reason for AOL’s refusal to use the CPC model was its basic 
business calculation because it reasoned that the CPC model could reduce its revenue 
since it was only paid when someone clicked. 	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 Along with AOL, other Web publishers denounced CPC, saying “we are not going 
to offer them a cost per click because we can’t figure out a way to make it make sense to 
us.”210 The tension between marketers and publishers persisted, and major marketers 
claiming that they would only invest limited capital for experimentation on the Web if 
there were no reliable measurement standard.211 In 1998, a survey conducted by the 
Association of National Advertisers revealed that the lack of accurate measurement and 
difficulty in tracking ROI were considered the biggest barriers for advertisers reluctant to 
buy online ads.212 From advertisers’ point of view, Web advertising did not offer any 
palpable advantage over traditional commercial media based on the CPM model. 
 However, search engine firms had their own unique problems in attracting 
advertisers besides the lack of standard measurement. Search engines by their very nature 
are meant to move Web users away from the search site as quickly as possible. This was 
counter-intuitive for advertising purposes, because from the perspective of traditional 
media experience, users needed to stay on the site as long as possible to see and click on 
ads. In other words, search engine technology lacked the so-called “stickiness” needed 
for an ad-based business model to succeed. In fact, search engines were once even 
considered a failed business idea because they were only conduits to other pages. Shortly 
after major search engines went for IPOs in 1996, Fortune Magazine ran an article saying 
that Internet advertising was not working and search companies were losing money.213 In 
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the article, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, expressed his doubts about online 
advertising and said that while Amazon advertised on all four search sites, he considered 
print ads in major publications like the Wall Street Journal to be more effective at 
delivering business to Amazon.  
 In response to this skepticism, search engines shifted to portals and offered various 
new services to attract more users and retain users in an effort to create “stickiness.” 
Yahoo!, Excite, Infoseek, and other major engines provided a variety of other services 
like ISP, news, email, chat rooms, and Web hosting so users did not need to leave the 
site. As they pursued the building of portal sites, the search engines also began to build 
partnerships with Internet content providers, and ISPs. In 1996, Excite established a 
strategic alliance and co-branding services with AOL, which then had the biggest 
audience, and WebTV Networks to broaden its audience.214 In 1997, Infoseek, Lycos, 
and Excite all joined forces with AT&T’s online service which offered Internet access 
through AT&T’s portal. The idea was that by connecting with AT&T, Internet search 
companies would try to generate additional advertising revenues and further expand into 
one-stop online services.215 They tried to reposition themselves as ultimate digital 
destination sites by offering content and other services to incentivize users to stay on the 
search site longer – and see the ads. 
 By the late 1990s, Yahoo!, MSN, Lycos, Excite and other Web portals were 
growing rapidly as primary entries to the Internet. They rushed to acquire other 
companies to expand their range of services in the hopes of increasing the time a user 
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stayed on a portal.216 Yahoo! offered online shopping, email services, free Web hosting 
services, online streaming and digital audio while it licensed its search engine technology 
from Inktomi. Many portal sites in fact licensed search technology, so search service 
became only a minor part of what search engines provided, and search itself was viewed 
as more of a traffic conduit to other Internet businesses.217  
 Yet, even the portal model did not last long. When the dotcom bubble burst in 
2000-2001, the 280 Internet stocks lost $1.755 trillion from their 52 week high.218 Within 
this 2-year period, $5 trillion in market value was wiped out which meant that people’s 
pensions, retirement and mutual funds simply disappeared. Political economist and 
historian Robert Brenner describes this as “stock-market Keynesianism” 219 which was 
the result of deliberate state regulations to encourage a speculative bubble by permitting 
retirement, pension, and mutual funds to invest in risky assets as a form of venture capital 
and extremely low interest rate which helped dotcom start ups to easily raise capital to 
commercialize the Internet. In response to the dotcom recession, the Federal Reserve cut 
interest rates on several occasions, and this set up the next bubble (housing) as capital 
was looking for its next site of capital accumulation.220 
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 During the 2000 peak in online advertising spending, dot-com firms were spending 
77% of advertising on the Web;221 but this dried up, and also brought about the collapse 
of the dominant form of ads – banner ads – which made it more difficult for search 
engine firms to generate revenues through advertising.222 By mid-2000, most advertisers 
had moved away from banner ads and advertisers and pundits further questioned the 
brand building capabilities of online advertising. And advertising agencies set aside their 
digital subsidiaries and only valued online ads for direct response campaigns demanding 
a specific action from consumers.223 This resulted in surplus ads space, which shifted the 
market to the advantage of advertisers.  
Selling Search 
 After the Dot-com bubble burst, the Wall Street Journal, reporting on a study by 
Harris Interactive Inc and Jupiter Media Metrix Inc. noted that, “the very nature of the 
Web may be incompatible with effective advertising. Users simply have too much ability 
to ignore or click off what they don't want to see.”224 Advertisers and marketers pulled 
their marketing budgets from online ads, and this forced Web publishers to find new 
sources of revenue. Major search engines realized that banner ads were not enough to 
generate revenue to make them profitable.225 Thus, they tried to reduce their dependence 
on online ads and altered their business model to fee-based services. In fact, Yahoo! was 	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adding new fee-based services in the late 1990s to see if users would be willing to pay for 
content or services.226 
 In the midst of this depressed ads market, there was some pulse as the search engine 
GoTo.com was attracting advertisers.227 GoTo.com was charging advertisers to bid for 
placement in search results. This is called “sponsored search” or “paid search,” where 
advertisers paid for preferred placement in search results. The concept of paid search is 
not new, rather it is similar to the Yellow Pages where advertisers paid to have their ads 
listed. However, in the early days, Internet communities vehemently resisted paid search, 
and many believed that search engines should display results based on the quality and 
relevance of Web content, not advertising dollars.228 And there were several attempts by 
search engines to pursue paid listings as a business model, but they were not only actively 
rejected by users but also questioned by the search engine industry itself. 
 While Google is the best-known paid search engine, capital’s attempts to sell search 
have a longer history. In 1996, the search engine OpenText first offered “preferred 
listing” services selling search results placement. The service allowed publishers to pay 
for higher search ranking results without requiring them to buy more expensive banner 
advertising.229 Because the company was first in this area, it faced the brunt of scathing 
criticism from users, though it was welcomed by advertisers and marketers. Abe 
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Kleinfield, a vice president at OpenText, said, “People thought it was immoral.”230 At the 
same time, Lilly Buchwitz, marketing manager for OpenText, addressed this issue, 
saying that the services were in response to marketers who demanded to be able to pay 
for preferred ranks on search results.231 However, the company got so many complaints 
that the feature was abandoned in a matter of a few short weeks.232 Yet, 2 years later in 
1998, GoTo.com (which became Overture and was incorporated into Yahoo! Search 
Marketing in 2002) resurrected the OpenText business model of selling search results 
with its own unique features. And the company was putting itself up against ads serving 
firms like Engage, 24/7 Media, and MatchLogic, which ran banners and other forms of 
advertisements on Web sites.  
 This time, besides user resistance, search engine firms were even skeptical about 
GoTo.com’s paid search since they saw users’ response to OpenText and how OpenText 
failed to sell search. Brett Bullington, Executive Vice President of Strategic and Business 
Development at Excite expressed it thusly, “My feeling that the consumer wants 
something more [sic.] cleaner than commercialism.”233 Likewise, Lycos search manager 
Rajive Mathur said, “I'm not sure it’s really providing value to the user, in the long term. 
I think they want some independent sorting.”234 Bob Davis, then CEO of Lycos, said, 
“With the Yellow Pages, listings are delivered alphabetically. There’s no illusion there…. 
To me, this damages the integrity of the search service.  This is like librarians putting 
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books on the end [of a bookshelf] if you pay her some extra money. We would not do it 
with Lycos.”235 Despite much continued skepticism from the public and from search 
engine firms themselves, advertisers and marketers were drawn to GoTo.com because it 
had several features that appealed to them – and that were later adapted by Google – and 
set it apart from the other search engines.236 
 First, GoTo.com offered Cost Per Click (CPC) in which advertisers were charged 
only when a visitor actively clicked on their ad and landed on their site.237 This 
performance-based pricing model enticed advertisers and marketers compared to the 
CPM model. As noted above, the CPC model had existed for a while, but it had not 
become popular among publishers. Second, keywords were sold in an automated auction 
where marketers bid for placement and the highest bidder was placed at the top of the 
search results. This guaranteed the targeted placement of advertisers’ sites, as opposed to 
Yahoo!, which offered paid submission to its directory, but gave no guarantees that a 
company’s ads would be included or have a particular placement order in its listing. 
Third, after the bid, human editors reviewed each link submitted by Webmasters to 
ensure the site and keywords were relevant, so the search engine displayed only relevant 
ads to users.238 This increased the possibility of searchers clicking on advertisers’ ads. 
This concept of relevance will be discussed later, but it became a core principle of 
Google’s system. Fourth, it deployed a self-service advertising platform with no 
minimum spending, which removed the barrier between sales people and ads inventories 	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and bypassed the paper contract.239 With this potent combination of self-service, ads 
relevancy, and CPC pricing model, GoTo.com attracted both small businesses and large 
corporations. The search engine began its service with 15 advertisers, but by the end of 
1999, the company had thousands of advertisers.240  
 However, the problem for GoTo.com was how to attract enough user traffic to 
monetize it. At the time when GoTo.com entered into the search market, there were 
plenty of other search engine options – such as Yahoo!, Lycos, AltaVista, Excite, Hotbot, 
and Microsoft MSN– so it was not easy to draw traffic since the company did not have a 
sufficiently popular brand.241 Thus, GoTo.com had to turn to sites that already had heavy 
user traffic like Yahoo!, MSN, AOL, and Netscape. The company decided to syndicate 
its service, so that affiliated sites could embed the GoTo.com search box on their site, or 
use the GoTo.com search engine directly and identify the results as partner results. 242 In 
those cases, GoTo.com would share the revenue with partnering sites; by 2001, it had 
reached revenues of $667.7 million and turned into a profitable business.243 The company 
offered non-ads sponsored search results as well as a complement to its ads-driven 
search. However, GoTo.com licensed its search technology from Inktomi for its non-
sponsored listings.244  
 Yet, despite its early success, GoTo.com faced a dilemma because it had to rely on 
larger search engines or portals to serve the traffic it needed, and this put them in a 	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vulnerable position since user traffic is the precondition for the search business.245 
GoTo.com founder Bill Gross even talked to Larry Page and Sergey Brin about a 
potential partnership; but Google rejected the idea and went their own way.246 The 
company changed its name to Overture in 2001 and was eventually acquired by Yahoo! 
in 2003. Up until GoTo.com, search engine firms couldn’t figure out a way to monetize 
user traffic; but Bill Gross built an advertising system that offered the basis for 
transforming search traffic into profit-making. 
 GoTo.com and Google entered into the search business at a similar time. Unlike 
GoTo.com, Google had plenty of traffic when it considered running ads, but it had no 
backend advertising system. In addition, Google was advantageously insulated from the 
dot-com meltdown in online advertising and had not been exposed to the collapse of 
banner ads because it hadn’t moved to the ads-based business model until after the bubble 
burst. When Google was looking for revenue sources, the ads-based business model was 
not its first choice. In fact, Sergey Brin and Larry Page were opposed to ad-supported 
search services because Brin believed, “advertising-funded search engines would be 
inherently biased toward the advertisers and away from the needs of consumers.”247 Thus, 
initially Google tried to license its PageRank search technology to other search engines 
rather than trying to compete in the already extremely competitive search market. By 
early 2000, Google was mainly generating the majority of its revenue through licensing 
fees. Since a search engine was an expensive and capital-intensive business, most portals 
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like Netscape, AOL, and even Yahoo! later outsourced search to Google. Google still had 
to compete with incumbants like AltaVista and Inktomi, both of whom concentrated on 
the development of search technologies rather than moving to a portal model.248 In 
particular, AltaVista was one of the most used search engines before Google gained 
popularity. However, AltaVista – at that time known for having high-end processors – 
was using a centralized index to answer queries from users, which made it difficult to 
deal with the large and growing amount of Web content, while Google chose to adopt a 
distributed crawling architecture in which the task of url crawling and indexing was 
distributed among multiple machines, making it markedly faster and more scalable.249 
Despite the fact that Google was drawing user traffic and building a national brand as a 
search engine, it was a challenge for Google to position itself as a service provider to 
large enterprises. Elizabeth Van Couvering pointed out that there were not enough 
enterprises to which to sell search services.250 Also, as Ken Auletta points out, unlike 
AOL, Yahoo! and the other portal sites, Google couldn’t count on subscription revenue 
and content sites on which to display banner ads,251 bringing it reluctantly back to 
advertising. 
 When Google was trying to figure out ways to run ads on its site, banner ads were 
still the dominant format. However, Google was hesitant to run banner ads. Sergey Brin 
said, “We are about money and profit … Banners are not working and click-throughs are 
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failing. I think highly focused ads are the answer.”252 Google’s alternative to banner ads 
were small and targeted text ads, though they were not even sure if targeted text ads 
would be attractive to advertisers and be successful because text ads had never been used 
for brand building. Google had a back up which was DoubleClick. Brin and Page said, “if 
we start to see that we’re running out of money, well then we’ll just turn on a deal with 
DoubleClick and we will be fine because we have a lot of traffic.”253 Given that 
DoubleClick was the leading banner ads operator at the time, Google was planning to 
outsource its ads business to DoubleClick in case its own ads business failed.254  
 It’s noteworthy that before Google’s search ads dominated the Internet, 
DoubleClick, which is now owned by Google, was the largest online ads network, and 
dominated the banner ads market. It pioneered large-scale online advertising by offering 
targeted ads using its patented Dynamic Advertising Reporting and Targeting (DART) ad 
management system to schedule, track and bill for ad placement among its network of 
content providers. By the end of 1998, DoubleClick’s network had grown to more than 
1,300 Web sites. However, its revenue was highly concentrated, with 61.2% derived from 
four Web publishers – including 44.7% of DoubleClick’s revenue from AltaVista 
alone.255 AltaVista, which did not have in-house advertising sales, outsourced its ads 
service to DoubleClick. Google was considering going the same route as AltaVista, but 
then the bubble burst in Spring 2000, and the online ad banner market crashed, so this 
induced Google to build its own ad program. 256   	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 In October 2000, Google officially launched its advertising system called AdWords 
with 350 customers on a flat CPM pricing model. AdWords was very different from 
today’s ads system, but it was self-serve and was restricted to relevant text ads. Google 
limited ads titles to 25 characters and one link, and displayed no more than eight small 
ads on the results page of any search. The ads results looked like part of the search 
results. Google had a few tactical reasons to go with small and targeted texts ads. This 
was not only to offer an alternative to banner ads, but also to try and ease some 
immediate technical and social obstacles.   
 Besides their ineffectiveness, banner ads often took too long to load and slowed 
down the system. In early 2000, the majority of users were still connected via dial up 
Internet connections with 56k modems, so banner ads required more time to display. By 
mandating its own 25 character text ads as the standard, Google was able to speed up the 
ad serving process, which allowed for users to conduct more searches and the company to 
serve more ads in a given time. With its text ads, Google was able to improve efficiency 
and speed, which became the major factors in Google’s profit-making search business. 
Further, targeted small text ads gave an illusion to users that the ads were part of the 
results, and blurred the line between search and ads results, treating them in a similar 
way. “If you treat advertisements as a great search result, they will work as a great search 
result” said Omid Kordestain, Vice president of business development and sales at 
Google.257 This deflected some users’ resistance to paid search.  
 Yet, Google’s AdWords didn’t immediately take off. The CPM based ads model 
still did not appeal to advertisers, and the system in general was still underdeveloped. 
According to Jeff Levick who worked on Google’s ads team at that time, “we were cold-	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calling people, trying to get them to buy keywords.”258 Less then 2 years after launching 
its first iteration of AdWords, the company overhauled the system and its search business 
began to take off.   
Making the Secret Sauce 
 Google’s later versions of AdWords were closer to its current system. Soon after 
launching the second iteration of its system, Google changed its pricing model from CPM 
to CPC. CPC was a more attractive model to advertisers because it imposed less risk to 
advertisers since they did not need to pay for impressions that were not clicked on.259 
Yet, the core features of Google’s later ads system were its ads algorithm, which 
determines Google’s ads rank, and its keywords auction system used to calculate ads 
price. Google designed an ads system that hit the trifecta – it maximized its profit and 
concomitantly drew in both users and advertisers, all the while persistently projecting a 
public image of “all about users.” 
 Google distinguished itself from its rival GoTo.com’s generalized first price 
auction (GFP) system where first position was given to the highest paid bidder. Rather 
than price, Google incorporated a user feedback loop into the system to place more 
“relevant” ads by adding Click Through Rate (CTR) to determine ads ranking for each 
query in real time. Google called their system AdRank (an ad’s maximum bid times its 
CTR = AdRank), which determines the order of ads in response to a user’s query. Despite 
being a controversial Web metric standard, CTR was one of the accepted measurements 	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among both advertisers and publishers, who associated CTR with user interest and intent. 
Google’s incorporation of CTR into its ads algorithm was merely the beginning of their 
systematic attempts to have user feedback generate more relevant/targeted ads. This 
principle of relevance seems an obvious factor for a traditional information retrieval 
system; however, for a money-making advertising system, it seemed paradoxical on its 
face – one would think that if Google relied on the highest bidder, it would receive more 
in return; yet Google’s seeming unselfishness toward users in relying on relevance 
proved to be the core driver of its profit-making, and the building of an ads system in 
which the House always wins. 
 Google quickly extended its ads relevance algorithm/ads ranking system to include 
more than just CTR. It introduced its so-called Quality Score (QS). In addition to CTR, 
QS today includes the relevance of each keyword to its ad group, landing page quality 
and relevance, the relevance of ad text, and historical AdWords account performance, 
among other undisclosed ingredients of relevancy factors. Google continually tweaks its 
ads algorithm QS over time as it updates its search algorithm. Google then factors this QS 
into its keywords auction program. If a keyword’s QS is too low, then it is automatically 
disqualified from participating in the auction. AdWords recalculates QS with only 
qualified keywords and multiplies the second QS and keyword’s CPC bid to calculate an 
ad’s rank. In its auction system, unlike GoTo.com’s “generalized first price auction,” 
Google has employed a generalized second price (GSP) auction to reduce the volatile 
pricing and inefficiency in investment to try to game the system that tend to happen in 
generalized first price auctions.260 Second price auctions work such that the price that the 	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advertiser pays is not the advertiser’s maximum bid price – this helps to assuage 
advertisers’ feelings of overbidding or overpaying for ads services. Unlike the 
generalized first price auction (GFP) in which the winning bid is the highest bid, the GSP 
is the minimum amount above the second place bid that an advertiser will pay in order to 
win the auction. GSP is a more attractive model to advertisers and prevents volatility of 
auction price.261 Higher quality scores lower the overall cost of ads – meaning Google 
gets less money per ad – but this spurs advertisers to create and maintain “quality” ads 
that meet Google’s requirements – and cause more ad clicks for advertisers and therefore 
more ad revenue for Google over time. Eric Schmidt affirmed this, saying, “Improving ad 
quality improves Google's revenue … If we target the right ad to the right person at the 
right time and they click it, we win.”262   
 Google emphasizes the idea that its ads algorithm is scientific, objective and purely 
data driven, and vows that this complex proprietary ads system is for users and user 
experience. However, Google isn’t purely concerned with users’ or advertisers’ 
experience per se, rather Google has a calculated capital logic to maximize its profit.263 
Google organized its ads system to generate more profit by putting its version of 
“relevant” ads higher on the list, where they have more chance to be seen and clicked on 
by more users.264 In this way, Google prevents itself from having advertisers on the top 
that may be generating little traffic and revenue. Google’s emphasis on relevance led it to 
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pass the other search engines by.265 The most relevant ad has the most profitable auction 
price point. In Google’s ads system, the best matched advertising is not merely limited to 
the most relevant from the traditional sense of an information retrieval system, but it also 
implies best revenue generation of pricing point from an economic perspective.266 Omid 
Kordestani, Google’s 12th employee, described Google’s ad system in an interview:  
We applied auction theory to maximize value – it was the best way to reach the 
right pricing, both for advertisers and for Google. And then we innovated by 
introducing the rate at which users actually click on the ads as a factor in placement 
on the page, and that was very, very useful in relevance.267 
 
 Google also launched its AdSense program to place ads beyond its search site and 
other Web properties and embed ads on individual Web sites willing to be part of 
Google’s content network in exchange for sharing advertising revenues. Google did not 
build AdSense technology but acquired it from Applied Semantics and absorbed their 
AdSense content-targeted ads technology including the AdSense name. Self-serve 
AdSense enticed online publishers by giving access to Google’s massive network of 
advertisers from AdWords to any Web publishers who signed up with its program. With 
a few lines of JavaScript code inserted into the Web page itself, AdSense would search 
for and embed relevant ads from its ads network using Google’s search algorithm. The 
AdSense program is a way to inject capital into the entire Web on a large scale since the 
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company doesn’t need to rely on its own staff to insert ads into each Website or create 
Web content in which to place ads.268  
 As Google was rapidly taking off, Yahoo! began to strengthen its own search 
services by acquiring Inktomi, as well as AltaVista and AlltheWeb through its acquisition 
of Overture (nee GoTo.com) in 2003.269 Soon after, Yahoo! stopped licensing Google’s 
search technology and began to use its own in-house search engine. In 2006, Microsoft 
also joined the sponsored search auction business.270 By 2007, Yahoo! had added its own 
quality-based bidding to its sponsored auction ad system to combat Google. Despite all 
this, Yahoo! was never able to raise its own proprietary technology on par with Google’s 
ad system. 
 Jason Spero, the head of global mobile sales and strategy at Google, calls AdWords 
the “nuclear power plant at the core” of the company.271 New York Times columnist 
Randall Stross wrote, “the best minds at Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google’s smaller rivals 
have spent years trying to replicate Google’s ad placing formula and all have failed to do 
so.”272 Often, Google’s success is attributed to its superior search engine algorithm 
PageRank over other search engines; but in fact, a large part of its profit-making relies on 
the 24/7 marketplace of its ads system that is designed to monetize user search activities. 
What then is the role of its search engine?  
  This 24/7 marketplace cannot run without a search engine. Underneath Google’s 
ads system, Google has its “free” search engine that attracts users and generates massive 	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amounts of user traffic, the precondition of search business. The search engine exposes 
users to ads as they conduct everyday searches, and then feeds user search data back into 
Google’s ad system to display ads based on users’ past or potential interests. The 
extracted, computed, and contextualized user data from users’ everyday search activities 
are fueling Google’s ads system to target “the right ad to the right person at the right 
time.”273 Google hoards its immense data reservoirs that are constantly being filled and 
refilled by searchers’ everyday information activities across Google’s search and other 
Web properties. One of Google’s former employees described Google.com as “a living 
laboratory processing data that reveals what is effective and what is not.”274 Using data 
from users’ search activities, Google is working on perfecting its advertising system. Eric 
Schmidt, in a 2007 interview with Wired Magazine, was asked, “how should we think 
about Google today?” Schmidt responded: 
Think of it first as an advertising system. Then as an end-user system – Google 
Apps. A third way to think of Google is as a giant supercomputer. And a fourth 
way is to think of it as a social phenomenon involving the company, the people, the 
brand, the mission, the values -- all that kind of stuff.275 
 
Tellingly, in his response, Schmidt did not mention search, what many people think of as 
Google’s essential function. Did he forget about Google’s search technology or 
misrepresent Google? Hardly. It’s a rare moment, but the description of Google in this 
interview is in fact an accurate one – Google’s business is built primarily on advertising 
systems with side ventures attempting to radically diversify their data streams and 
revenue sources. 
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 There is additionally a lesser-known piece of Google’s advertising system that 
feeds data back to the mother ship and supports the company’s profit-making project. It is 
Google analytics, which generates detailed statistics on Web traffic, traffic sources, what 
pages visitors are viewing and how long for marketers. While Google AdWords collects 
data on users’ search activities on Google’s site, Google analytics follows users as they 
travel through the entire Web.   
 In 2005, Google acquired San Diego Web analytics’ firm Urchin Software Corp, 
rebranded its service as Google Analytics and began to offer free Web analytic services 
to Google AdWords customers. Google was the first company to offer Web analytic 
services for free. At that time, other firms were charging fees, and Yahoo! and Microsoft 
did not have a sufficient analytic tool for their advertisers who were clamoring for more 
data.    
 By giving away its “free” analytics tool, Google was first able to appeal to 
advertisers who were hesitant to adopt online advertising. Even if Google was giving its 
analytics for “free,” if it were able to attract more advertisers by providing a feedback 
loop to measure their advertising, the company calculated that it could be more 
profitable.276 Second, Web analytics were still evolving, and over 80% of advertisers on 
the Web were not using analytics at that time.277 If Google analytics could be adopted 
widely, then it could be the de facto Web analytics standard. By offering quantifiably 
measurable ROI, Google provides a tool to justify search spending. Third is data. Google 
analytics users have to insert Google-provided JavaScript into every Web page they 
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serve, and all their site statistics end up on Google’s servers.278 This is a way for Google 
to acquire massive amounts of 2-way Web traffic data in exchange for its “free” analytics 
tool. All of these data are fed into its advertising system. 
 The role of user data in Google’s profit-making will be discussed further in the next 
chapter; however, given the importance of user data in its search business, it should not 
come as a surprise then that Google has a voracious appetite for data as the company 
devours what it gleans from users’ searches, keystrokes and movements, to their homes 
and email, and its wide-ranging political efforts to control user data across the globe.  
 For Google and other Internet firms, mining, managing and controlling user data 
are not options, but business imperatives. Bruce Schneier, a security expert, observed, 
“Surveillance is the business model of the internet.”279 Grounded in this surveillance 
based business model, search engines have been scaled up to large enterprises by 
automating and mechanizing ads selling, buying and serving processes. 
Large Scale Enterprise 
 Steven Levy (2009) describes Google’s AdWords as “the world's biggest, fastest 
auction, a never ending, automated, self-service version of Tokyo's boisterous Tsukiji 
fish market.”280 The tuna auction in Tsukiji fish market is run by skilled auctioneers, from 
5am to 7am, but Google has built an automated system that runs 24/7 with an auction-
based online marketplace on a massive scale.  
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 Traditional advertising production was labor- and time-intensive as it required staff 
to customize ads design, campaigns, schedules, and placement that might require 
meetings, phone calls, and production schedules. Even in the early Web era, the process 
of buying, selling and serving ads depended on manual recording, ad scheduling, and 
tracking on number of visits or impressions, assisted by staff, and ads were also bought 
and sold through individual contracts which were negotiated on a case-by-case basis; 
advertising sales were oriented toward the larger advertisers.281  
 This rapidly changed in the mid-1990s Dot-com era when a range of new 
advertising technologies were developed including online ads networks, data profiling 
technologies, Web metrics, ad serving and management technologies. Ads buying, selling 
and serving processes were further automated and mechanized. By the mid to late 1990s, 
a host of ads serving technology firms like Focal Link, MatchLogic, Flycast, 
DoubleClick, NetGravity, AdForce, SoftBank, and CMGI had emerged and developed 
technical capabilities for ads sales, targeting, serving and tracking under one integrated 
system. For instance, in 1996, Yahoo! used NetGravity's AdServer to schedule, place, 
target, track, measure and  manage banner ads and further automate and speed up ads 
management. In particular, DoubleClick – acquired by Google in 2007 – first deployed 
its ads network model in its online and centralized ads serving system, which built a 
foundation for large-scale online advertising.282 Mentioned earlier, DoubleClick as the 
largest ad broker was considered the Google of its time, and major advertisers and 
publishers used them. In 1997, DoubleClick’s network of server computers delivered 
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over 500 million ads impressions a month, and by 1999, it was delivering 500 million a 
day.283 The company’s services delivered ads from 3,600 different advertisers.284  
 However, DoubleClick was still limited to large advertisers and publishers 
representing sites with at least 1 million page views monthly285 and required a formal 
sales contract with those sites.286 The company was known for having one of the largest 
and most aggressive sale forces on the Internet, and roughly 500 of its 1,400 employees 
were working in its sales unit.287 However, the coming years would see the search engine 
industry figure out ways to exponentially scale up their ads businesses.  
 GoTo.com and Google launched self-service platforms instead of having a sales 
representative to pitch ads directly to individual advertisers or publishers. While they 
were selling premium ads in person, they automated the majority of the management of 
ad buying, selling and serving process. By instituting an automated self-serve model with 
no minimum spending, Google and other search engine firms were able to quickly 
expand their ads business on a mass scale without hiring thousands of sales people. Using 
the Internet as a business platform, the self-serve model shifted labor costs to advertisers, 
marketers and publishers by giving them the tools to work on buying, targeting and 
tracking ads. At the same time, the search engine firms further automated their ad-serving 
systems from ads allocation to payment scale by using algorithms. The result is that, in 
2012, Google alone had more than one billion advertisers, and generated 29.8 billion ad 
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impressions every single day between ads on its own site and ads on its network.288 Eric 
Schmidt describes Google as an operating system for advertising, and now Google 
continues to hone its ads OS to speed up and serve as many ads as possible.289 
 This is a major reason why Google has been spending massive amounts of capital 
on building the infrastructure described earlier, to accelerate its ads serving by speeding 
up search – more and faster search means more ads. From the beginning, Google tried to 
squeeze out better performance from its hardware, wrote a myriad of customized 
software to speed its data processing and built its massive industrial sized infrastructure. 
Urs Hölzle, Google’s search guru and SVP of Infrastructure, points out that speed has 
been Google’s mantra from its early days and “speed is the essence when it comes to 
search results.”290 He asserted, “when you speed up service, people become more 
engaged – and when people become more engaged, they click and buy more … Speed 
isn't just a feature, it's the feature.”291  
 Today search engines are fighting for every millisecond.292 Google calls this its 
“Gospel of Speed” – a rule that it requires all Google engineers and product managers to 
follow: “Don’t launch features that slow us down.”293 In 2010, Google introduced a new 
search-before-you-type feature called Google Instant to shave 2 to 5 seconds from the 
average 25 second search speed. Google’s own data showed that four tenths of a second 	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would translate to 8 million less searches per day, and millions fewer ads.294 Marissa 
Mayer, then vice president of search products and user experience said, “It’s search at the 
speed of thought.”295 “Two hundred fifty milliseconds, either slower or faster, is close to 
the magic number now for competitive advantage on the Web,” said Harry Shum, a 
computer scientist and speed specialist at Microsoft.296 
 So far, Google has succeeded in designing a ubiquitous, lightning-fast, and 
powerful system that has allowed the company to monetize users’ information activity on 
a massive scale and generate obscene amounts of wealth. Yet, the online advertising 
environment is changing at a rapid rate due to the increasing use of a range of Internet 
connected devices such as smartphones, tablets, smart TVs and others. Google is under 
pressure to respond to this changing environment, and understands that it is not enough to 
maintain control over the ads business by merely relying on its current ads system. Thus, 
Google is now busy reassembling its back-end ads technologies with new acquisitions as 
well as in house developments to assure its profit-making in other forms as ads proliferate 
across other hardware devices.   
Reassembling the Machine  
 In 2005, Google vowed that “there will be no banner ads on the Google homepage 
or Web search results pages.” However, by 2013, the company had begun to experiment 
with banner ads for 30 brands, which appeared at the top of brand search results in the US 
only. Google stopped its experimentation after 6 months, but Google’s bold move hints at 
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the company’s ambition to conquer display ads, which are generally used for brand 
building. Marketers expect that display ads will outpace search ads by 2016 with $74.4 
billion driven increasingly by mobile and video ads.297 Yet, it is worth noting that despite 
online display ads being the fastest growing advertising media, display ads market’s 
profit margin is still low because there is an oversupply of display ads and they are 
known for low click through rates. In the U.S. alone, 1.1 trillion display ads are shown 
online each quarter, but the advertising industry has not yet fully solved the so-called 
“banner blindness” which means that consumers simply ignore banner ads after a short 
period of time. Despite their limitations, display ads have become more important for the 
advertising industry, as users shift to mobile where they spend more than 80% of their 
time inside mobile apps,298 and the increase of the online video market, which aims to 
garner some of the lucrative spending on television ads. Google is retooling its backend 
advertising technology to aim at not-fully-tapped markets, and to reduce its reliance on 
search ads.  
 Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick in 2007 was largely to purchase its tool for 
selling and serving display ads. Google has been rebuilding this display ads platform and 
gradually integrating it into its larger ads infrastructure. Google linked AdWords to 
DoubleClick and relaunched it as DoubleClick Ad Exchange (AdX) to directly compete 
with other big ad exchanges run by Yahoo!’s right media  and Microsoft.299 The Ad 
Exchange platform facilitates the bid buying and selling of display, video and mobile ads 	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from multiple ad networks, individual Websites, and large publishers.300 The emergence 
of the Ad Exchange business is the result of the advertising industry’s efforts to 
rationalize and further mechanize the online ads market. There are massive marketplaces 
consisting of many ad networks, individual Websites, and large publishers and serving 
targeted ads is made more complex when a variety of different devices are added to the 
mix. The advertising industry is trying to figure out ways to buy and sell ads process in 
order to increase ads prices and ads accuracy for display ads. Ad Exchanges have arisen 
to make it easier and more efficient to find the audiences and impressions by 
programmatically matching ads buyers and sellers at the right time and at the right 
price.301  
 Google’s AdX includes AdSense publishers and AdWords advertisers and 
generates a massive demand on both the buying and selling sides.302 Initially, Google’s 
AdX was only available to premium publishers, but now it has been expanded to include 
small and medium publishers as well. Through its DoubleClick Ad Exchange, Google has 
also built Real Time Bidding (RTB) – search-like real time bidding systems for cross-
platform display advertising.   
 There are four components in the RTB environment – advertisers/advertisement 
agencies, a Demand Side Platform (DSP), Ad Exchange, and a Publishers/Supply 
Platform. Ads Exchanges like DoubleClick consist of two sides; on the one hand is the 
Demand Side Platform (DSP) and on the other is the Supply Side Platform (SSP). The 	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DSP works as the agency of advertisers by bidding and tracking on selected ad networks; 
while the SSP works as the agency for publishers by selling impressions and selecting 
optimal bids.303 Over the years, Google has built its own DSP and SSP platforms in 
concert with a number of acquisitions. The company acquired DSP Invite Media, recoded 
it, re-launched DoubleClick Bid Manager as a demand side platform,304 bought the 
supply side platform AdMeld in 2011 and integrated it into its DoubleClick Ad 
Exchange.305 DoubleClick Ad Exchange interface connects the supply and demand sides 
and facilitates the purchase of inventory via RTB.  
 In RTB, each impression is bid for in real time, as opposed to a static auction where 
the impressions are typically sold in bundles of 1000. RTB allows buyers to bid on an 
impression-by-impression basis using data about user behavior, intent, semantics, 
geography, device, location and demographics. This extremely complex method is hyper-
data-driven and promises to deliver the right ad to the right consumer at the right time on 
the right device. The model that Google is pursuing is similar to AdWords that is 
targeting individuals, but it generates display advertising on large advertising networks. 
 The RTB market promises accuracy and speed as its selling points. Google 
describes that in its RTB, the bidder has to respond to an exchange request within 100 
milliseconds and this speed of response has an impact “everywhere along the bidder’s 
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technology stack, from the physical infrastructure to the implementation of bid logic.”306 
Given technologies that support AdExchanges are complex and capital intensive, it’s not 
surprising that Google and Microsoft, with their deep pockets and extensive 
infrastructures, are leading the way in building out Ad Exchanges to include RTB ads 
systems.307  
 Yet, Facebook and Twitter are right behind them, joining the RTB market for 
mobile display ads and beefing up their backend ads technology infrastructures. Yahoo! 
also acquired Flurry, the mobile ad exchange, to bolster its mobile market. Flurry has its 
own RTB platform called the Flurry marketplace that facilitates the process of selling ads 
across different web properties.308 Even Amazon threw its hat into the RTB market by 
building its own proprietary platform that can plug into ad exchanges or supply 
platforms.  
 RTB marketing is growing. International Data Corporation (IDC) predicts RTB 
spending worldwide will reach $20.8 billion by 2017, accounting for 28% of all online 
display advertising sales,309 while it is still a relatively small segment of ads market and 
faces uncertainties – given that the technologies have not been proven yet. However 
Google is preemptively trying to occupy the market and is attempting to get a firm grip 
on its backend ads technologies as they evolve as it did similarly with search ads.  
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Today, the most crucial function of search on the Internet served by the 
marketplace seems naturalized and accepted with no alternatives. However, given its 
history, this was not an imperative, rather there has been a long march for capital to 
monetize search coupled with US government’s efforts to spur the commercialization of 
the Internet. Alternatively, publicly funded search technology could have been bolstered 
within the public information provision space like libraries and organized as a public 
utility. Instead, search has turned into the foundation of a giant advertising system, has 
been fully integrated into the very core of capital accumulation processes by monetizing 
people’s everyday activities, and has become a large-scale information enterprise.   
The question to then explore in the next chapter is: who is laboring behind this 
newly emerged large-scale information industry? A highly automated search engine 
industry seems to require little human labor; however, it has distinctive labor processes, 
which offer us a glimpse of the emerging labor structure and labor control in the Internet 
sector. The following two chapters are devoted to the labor behind the search engine to 






 Laboring behind the Search Engine 
 According to one IT industry expert, the search engine is 21st century 
infrastructure – and “building and maintaining a search engine is so expensive and labor 
intensive that it requires the same kind of planning and upkeep that, say, the Golden Gate 
Bridge does.”310 This statement defies the popular notion of the search engine industry as 
the emblem of the “new” information economy, which, unlike the industrial capitalist 
economy, needs very little in the way of human labor. Yet, technology as a social process 
embodies human labor, and the search engine is no exception – every link on the Web 
and each keystroke on a computer, tablet, or smartphone contain human labor. Search 
engine technology is so seamlessly embedded in our daily lives, however, that it masks a 
whole series of complex labor processes that enable and animate it; these processes, 
moreover, provide an unmatched window onto our contemporary social organization.  
 This chapter uncovers the labor structure of the search engine industry to clarify 
both the changing social relations between capital and labor, and the search industry’s 
own profitable expansion. What are the distinctive modes and forms of labor organization 
that assist in the search engine industry’s profitable accumulation? Who is actually 
laboring to deliver information instantaneously in response to our seemingly highly 
automated search queries and where are these workers located? By answering these 
questions, this chapter illustrates representative patterns of labor in a leading Internet 
industry. But before discussing specifics, the chapter begins by setting labor within a 
larger context of changes gripping the information and communications workforce.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 5 years after the great recession, which wiped out 8.4 million jobs between 2008 
and 2009, President Obama celebrated US economic progress and declared, “We have 
got back off our feet [sic], we have dusted ourselves off… Construction is 
up. Manufacturing is back. Our energy, our technology, our auto industries, they’re all 
booming.”311 He reminded the public that the unemployment rate was at its lowest point 
since September of 2008, and the economy was improving. In fact, in 2014, the 
Department of Labor reported the unemployment rate at 6.2%, down from its recession 
peak of almost 10% official unemployment rate.312 Indeed, it seems that the US economy 
has improved; however, President Obama’s “booming” economy does not translate to the 
majority of everyday Americans.  
 The official unemployment rate is 6.2%; however, this does not give the full 
picture of the current labor condition. The official unemployment rate does not account 
for missing workers who are neither employed nor actively looking for jobs because they 
are discouraged by job prospects and have given up searching for a job. In October of 
2014, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated that if these missing workers were 
included in the government’s calculations, real unemployment would be at 9.6%.313 
Moreover, there is a massive number of workers who are chronically underemployed – a 
situation when workers want to work full-time, but are forced to work part-time 
(involuntary part-time) due to economic conditions or work at jobs for which they are 	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overqualified. For college students over the last decade, the average underemployment 
rate has been 44%, and for black college students, the average has been 50%. What’s 
worse, during the “recovery” from the 2008 recession, the majority of employment gains 
have been concentrated in lower waged occupations, and with millions of Americans still 
looking for work and underemployed, capital has no urge to raise wages for those who 
are working.314 
 In this “booming” economy, these vast pools of labor power are evidently not 
needed by the search industry or, indeed, by the information sector at large. But they do 
play an important ideological function for the Internet industry to serve their interests. In 
response to the high unemployment rate, Google Chairman Eric Schmidt stated at the 
2012 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, “…there are plenty of companies in 
the US and other countries I've visited that are very short of highly skilled workers.” 
Schmidt answered that the problem of unemployment is the result of inadequate skills 
among the workforce, which therefore may be solved with better education. Echoing the 
industry’s complaints that it suffers from a shortage of “highly skilled” workers, 
President Obama launched an engineering initiative to train 10,000 engineers per year in 
“collaboration” with the private sector and proposed to reform the education system to 
put more emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM).  
 While the Internet industry is crying over the shortage of skilled labor and asking 
for government assistance, IBM, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, and Microsoft are 
laying off large numbers of workers as they face emerging Internet services and a rapidly 	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changing IT market. In July 2012, Cisco slashed 1,300 workers – 2 percent of its global 
workforce315 – and recently announced that it would cut an additional 6000 workers as 
part of the company’s restructuring plan. In September 2012, HP announced that the 
company would lay off 29,000 workers by 2014 as it eliminated roughly 8 percent of its 
workforce – to become a “leaner and more profitable” company.316 Over the last decade, 
HP has eliminated 120,000 jobs, almost equivalent to the populations of Mountain View 
and Palo Alto combined.317 Google itself, which had not used layoffs beyond eliminating 
200 sales personnel and 100 contractors in 2009,318 went on to cut 20 percent of the 
workforce of its newly acquired Motorola Mobility,319 and sold off the company within a 
year. In 2013, BlackBerry reduced its workforce by 40% – 45,000 workers.320 In July 
2014, Microsoft announced that the company was planning to cut 14% of its workforce – 
as many as 18,000 employees, 12,000 of whom were from Nokia, its mobile business 
acquired in 2014. This is considered the “biggest round of layoffs” in Microsoft’s 
history.321 In response, Chinese workers at Microsoft’s Nokia factory at Yizhuang 
Industrial Park took to the streets to protest against Microsoft’s mass layoff. In his public 
memo to Microsoft employees, CEO Satya Nadella said that this drastic change was 	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necessary to become “more agile and move faster.”322 Microsoft’s reorganization of its 
labor force was done in order to shift its business toward cloud and mobile. Industry 
experts predicted that in 2014, layoffs in IT sectors would reach their highest levels since 
2009 at the peak of the recession.323 A Forbes article wrote at the time that, “layoff is a 
permanent feature in the tech sector.”324  
 These massive layoffs seem contradictory given it is the most dynamic business 
sector, but it is indicative of an IT sector which is demonstrably undergoing a wide-
ranging reorganization with the rise of new Internet businesses, but also highly uneven 
workforce restructuring, and exhibiting disparate and even contradictory trends that are 
deeply marked across the length and breadth of the information workforce. The labor 
incarnated in the search engine industry needs to be situated and understood within this 
vortex.  I now turn to examine some trends characteristic of the high-pay, high-status 
segment of the occupational structure – in the information industry in general and the 
search industry in particular. 
Top of the Pyramid  
 As the Internet sector expands, it generates new kinds of occupations, labor 
demands and workplace structures. And one of the characteristics of the labor structure 
within emerging Internet industries like search and social media is a concentration at the 
top of disproportionately well-paid and highly skilled workers. The workers categorized 
as “highly skilled” labor referenced by the flourishing search engine industry are 
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computer scientists, software engineers (applications), Web developers and computer 
systems engineers/architects, as the industry expands its territory to include mobile, 
wireless technologies, cloud, app development, VoIP, and medical data. According to a 
2011 report released by the Northern Valley Job Training Consortium (NOVA), the most 
highly sought-after jobs in Silicon Valley where Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, Apple, eBay 
all reside, are computer engineers and project managers who often have engineering 
degrees. More specifically, the most-demanded “high skilled” IT occupations considered 
by Silicon Valley IT industry are software engineers, field applications engineers, quality 
assurance engineers and user interface designers.325  
 These “highly skilled” IT workers are often said to be akin to those of well-paid 
young “Googlers” who have four-year- or advanced degrees in computer engineering and 
business and the nature of their work has to do with computer systems design, scientific 
research and development and/or management and business. Many of them come from 
elite universities. Google recruits many of its employees from Stanford University, 
University of California Berkeley, MIT, Carnegie Mellon, and UCLA,326 the historic 
hubs of the Academic-Military-Industrial Complex (AMIC). This is not a surprise given 
that the origins of the search engine industry are tightly rooted in AMIC, where engineers 	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have historically had access to both technical training and capital. Engineers with venture 
capitalists, guided by capital expansion, have been undertaking the transformation of 
search technologies into one of the most powerful sectors of the information industry.  
 Google describes its company as an engineering company and states that its, 
“engineers make an impact on billions of users.”327 Ken Auletta states that Google is run 
by engineers: “Google’s leaders are not cold businessmen; they are cold engineers.”328 
These engineers, under the guidance of corporate goals, design and build search 
technologies to be productive and profitable. While search companies typically do not 
reveal the number of engineers that they have, LinkedIn lists 18,882 engineers at Google 
as of June 2014. To give some perspective, the number of full, associate and assistant 
faculty members of the 50 top US Computer Science Programs is 2,200 – Google has 
almost 10 times more engineers than all of these academic programs put together.329 
LinkedIn estimates that at Google, 55% of its employees have a Bachelor’s degree, 36% 
possess a master’s degree and 7% a PhD degree.330 In fact, this engineer-driven search 
industry has been absorbing “highly skilled” IT workers for quite a while. During the 
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression – when other established IT 
companies like IBM, Cisco and HP were shedding workers in a rapidly restructuring IT 
market – Google added more than 4,500 workers in 2010 and announced that the 	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company would aggressively recruit more than 6,200 workers in 2011, primarily in 
engineering and sales.331 In 2011, Google’s workforce grew by 33 percent, or more than 
8,000 employees, and as of January of 2014, Google had 4000 open positions.332 
Struggling Yahoo! even added workers in 2011, but  soon after the company had begun 
to make cuts as it had lost market share.333 
 This demand for “highly skilled” IT labor by new Internet companies has been 
pushing up wages for this class of young IT workers, with an average age of less than 35 
years old – the average age of workers at Google is 29; Facebook 28 and Apple 33.334 
Google pays newly graduated computer science majors $90,000 to $105,000.335 Google 
software engineers earn an average base salary of $128,336 and their counterparts at 
Microsoft and Yahoo! earn over $100,0000. By comparison, the average starting salary 
of a U.S. teacher is $39,000; the average ending salary – after 25 years in the profession – 
is $67,000.336 And half of all Americans earned less than $27,529 according to the 2014 
Social Security report.337  
 It is telling that new Internet companies indeed create well-paid jobs, but the story 
not told to the public is that they tend to nourish and enrich only a small cadre of very 
high-skilled workers by generating a relatively narrow array of jobs that require 	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considerable education and skills. Given the entirety of STEM occupations in which 
many of the highly skilled workers in the Internet sector are categorized, this is less than 
5 percent of all jobs in the US economy, and the computer-related workforce within 
STEM occupations is less than 2.5 percent.338 This reflects a structural shift occurring in 
the IT sectors, which can be seen in changing workforce patterns in Silicon Valley where 
many of these new Internet companies reside.  
 Over the years, the majority of the existing high-tech firms in the field of 
computer systems design, telecommunication, semiconductor equipment manufacturing, 
and data processing shed jobs as they automated, standardized or outsourced their work 
to lower-cost regions in the US and abroad. Now even higher-skilled tech jobs like 
engineers and computer programmers are being sent to places like India and China, 
where there is an increasingly abundant supply of lower-cost IT workers. A decade ago, 
one-quarter of the jobs in Santa Clara County – the heart of Silicon Valley – were at high 
tech manufacturing firms. But nearly one-third of those jobs have relocated, as the 
valley’s focus has shifted toward software and the Internet.339 Silicon Valley has been the 
symbol of new economic growth, but over the past decade between 2002-2012, it has not 
added any net new jobs; instead, the employment rate has fallen 2% according to a 2012 
report by the community labor organization Working Partnerships in USA.340 In 
particular, middle-wage jobs fell to 46 percent of the work force, from 52 percent. All 
start-up success stories and the wealth in the Valley – the region that the world wants to 	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emulate – have not translated into the creation of jobs or been generalized to the rest of 
the population. During the recession, the unemployment rate rose as high as 11%. Silicon 
Valley is today boasting about its 5.4% unemployment rate; however, what’s left unstated 
is that the Valley’s recent job growth is mainly from jobs that pay less than $50,000 
annually – an annual income far below what is necessary to afford the median price of a 
home in the area.341  
 Over the past decade, the industry mix in the Valley has shifted away from 
middle-wage manufacturing towards the very high-wage information- and services 
sectors. The new information economy is polarizing the workforce and deepening wage 
inequality in Silicon Valley as well as the US as a whole. From 2000 to 2010, the number 
of households in Santa Clara County, the hub of Silicon Valley, who earned less than 
$10,000 a year more than doubled – increasing by 128%.342 Almost a third of the 
Valley’s workers earn less than $16 an hour, not a sustainable wage given the area’s high 
cost of living, and another third of wage earners make less than $36/hour.343 The poverty 
rate in Silicon Valley has surged, and tent cities have sprung up around the Valley, which 
has the largest homeless encampment in the US, called “the jungle.”344 The bottom is 
expanding, defying the common notion that the Valley’s productivity, driven by the new 
information economy, will distribute wealth and reduce poverty. It is true that the “new” 
economy redistributes wealth, but as David Harvey points out, wealth is redistributed to 
the top.   	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 Unlike the popular rhetoric, new Internet companies generate a relatively small 
number of “highly skilled” workers whose capabilities can be adapted to meet current 
market changes. Compared to traditional IT companies, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook or 
Twitter do not require many workers to design their algorithms or service-based 
products.345 For instance, Google is larger than software and hardware company Oracle in 
terms of revenue, but Google’s highest number of workers was 54,604 in 2013 after 
doubling its workforce with its 2012 Motorola Mobility acquisition, while Oracle had 
122,458 workers in 2013. Social news site Reddit has only 11 employees servicing a site 
that can handle hundreds of thousands of unique visitors per hour; the photo sharing 
social network company Instagram, before being acquired by Facebook, had only a team 
of 16 to support 30 million users and a $1 billion valuation.346 The Search engine industry 
and other internet-based businesses have often been perceived as creating a large number 
of highly skilled jobs, but compared to traditional IT industry, it tends to generate a 
relatively narrow array of jobs that require considerable education and skills. Contrary to 
popular notions, the search engine industry in fact operates with only a small cadre of 
very high-skilled workers at the top. 
 However, this small number of highly skilled workers is not even insulated from 
capital’s effort to cut labor costs and increase profits. The industry is rallying together to 
further open the skilled labor market. Companies in Silicon Valley, contrary to recent 
anti-immigration rhetoric against working class immigrants in the US, have long been the 
most outspoken protestors against US caps on visas for “highly skilled” foreign workers. 
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While they have been silent on the US government’s deportation of 2 million working 
class immigrants, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook and other major IT companies 
have been at the forefront of lobbying the US Congress to reform immigration laws to 
increase the number of H-1B visa holders to bring more “highly skilled” workers from 
other countries, if not completely remove the barriers to bring in an indefinite number of 
foreign IT workers. Laszlo Bock, Senior Vice President of People Operations at Google 
writes, “… at a time when the U.S. economy needs it most, our immigration policies are 
stifling innovation … Our experiences here at Google and in the tech sector show us that 
immigrants to the US are a powerful force for entrepreneurship and innovation at every 
level, from start-ups to multinational corporations.”347   
 Since the 1990s, the US Department of Labor has issued between 65,000 and 
200,000 H-1B visas per year to allow foreign-born workers with specialized skills to 
work in the United States on a temporary basis.348 More than half of these H-1B visas 
have been issued to technology related positions. The top H-1B visas holders were not 
Google or Facebook, but they were multinational information technology consulting and 
outsourcing firms – Cognizant Technology, Wipro Limited, and Cisco Systems topping 
the list. In 2013, IBM received 1624 H-1B visas, Microsoft had 1048, and Google had 
753.349 Google, Facebook, and other Silicon Valley firms desperately want more access 
to the global pool of skilled – cheaper – labor.  
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 As mentioned earlier, Eric Schmidt, at Davos in 2012, attributed the problem of 
unemployment during the 2008 recession to a shortage of “highly skilled” labor; and 
before that Microsoft founder Bill Gates testified before the US House Committee on 
Science and Technology, stating that US companies were facing a severe shortage of 
scientists and engineers with the skills needed to cultivate future innovative information 
technologies. Gates asked that Congress reform immigration policies to allow indefinite 
numbers of “highly skilled” foreign workers to work for US companies. In 2007, Google 
VP of People Operations Laszlo Bock testified before the US House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, urging Congress, “to significantly increase the annual cap 
of 65,000 H-1B visas, to a figure more reflective of the growth rate of our technology-
driven economy.”350 In 2012, Brad Smith, Microsoft's general counsel and executive vice 
president, said that tech companies faced a workforce crisis because of the severe 
shortage of qualified applicants.351 He pointed out that Microsoft had 3,400 open 
positions for researchers, developers and engineers – an increase of 34 percent from 2011 
– and that the skills gap was one of the major impediments for the company.352  
 Claiming “shortages” of skilled labor, in 2013, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, 
supported by Microsoft’s Bill Gates and Google’s Eric Schmidt, formed a political 
lobbying group FWS.us to focus specifically on immigration reform and rallying around 
immigration reform bills to serve its business interests. The IT sector also banded 
together to back several immigration bills such as Science, Technology, Engineering and 	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Mathematics (STEM) Jobs Act, Startup Act 2.0, STEM visa legislation and Brains Act.353 
Put succinctly, the industry is demanding that the US government intervene to enlarge its 
“highly skilled” labor force, because the barrier to transnational mobility of IT workers 
can only be resolved by nation state regulation.  
 The IT industry’s urgent demand to the state for more “highly skilled” foreign 
workers to cope with the “shortage” of labor has not persuaded the majority of IT 
workers and many experts on the IT labor force. The definition of “highly skilled” in 
industry is not static; rather it varies depending on changing economic base and 
technologies.354 Thus, the skill shortages refer to the gap between the estimated demand 
for workers with a particular skill and the number of available workers at the very 
moment without considering unemployed IT workers who could learn the requisite 
skills.355  
 Technology union Washington Alliance of Technology Workers has voiced the 
perspective that tech CEOs’ persistent claims of a shortage of highly skilled tech 
engineers is far from true and that there are thousands of domestic tech workers that are 
either underemployed or out of work. In fact, there has been no evidence of a shortage of 
“highly skilled” labor; the US actually produces three times more STEM degrees than the 
economy can use356 and less than 30% of STEM degree holders are working in their 
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chosen fields.357 The 2014 Science and Engineering Indicators Report showed that 
between 2007 and 2010, the unemployment rate for engineers more than doubled – from 
2.4 percent to 4.6 percent – even though it remains below the national average.358 In 
2011, when Google announced it would hire 6,000 employees, the company received 
more than 75,000 job applications.359 Google receives over 1 million resumes each year 
and only hires between 1,000 to 4,000 people annually.360 Paul Krugman, the economist 
and New York Times columnist, wrote that multiple studies have found no support for the 
linkage between inadequate workers’ skill and high unemployment. He railed that the 
myth of the US suffering from a “skilled gap” “ … should have been killed by the 
evidence, but refuses to die.”361 
 Yet, indeed, there is a demand for new kinds of skill sets that can be immediately 
applied to churn out new products for new businesses; however, the IT industry’s claim 
of a shortage of workers has been their way to enlarge the labor supply, allowing them to 
have a more flexible labor pool at lower cost, while maintaining expansionary 
momentum.362 Harvard economist George Borjas explains that raising the supply of 
doctorates by just 10 percent through immigration lowers pay in a given field by 3 to 4 
percent.363 The industry’s rhetoric of catastrophic labor shortages is an attempt to 
increase the mobility of highly skilled labor and justify the reform of immigration laws in 	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order to have access to foreign labor as they expand to global markets and to hire more 
temporary, lower-paid foreign workers. Despite the fact that foreign workers are required 
to be paid comparably to American workers, in 2006, the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found that 54% of foreign workers holding H-1B work visas were paid less 
than their American counterparts.364  
 As the competition between and among global IT companies has intensified, the 
industry has made a concerted effort to liberalize and reorganize not only low waged 
workers but also increasingly “highly skilled” workers to create a large and more 
casualized labor pool for its rapidly changing sector. As Xiang points out, since the high 
tech industry was financialized in the 1990s, the value of the IT industry is tightly linked 
to fluctuations within the stock market and the industry’s hiring and layoff cycles, as 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, a common practice to beef up companies’ 
valuations.365 Zynga, the social game company, is a recent example. The company laid 
off 5% of its workforce soon after its stock price plummeted. Microsoft‘s announcement 
of a 14% cut of its workforce in 2014 lifted its stock price 3.7%. The logic of capital here 
is not only to have an abundant skilled labor pool, but also a highly mobile workforce 
that can be quickly deployed to constantly changing market conditions.366 This signifies 
that the labor market is extremely volatile, and there is no job security even if one is 
“highly” skilled in the current “new” information based economy.  
 Russell Hancock, president of Joint Venture Silicon Valley, summing up the 
current labor conditions in Silicon Valley – the heart of the “new” economy – said, “You 
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can have companies doing well and you can have all this startup activity, but it no longer 
means lots of jobs.”367 Then does this mean that the search engine industry merely 
depends on a small number of highly skilled workers? The answer is no.  I turn now to 
show some characteristic features of the information industry at the other end of the pay 
scale as I demonstrate that the search engine industry is able to depend on only a small 
number of skilled workers, not just because it is a highly automated industry, but because 
the industry has appropriated a large number of invisible low and unwaged workers to 
prop them up.  
Low-Waged Workers 
 The myth of the search engine industry is that it is exclusively, even generally, 
reliant on highly-paid workers. As we have seen, the industry does rely on a dense array 
of highly skilled, young and educated employees. However, it is likewise crucially 
dependent on a large and growing number of low-waged contingent workers who serve 
the Internet industry and are rendered mostly invisible by this same myth. Beneath the 
small segment of senior software engineers, research scientists, product managers, sales 
engineers, financial analysts, and the like, are legions of low-waged workers. Huws 
describes them as process workers who work under strict direction and tight control and 
are isolated from their co-workers.368 This group’s much-needed work is obfuscated by 
seemingly magical technology, but there is actually a distinctive hierarchy and division of 
labor within this sector of the labor force.  
 For years, Google has attributed the supremacy of its search results to its 
automatically configured algorithm. While Yahoo! began its search business based on its 	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– paid – human indexed directory, Google and others developed automated crawl-based 
search technology. There are no longer human indexers per se as search engine 
technology has become automated, but their work has not been entirely eliminated; rather 
this automation has led to the emergence of a new class of low-waged workers who are 
practically invisible. 
 Google rarely talks about its outsourced, low-waged workers, but it has admitted 
to hiring a great number of human evaluators to pretest its algorithms. They are often 
referred to as “quality raters,” or “search engine evaluators” whose task is to determine 
the relevance of search engine results before the company releases an alteration to its 
algorithm. The head of Web spam at Google, Matt Cutt, acknowledged the role of quality 
raters in responding to the Search Engine Optimization (SEO) community, which 
expressed concern that raters were affecting search results. Cutt defended the objectivity 
of Google’s search results and said, “Human raters work under the Search Quality 
Evaluation Team and are used in the initial testing phases of proposed changes to the 
organic search algorithm.”369 
 Google started to advertise for quality rater positions in late 2004 and hired them 
directly, but today they are no longer recruited by Google. Rather, Google hires them 
through contractors like Appen Butler Hill, iSoftStone, Lionbridge, Leapforce and 
ZeroChaos (formerly WorkforceLogic), IT outsourcing companies specializing in 
supplying global IT workers to large multinational corporations.370  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Miranda Miller, “How Google Uses Human Raters in Organic Search,” Search Engine Watch,  
March 2, 2012, http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2172154/How-Google-Uses-Human-Raters-in-
Organic-Search. 
370 Matt McGee, “An Interview With A Google Search Quality Rater,” Search Engine Land, January 20, 
2012, http://searchengineland.com/interview-google-search-quality-rater-108702;  
	  123	  
 Under terms such as Multimedia Judge, Internet Search Administrator, Speller 
Web Content Assessor, Query Understanding Judge, Ad Assessor, Internet Crowd 
Worker, Web Content Assessor and Internet Assessor and Social Media Internet 
Assessor, these positions are advertised as flexible, telecommuting, temporary work from 
10-30 hours per week.371 Ads, direct email, and robo-commenters abound that say, “Can 
You Work-at-Home by Surfing the Web All Day? Yes!”372 Since the positions are 
advertised as work-at-home jobs, they often target stay-at-home mothers, advertising the 
positions on Websites like workathomemom,com, telecommutingmommies.com, and 
baycenter.com. These positions make up Google’s search quality evaluation team; but 
their salaries and working conditions are far from the idyllic conditions on the Google 
campus. These workers are even required to pay their own expenses for high-speed 
Internet connections, and to have a smartphone and tablet for their tasks and ever-
changing computer technologies. The average salary for these permanent temporary 
quality raters is between $12-16/hr with no benefits or job security. While their wages are 
set, payments are based on completion of agreed upon tasks within specific time 
periods.373 The positions require employees to have a BA/BS degree or equivalent or 4 
years relevant work experience; however, quality raters do not enjoy the prospect of 
moving up to a full time career at Google or other Internet companies. While their work 
is tightly connected to the engineers who design Google’s algorithm, quality raters do not 
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have any direct interaction with engineers or other workers at the company as they are 
managed remotely.  
 The major tasks of quality raters are to evaluate search and/or advertising 
“relevancy,” label spam and flag problem pages as engineers constantly tweak the 
algorithm. According to Search Engine Watch, while the nature of the job for quality 
raters is presented as flexible and self-directed, it is routinized, mechanized and tightly 
managed, as the raters perform their tasks based on a 125-page manual of specific 
guidelines provided by the company. Their task is not conducting search to evaluate 
search results; rather raters are given a URL and query and are instructed to visit the 
landing page and score a rating.374 They rate the URL based on categories that are given 
such as user intent, location, language, etc.375  
 According to a Google rater in her interview with Search Engine Land, raters 
have to meet their productivity goals in order to stay on the job. She describes the nature 
of the work and says that there are a certain number of tasks that they have to complete 
every minute. If they fall behind in terms of “productivity,” workers can be put on 
probation and cannot work during that period. The quality of work for quality raters is 
tracked based on staying within the time period for rating tasks and the number of tasks 
that have to be returned.376 If raters’ quality is not up to the company’s standard, they are 
terminated. She offers that, “it’s a very controlled work environment.”  
 Quality raters are not exclusive to Google or to search engine companies; rather 
they are a standardized workforce in many Internet companies, which rely on search as a 	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basic function in terms of access and revenue generation.377 Bing also has a similar 
program and Microsoft refers to evaluators as “judges” who work under its Human 
Relevance System (HRS) project, which has been active since 2004 when MSN began 
generating its own search results.378 These “judges” perform their tasks based on the 52-
page HRS Judging Guidelines, but Microsoft is reluctant to discuss their role and very 
little has been written about their work.379 Social media company Facebook also directly 
recruits so called “Entity Quality Raters” whose tasks are described as assessing the 
quality of Facebook’s search results for People, Pages, Games etc.380  
 So far, there are no official numbers on how many quality raters are employed by 
the search engine industry and other Internet sectors. In 2007, former Google executive 
and current Yahoo! CEO Marissa Mayer, in a session at the Google scalability 
conference, said that Google employs more than 10,000 quality raters;381 however, the 
company has so far avoided providing exact data. Google’s Engineering Director Scott 
Huffman, who leads the search quality evaluation team, confirmed the existence of the 
large number of raters who evaluate search relevance across all of the locales in which 
Google operates.382 These low wage quality raters collectively constitute a new category 
of workers and an integral part of the search engine industry workforce. This is but one 
segment of the massive substrate of low-wage workers. Others include content filterers, 	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digitization workers, and other outsourced contract workers. So far, the numbers of these 
low-waged workers have not been tallied. However, perhaps the most telling hallmark of 
the search industry is its massive reliance on an entirely different and still often 
overlooked category of labor. 
At the Bottom  
If quality raters are at the bottom of the hierarchy for wage-labor that supports the 
search engine industry, there is an even larger workforce that is unwaged: a great mass of 
labor that is incarnated in Internet users themselves. The search engine industry relies on  
uncompensated labor – not merely self-service labor that takes over a function that used 
to be waged, but labor that generates inputs that are appropriated by Google and other 
information companies without compensation. 
 The labor that is provided by searchers is more complex than may be thought. 
Users perform a variety of tasks for search companies as they create content, refine 
search engines by providing constant feedback via searching, viewing, creating content, 
networking, rating, and commenting. It is profoundly striking that searchers think that 
they are receiving “free services,” when their labor – in enormous quantities – provides 
much of the basis of this “free service.” As the search engine industry has automated and 
industrialized, the need for and use of human labor has not been eliminated;383 on the 
contrary, it has intensified and changed form, as large-scale commercial search engines 
have predicated their business models on continuing and ubiquitous inputs made up by 
searchers. In the process of its expansion, the industry has externalized much of its labor 
processes by incorporating a large pool of unpaid users. While user labor is not waged 
labor, it has been visible and valued; in this respect it contrasts with the unpaid domestic 	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labor which has long been devalued and invisible despite its value to capitalists in 
allowing them to set below-subsistence wages.384  
 Mainstream media and scholars have recognized the important contributions of 
users in culture and economy. Time Magazine chose “You” – complete with a mirror on 
the cover – as their person of the year for 2006 by recognizing the millions of people who 
contribute to YouTube, Wikipedia, Facebook, etc. Many scholars hail user labor as a new 
and supposedly emancipatory mode of social and cultural production.385 Yochai Benkler 
popularized the concept of peer-to-peer production as an alternative to and an 
improvement over industrial capitalism. He describes this new kind of production as a 
subset of a commons-based production that “depend on individual action that is self-
selected and decentralized, rather than hierarchically assigned.”386 For Benkler, Google’s 
PageRank algorithm is a product of peer-to-peer production, which builds its search 
ranking through valuing decentralized individual acts of linking to other sites as search 
engines count those links as “votes of confidence.”387 Benkler claims that this is a new 
mode of production that resides somewhere outside of the imperatives of capitalist 
production. Peer production, convergence culture, collective intelligence, and free culture 
all describe the increasing role of users as part of the “new economy.” However, what is 
striking about these analyses is their common abstraction away from a discussion of labor 
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in relation to capital.388 Dean Colby succinctly points out that online activity constitutes 
both means of production and social relations; current debates centered around the “new 
economy” are absent any discussion of labor and capital as a constitutive social relation 
in order to concentrate solely on changes in the means and techniques of production.389 
Those who view this unpaid user labor as a new phenomenon or as unique to our 
contemporary information economy have neglected to understand an ongoing, decades-
long effort by capital to systematically appropriate unpaid customers’ labor in order to 
augment profits. 
 For instance, a history of self-service, a common business model, illustrates how 
portions of the work processes in diverse industries have been transferred to unpaid 
consumers to increase profit and productivity. While self-service is widespread today in 
fast food, grocery, banking, post office and other industries, this business model goes 
back to the early 20th century in the retail industry. With expansion of mass production of 
food manufacturing, the first self-service chain grocery stores – Piggly Wiggly – were 
introduced by Clarence Saunders in Memphis, Tennessee in 1916. Saunders modeled this 
self-service grocery store on the cafeteria-style restaurant and reconfigured his store to let 
his consumers serve themselves.390 He patented his standardized store floor plan, building 
fixtures and finishers and franchised Piggly Wigglys across the US.391 The first principle 
for Saunders’ Piggly Wiggly was uniformity.392 He insisted that, “every store must do 
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everything in exactly the same manner … this is one of the greatest advantages of our 
system. Clerks, goods, fixtures are interchangeable.”393 Saunders’ self-service system 
was built on standardization and routinization of labor processes so that each could be 
broken down into a separate task. During WWI, many retailers, facing labor shortages 
and rising labor costs associated with the war effort, increasingly shifted to self-
service.394 This adoption of a self-service model by industry was not exclusive to the food 
retail industry. Bell Telephone Company for example started to automate its local phone 
service after WWI. By 1930, after a long labor struggle, nearly one-third of all telephones 
in the United States were rotary dial phones which automatically connected local calls, 
replacing many telephone operators395 – though the full brunt of the evil combination of 
automation and self-service in US telephony was felt only beginning in the 1950s and 
1960s.396 Today, self-service principles have been diffused throughout many other retail 
and service industries, such as home improvement, DIY furniture, ATMs and online 
banking, pharmacies, airports, online travel ticketing, automated phone systems, print-on-
demand publishing, post offices, etc. 
 The capital logic of self-service is to transfer work from paid workers to the 
unpaid time of the consumer, which allows firms to cut labor costs by eliminating service 
workers. Thus, many service industries where consumers and firms interact at the stage 
of production continue to make an all-out effort to incorporate unpaid consumer labor as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Ibid.  
394 Glazer, “Servants to capital,” 69.	  
395 Michael William Palm, “Phoning it in: Self-service, telecommunications and new consumer labor” (PhD 
diss., University of North Carolina, 2010), 23. 
396 Venus Green, Race On the Line: Gender, Labor, and Technology In the Bell System, 1880-1980 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 
	  130	  
a means to improving productivity and lowering labor costs.397 In the 1970s, service 
sectors of the economy were on the rise, service businesses were increasingly rationalized 
and standardized, mirroring the model of mechanized manufacturing industry. The 
concept of the “production line approach to service” or “industrialization of service,” 
theorized by Harvard economist Theodore Levitt, applied manufacturing logic to 
consumer service to move consumers to take part in a “production line” as a given 
automated, standardized and routinized service. In business management literature, the 
consumer was discovered as a productive resource for corporations.398 By the early 
1980s, business literature had pointed out that productivity would be enhanced when 
consumers were treated as partial employees and as emerging sources of labor.399 As 
consumer participation has become a standard part of the process of service production, 
customers as employees and employees as customers have become interchangeable 
slogans in business discourse.400  
 While the methods and levels of utilization of unpaid time of consumers in 
capital’s profit making venture today vary depending on the business – from laboring by 
simply contributing comments about a service or a product in order to improve quality 
and quantity for production to completing tasks on behalf of and replacing employees, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Christopher Lovelock and Robert Young, “Look to Consumers to Increase Productivity," Harvard 
Business Review 57 (May-June 1979), http://hbr.org/1979/05/look-to-consumers-to-increase-
productivity/ar/1. 
398 Theodore Levitt, “Production-line Approach to Service” Harvard Business Review, 50 (September 
1972): 41–52; Frank Kleemann, G. Günter Voß, Kerstin Rieder, “Underpaid Innovators: The Commercial 
Utilization of Consumer Work through Crowdsourcing,” Science, Technology & Innovation Studies, 4, no. 
1 (2008): 5-26. 
399 Peter Mills, Richard Chase, and Newton Margulies, “Motivating the client/employee system as a service 
production strategy,” Academy of Management Review 8 no. 2 (1983): 301-10; David Bowen, "Managing 
Customers as Human Resources in Service Organizations," Human Resource Management 25, no. 3 
(1986): 371. 
400 Michael Bowers, Charles Martin, and Alan Luker, "Trading Places: Employees as customers, customers 
as employees," The Journal of Services Marketing 4, no. 2 (1990): 55.  
 
	  131	  
use of unpaid consumer labor is radically increasing with the introduction of new 
information technologies which offer newly direct and comprehensive interactive links 
between consumers and producers. Capital continues to search for new mechanisms and 
territories where consumers can be part of the labor process. Capitalism is dynamic and 
constantly reinventing and reconfiguring labor processes through new technologies, 
management skills and business models. For decades, the question for capital had been 
how much value could be extracted from unpaid consumer labor, taking into 
consideration the cost of incorporating and managing their labor. Yet, the distinctions of 
today’s unpaid consumer labor that is integrated into search is that it involves the 
appropriation of involuntary as well as freely donated behavior – the capture of users’ 
content, keystrokes, click-throughs and data trails.   
 Given this increasing role of unpaid workers in the Internet industry, it is 
insufficient to understand the labor process of search engine industry only through 
analyzing paid labor. The analysis needs to be extended by relating the search engine 
industry’s incorporation of unpaid labor within the longer historical process by which 
capital has continually sought to reorganize labor and cheapen its labor costs, among 
other ways by making greater use of unpaid consumer labor.  
User labor as a business imperative 
 The role of unpaid labor in capital’s profit-making has been reignited as Internet 
technologies have provided a ubiquitous platform to easily aggregate and manage the 
entire process for a dispersed unpaid user labor pool. From the early stages of the search 
engine industry, unpaid labor was viewed as a valuable resource and competitive 
advantage by the industry. Unwaged labor has been not only an integral part of 
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development of the search engine industry; more importantly it constitutes a new urgent 
and strategic labor force for the industry.   
 In the 1990s, when Yahoo! was the leading search engine in the market – with its 
paid human indexed Web directory – NewHoo was launched to compete with Yahoo! 
under the premise that enlisting a large body of volunteers to compile a Web directory 
would be more comprehensive than the Yahoo! directory.401 NewHoo’s founders, four 
Sun Microsystem engineers, noticed that Yahoo! was not able to keep up with the growth 
of the Web and was struggling to maintain fresh content, and recognized that building a 
directory was extremely labor intensive and expansive. They discovered their business 
model in open source software that was being used with little capital investment across 
the IT industry, and posited that they could apply the open source idea to building a Web 
directory by recruiting volunteer workers as their main source of labor.402 As capitalists 
provided tools for their waged workers, NewHoo provided tools for editing, deleting and 
updating links to their unpaid voluntary workers who selected, described and organized 
Websites and added to the directory. By the time NewHoo was acquired by Netscape in 
1998, the search engine had compiled 100,000 Websites with over 4500 volunteer editors 
compared to Yahoo!’s 70 paid editors.403 NewHoo sold its unpaid worker-built directory 
to Netscape for $1 million, which promptly renamed it the Open Directory Project (ODP). 
At that time, ODP already had 1.6 million entries – surpassing Yahoo! – to become the 
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largest, most comprehensive human-edited directory on the Web.404 All major search 
engine companies – Lycos, HotBot, Ask Jeeves, Google, AT&T etc. – incorporated ODP 
to augment their search databases and to get fresh content which allowed them to level 
the content playing field. When Netscape was acquired by AOL in 1999, the ODP was 
considered one of the assets included in the acquisition.  
 Ironically, ODP is often held up by popular media and scholars as one of the best 
examples of this “new” mode of production occurring outside of the capitalist market. In 
fact, ODP was initially built with unpaid voluntary labor specifically in order to 
contribute to a profitmaking investment rather than to challenge capitalist social relations. 
ODP was firmly rooted in a capitalist market in which unpaid voluntary labor was 
integrated into and subordinated to a capitalist accumulation project. NewHoo was not 
the first or only Internet company to deploy unpaid voluntary labor to leverage paid 
workers. In 1994, a start-up called Geocities was built with a business model based on 
“community.” Geocities provided free Web hosting, suites of utilities and other 
“Geotools” to its members – called “homesteaders.” In exchange, unpaid laborers created 
content by building Websites focusing on their interests and organizing collections of 
member Web pages by themes and subjects for Geocities – who then used members’ 
Websites for advertising to generate revenue. Geocities’ founders David Bohnett and 
John Rezner wanted to create a massive amount of content and traffic but on very limited 
capital. Instead of hiring paid workers, Bohnett and Rezner utilized a “community” based 
business model as a way to extract labor power from users. Contributing to Geocities’ 
success was its cost-efficient editorial structure, because the most labor-intensive part of 	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the work was performed by voluntary unpaid workers who created and maintained their 
own pages.405 Bohnett touted that GeoCities “has 75 employees and 900,000 editors,”406 
which meant 75 paid workers along with 900,000 unpaid volunteer workers. The 
company leveraged the content by unpaid users to generate more market share and more 
traffic. In 1999, GeoCities was purchased by Yahoo! for $3.57 billion.407 
 The extensive use of unwaged user labor by Internet companies went 
unchallenged until a group of volunteers at AOL’s “Community Leader Program” asked 
the Department of Labor to investigate whether the company had violated the Federal 
Fair Labor Standards Act. They pointed out that they were treated like any other paid 
employees – filing time cards, working specific shifts etc. – and therefore should be 
compensated.408 AOL, then the largest ISP and a major market actor across the length and 
breadth of cyberspace, recruited a large number of volunteers as “community leaders” to 
perform routine tasks – answering subscribers’ questions, maintaining chat rooms and 
offering technical support in exchange for waived or heavily discounted monthly AOL 
connection fees. At its peak, AOL had up to 16,000 volunteers, including ones as young 
as 12 years old,409 outpacing AOL’s 12,000 employees.410 One former executive once 
estimated that the worth of work performed by volunteers was as much as 30% of the 
company's annual revenue,411 and Forbes reported that AOL saved almost $1 billion in 
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expenses from 1992 – 2000.412 In 2001, the US Department of Labor declined to take any 
legal action against AOL, reasoning both that the agency lacked resources and that 
government intervention was  “inappropriate” in the dispute between AOL against its 
volunteers.413 Later, the group of volunteers filed a class action lawsuit against AOL, and 
they settled for $15 million. 
 This brief moment of questioning the use of unpaid volunteer labor within social 
relationships between labor and capital quickly disappeared, as the Internet sector 
increasingly became a site of economic growth. The deployment of consumer labor under 
the “new” economy has been theorized in business literature with neologisms like “co-
creation,” “co-innovation,” and “democratization of innovation.”414 The definition of co-
creation or co-innovation here is the creation of value jointly with consumers at the 
behest of capital. Leading business scholars have started to point out that the future of 
competition depends on this “new” approach to value creation based on a supposed 
individual centered co-creation of value between consumers and companies rather than a 
company-centric value creation.415 This “new” approach goes beyond earlier forms of 
self-service such as pumping one’s own gas or making a withdrawal from an ATM 
because unpaid consumers are now actively drawn into capital’s profit-making pursuit 
and participate directly and indirectly in the creation of value.  
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 The concept of “co-creation” has become a business mantra: “users must be 
treated as co-developers” which today lies at the very heart of many Web 2.0 projects.416 
The ubiquitous exploitation of unpaid user labor by internet companies is typically no 
longer even visible; while its status as labor is effaced, user labor is hailed as typifying a 
supposed internet-based culture of participation, democracy and so-called “open 
innovation.” Moreover, the incorporation of unpaid voluntary user labor in profit-making 
has become an increasingly standardized labor process for many Internet companies 
today. The value of unpaid user labor in improving its competitive advantage has long 
been recognized by capital whether or not users are aware of it.  
Users as Covert Strategic Workforce  
 Unpaid workers toil side by side paid workers as they perform various tasks. In 
the case of the search engine industry, companies depend on unpaid user workers for the 
most capital- and labor-intensive part of their work – providing feedback on algorithms, 
creation of content, and constant testing of new products. One of the most apparent tasks 
performed by unpaid workers is providing feedback on search engine algorithms. Users 
as “co-developers” with engineers assist in the refining of a search engine company’s 
core algorithm technology as they go about their everyday search activities. 
 Google changes its search ranking algorithm 500 – 600 times annually.417 While 
these changes are based on numerous factors, one of the factors is user activity, which 
signals Google to tune the search algorithm in order to match user queries with context-
appropriate advertisements. Currently, Google has devoted roughly one-third of its 
workforce to research and development. This segment of the workforce has the 	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responsibility for working on the design of information systems including algorithm and 
new service products. Along with them, Google might have 10,000 paid quality raters, 
more or less, and an unknown number of paid usability testers, but the largest number of 
workers who provide constant feedback to improving the algorithm are unwaged users 
who perform searches everyday. Google’s personalized search feature is a good example 
whereby all Google searches are connected to users’ browser cookie records, so that the 
results are not merely based on the relevance of a Web page to a user’s search term, but 
also on the user’s previous search activities. This ratio between paid- and unpaid labor at 
Google provides a stark contrast as to the enormity of the pool of unpaid labor.  
 As of January 2013, Google had 170 million unique US visitors per month, with 
an average of 125 minutes per visitor per month in unpaid labor.418 This equates to an 
additional 2,213,542 full time workers for Google (based on the 40-hour work week). 
These 2,213,542 “people” are not categorized as a productive force in classical economic 
terms or included in the generation of GDP, but their activities are as vital as the 47,756 
full time Google employees (2013 statistics) – if not more so – as their activities 
contribute directly to Google’s revenue generation. Here the ratio between equivalent 
unpaid users and paid full-time workers is around 46:1. Even if each of these unpaid 
workers received a salary of $12/hr (the average pay for a quality rater) – or $23,000 per 
year – it would cost Google an additional $51,000,007,680 in salary each year. This is 
almost the equivalent of Google’s 2013 global revenue of $59.83 billion. In other words, 
Google would not be the grossly profitable company it is without these unpaid users. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 Google’s astronomical success and profit generation have been predicated on its 
wholesale incorporation of unpaid user labor into its business model. The role of unpaid 
labor in profit-making for the search engine industry is not a secret. In 2005, Microsoft 
Chairman Bill Gates somewhat ironically pointed out that Google doesn't share ad 
revenues with end users who help them get the revenue, saying, “Google keeps all of the 
money with [sic] itself.”419 
 While algorithms are central to search engine businesses, they cannot be effective 
without a large quantity of fresh content to index and deliver to users and advertisers; 
thus generating original content has long been a major capital- and labor-intensive task 
for search engine businesses. For this, companies again rely heavily on user labor in 
creating, uploading, and commenting supplemented with acquiring proprietary content 
and partnering with content providers like NBC Universal, Sony Pictures, and Disney.  
 Take Google’s YouTube site for instance. In 2013, YouTube handled more than 1 
billion unique users each month – the third most-visited site on the Web after Google 
search and Facebook and the world’s largest video sharing platform.420 As of 2014, 
according to Google’s own statistics, 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every 
minute, over 6 billion hours of video are watched each month, almost an hour for every 
person on Earth.421 Google has discontinued provision of data on users’ social actions 
(likes, shares, comments) on YouTube, but its last statistics in February of 2013 showed 
that 100 million people took some sort of social action on YouTube (likes, shares, 
comments, etc.) every week, and more than 50% of videos on YouTube have been rated 	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or include comments from the user community ⁠. Google’s YouTube unit has only 700-900 
full-time workers despite the enormous scale of the site and the massive workload to 
improve functionality and interface, upload new content, and increase its revenue.422 The 
reason Google is able to assign a relatively small number of workers considering this 
amount of work is because of the more than 1 billion monthly unique visitors assisting 
them.  
 Google is one of the industry trendsetters for its creative deployment and 
exploitation of user labor. The company has introduced its so-called beta business model 
– which mirrors the open-source community’s bug fixing approach – in which its 
products are released incomplete and during development. At Google, their motto is: 
“launch early and iterate,”423 which means that the iterations process relies on work by 
users to assist Google in perfecting its products. A product would normally be tested by 
paid workers or internally by Googlers, but Google has decided to release its products to 
large numbers of users perpetually in beta versions. According to Jeff Jarvis, this is 
Google’s way of saying, “there are sure to be mistakes here and so please help us find 
and fix them and improve the product” as the company monitors user activities to see 
how new “free” products and services are used and which features are rejected and 
adopted.424 As Tim O’Reilly points out, “it’s no accident that services such as Gmail, 
Google Maps, Flickr, del.icio.us, and the like may be expected to bear a ‘Beta’ logo for 
years at a time.”425 The logic behind releasing “perpetual beta” products is not as a 
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technical experiment; rather it is a business strategy to transfer part of the work to unpaid 
user labor. This business approach carries on the 20th century’s corporate welfare 
capitalism in which exploitation is cloaked in typically paternalistic corporate initiatives 
aimed at showing “we care.” The deployment of welfare capitalism in Internet industry 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
 It is vital to add that the search engine industry built over the Internet is able to 
tap into user labor across national boundaries. Many Google products (Google.com, 
Blogger, Google Earth, and others) are currently available in more than 170 languages, 
from Abkhazian to Zulu. Most of these translations are done by volunteers from around 
the world, as the company encourages them to participate by creating and using 
translation programs and providing tools to perform this task. Google maps also uses 
volunteers from various countries who post updates on their neighborhoods or travel to 
remote places to map the area before uploading their findings to Google Map Maker. In 
particular, in the countries where there is little Web content to index and monetize, 
Google has launched volunteer programs to create and translate content. Imagine how 
many paid translators and cartographers Google would need to perform all of these 
myriad tasks. Instead of waged-workers, Google is taking the old but familiar 
“community” based business model in which work can be transferred to unpaid voluntary 
labor. This “community” as covert strategic labor has been a vital workforce for the 
industry’s survival, development and transformation of search engine technologies into 
one of the most dynamic information industries. 
 There are several remaining questions to be answered: why are people willing to 
perform voluntary work for Google and the other Internet firms?  Users are not merely 
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performing work on behalf of Google’s business. Their everyday information activities 
are also rewarding in and of themselves for entertainment, communication, work, 
education, building social reputation, and meeting information needs. Given that users get 
benefits from commercial Internet services, some might argue that users are willing to 
trade their labor in exchange for “free” services. The question then needs to be shifted 
from “why?” to “what price?” The price to pay for users to use those services is to live in 
a constant state of surveillance in which their moves are being gathered, monitored, 
extracted, and analyzed for corporate gain and beyond. Is this a fair trade for users? The 
absence or lack of public information provision offers few choices for the public. This 
then leads to the next question. Since not all Internet activities can be deemed labor to 
assist capital, what percentage of Internet users’ activities are directly put into profit-
making? Given the complexity of the labor processes, is it possible to even calculate? 
 The search engine industry is built on the work of a mass of people whose labor is 
the basis of its business. Unpaid labor is not new; rather, it has always been part of the 
capitalist system – women's labor, slave labor, prison labor, child labor, and today's 
increasingly unpaid interns. Yet, what is new in the search engine industry is that the 
sheer scale of voluntary and non-voluntary unwaged labor appropriated by capital and the 
directness of its incorporation into profit-making projects and its strategic urgency for 
capital are historically unprecedented. The profitability for the search engine industry 
rests on the appropriation of unpaid user labor. Today, the deployment of user labor in 
search engine companies and other Internet companies is no longer a choice; rather it has 
become a business imperative. Concomitantly, there is no longer even a choice for users 
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to bypass laboring for the Internet firms as Internet activities are fabricated into our 
everyday lives.  
 The search engine industry is perceived as charting a path forward for the “new” 
information economy, which generates a large quantity of highly skilled workers where 
workers are not exploited but rather are empowered, highly-paid and engaged in creative 
work. The information-based economy is viewed as the driving force behind the 
prosperity of workers and the building of a more egalitarian society. Yet, as 
demonstrated, the actual emerging labor structure and organization of the search engine 
industry offers us quite a different picture. The next question that I will examine is how 
the search engine industry controls its workers? In the following chapter, I explicate how 




Digital Welfare Capitalism  
In the era of the industrial economy, the distinct characteristic of labor 
management is the “scientific” management approach – or “Taylorism” after the works of 
Frederick Taylor – where workers are tightly controlled and tasks are highly automated 
and mechanized. Along with Taylorism, industrial capitalists have also experimented 
with other paternalistic methods of labor control by providing some private welfare 
programs and improving working conditions as a way to curtail the tension between labor 
and capital and kill labor unions. Yet, since the 1970s, post-industrial theorists have 
suggested that the new information-based economy that has brought about the structural 
transformation of capitalism bears different forms of labor control and management 
practices.426 Rather, in the “new” economy, they argue that capitalists will move away 
from old forms of labor control techniques as workers become more empowered, have 
more control over their work processes and working conditions, and become more 
involved in the production process. Ultimately, they predict that there will be 
fundamental shifts in the amount of control workers have.  
 Yet, the search engine industry that represents the information-based economy 
illustrates that seemingly participatory and democratic approaches to labor management 
are firmly ingrained in the historical tradition of capitalist labor control. This chapter 
discusses the specific modes of management employed by the search engine industry to 
both paid and unpaid labor – modes that facilitate the expansion of capital. It focuses on 
the organization of labor within the search engine industry – in particular within and 	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around Google – and sheds light on how work and workers are structured within the 
longer history of labor management.  
Workers’ newly found Paradise?  
 Organic gardens, cafes, swimming pools, onsite doctors, day care, free haircuts, 
24/7 fitness centers, yoga and meditation classes, Wi-Fi enabled commuter shuttles with 
private guards, are all part and parcel of the Googleplex. Googleplex – its 4 million 
square feet or the equivalent of about 40 Home Depot stores427 – occupies a suburban 
landscape within sunny Silicon Valley. This hardly looks like any workplace that one 
could imagine. Google made a name for its search business but is also known for its 
“unconventional” working environment and management style. For several consecutive 
years running, Fortune Magazine has named Google the best place to work in the US, 
and for many young professionals, the company has been perceived as an icon of the 
idealized workplace.  
 With “Passion not Perks” as its corporate motivational tagline, Google is famous 
for its 20% time program, where its engineers are allowed to spend one day a week 
working on projects they are passionate about but which are not in their job 
description.428 This is one of the known aspects of the company’s “innovative” policy. 
Apple followed Google’s footsteps and launched its own version of Google 20% time,429 
allowing its employees to take two weeks to work on projects outside their normal 	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responsibilities. Yahoo!’s CEO Marissa Mayer, is attempting to emulate Google by 
offering free food and an iPhone to Yahoo! workers and changing the layout of the 
workspace to revitalize the company.  
 At Google, employees seem to have their own autonomy, and are able to pursue 
their curiosity and inspiration. Google management has embedded the Maker/DIY ethos 
that encourages experimentation and technology play for their own sake – and is 
presented as if it were an alternative to capitalist pursuits – into the Googleplex. The 
company has often been portrayed by media as an intellectual playground, a relaxed and 
informal workplace that fosters creativity and innovation. Instead of a bureaucratic, 
hierarchically controlled structure, the company has become known for its flat, open 
organization and its bottom-up approach to its management as it promotes employee 
participation and democratic decision-making. Mission, transparency and voice are 
ostensibly the main components of Google’s corporate culture. Google’s success has 
often been attributed to its “unique” management style that distinguishes Google from its 
more traditional and bureaucratic counterparts.430  
 Google’s seemingly idyllic culture and exciting and fun working environment are 
unthinkable for the majority of workers today who are barely clinging to their jobs and 
facing radical reductions in pensions, and health benefits.431 Google’s showering of its 
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workers with a whole host of benefits, services and amenities seems unfamiliarly new to 
many ordinary workers, and even anti-capitalistic. Yet, not that long ago, there was a 
time in American history when corporations forged the paternalistic labor management 
style of so-called welfare capitalism in response to the rise of workers’ unions and labor 
unrest in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 Around the turn of the 20th century, National Cash Register (NCR), located in 
Dayton, Ohio – considered the Silicon Valley of its day432 – was known for its lavish 
welfare programs for workers. NCR, which produced the first mechanical cash registers, 
was a symbol of the era of commercial automation at that time.433 The company started 
the first sales training school and offered unprecedented internal private welfare 
programs providing lunchrooms, lending libraries, free child care, paid education, onsite 
medical services, sponsored retreats, musical concerts, and neighborhood programs for its 
employees.  
 NCR’s new style of management was seen to be a transformative moment of 
capitalism, strikingly distinguished from Taylorist techniques in which workers were 
treated as part of the factory’s machines, watched by foremen and tightly controlled. 
However, NCR’s seemingly generous employee benefits then were not based on altruistic 
motives and did not indicate a change in fundamental social relations between capital and 
labor. Rather this new-at-the-time management technique was motivated by capital’s 
serving of its own long-standing interests. John Patterson, the President of NCR, bluntly 
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admitted that improving workers’ lives would boost the company’s business interests.434 
He was known for posting signs throughout NCR shops saying, “It Pays” 435 and 
claiming to his employees that, “While it is the duty of the company to show to its people 
that it is not a corporation without a soul, it is fair for the people to show … that they too 
have a soul, a spirit which responds to considerate treatment.”436  
 Labor historians refer to this more “humane” labor management that emerged in 
the late 19th century as welfare capitalism, or industrial paternalism, which gave workers 
a variety of employment benefits including pensions and stock shares as part of a larger 
strategic business management. The objective of industrial paternalism was to gain 
competitive advantage by fostering loyalty and dedication among workers.437  
 For instance, Ford Motor Company developed a sophisticated experimental 
industrial welfare program. Henry Ford found that productivity did not increase as much 
as he had expected after he mechanized and transformed production processes by 
employing assembly production lines.438 The company was still suffering from instability 
and a high workforce turnover rate. In 1913, Ford’s plant in Detroit had a turnover rate of 
370%.439 Ford discovered that productivity and efficiency on the factory floor were 
affected by “human elements” as much as machinery. Thus, along with the introduction 
of mechanized assembly lines and new technical machinery, the company experimented 
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with internal welfare programs in an effort to solve the human elements, the so-called 
“labor problem.” They extended control of labor processes beyond the factory floor by 
instituting various welfare programs such as savings options, health care, and profit 
sharing.  
 One of Ford’s famous programs rooted in welfare capitalism was the five-dollar-
a-day plan with a reduction of the working day from nine hours to eight, which shocked 
the world because it was double the average wage at that time, making Ford workers 
better paid than in any other industry.440 Ford’s five-dollar-a-day program had two 
functions, both aimed at solving capital’s immediate problems. Since mass production 
requires mass consumption, this was a way to generate higher consumption of 
automobiles by raising worker’s wages. The other function was using the program to 
control workers’ social behaviors beyond the factory floor.   
 The five-dollar-a-day wage was not just given to workers as fair wages; rather it 
was used as a reward system to intervene in workers’ private lifestyles to fit into the 
mechanized factory work environment for mass production. In order for workers to earn 
five dollars per day, workers had to qualify by meeting particular behavior criteria 
established by the company. To tackle these tasks, Ford established a Sociology 
Department at Ford’s Highland Park facility in Detroit where the company conducted 
investigations on workers by detailed monitoring of private lives to administer the five-
dollar-a-day program. By 1919, the department had hired hundreds of investigators who 
visited workers’ homes, talked to workers and documented their spending habits, 
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cleanliness, sobriety, etc.441 After gathering data on workers’ private lives, the sociology 
department used those data to monitor behavior of workers and determine eligibility for 
the five-dollar-a-day program. In fact, Ford extended its management “beyond the purely 
technical realm to the broader social and cultural ones of values and forms of 
behavior.”442 As capital extended its control to workers’ social and private lives and 
recognized a “human element,” there was an increasing interest in social and behavioral 
science by corporate America in order to understand the conditions under which workers 
were most efficient and productive.   
 The industrial research at Western Electric Company, a subsidiary of American 
Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) at the Hawthorne Works, in Cicero, Illinois was one of 
the landmark attempts in social and behavior science experiment introduced to the factory 
floor on a large scale in order to investigate the relationship between productivity and 
working conditions and to solve once and for all the “labor problem.” Western Electric 
was one of the leading companies to endorse welfare capitalism from early on, and 
refined its approach over time. By the mid-1920s, the company offered a pension system, 
stock options, and a benefits package, opened a hospital and medical department, and 
established a Hawthorne Club as the center of workers’ social activities – concerts, 
classes, sports competitions, club store, and beauty contests.443 In order to administer and 
manage their various welfare programs, Western Electric established a centralized 
personnel management department. By implementing formal systems of personnel 
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programs, the company innovated bureaucratic techniques and asserted power over a 
large workforce for mass production. This emergence of personnel management – an 
essential feature of welfare capitalism – drew social and behavioral science on to the 
factory floor.  
 The plant brought in Harvard professor Elton Mayo and his research team – 
including Fritz Roethlisberger from the Harvard Business School and Clair Turner from 
the Biology and Public Health Department at MIT – to conduct research on a team of six 
women relay assemblers under various working conditions. They ran numerous 
experiments with different variables such as rest periods, shift hours, and length of 
working day and week to measure their relationship to workers’ efficiency and 
productivity.444 Mayo’s research team conducted more than 20,000 interviews with 
workers and collected data not only on workers’ attitudes toward the organization and 
personnel policies but also individual personalities of workers and individual adjustments 
to working and social conditions as the researchers applied their backgrounds in 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology.445   
 According to Mayo’s research team, workers’ productivity increased with the 
improvement of the working environment; but also productivity continued to increase 
even if special improved working conditions were removed. Their research claimed that 
workers’ attitudes and motivation toward work, and their morale could be more important 
than their physical working conditions in increasing efficiency and productivity. The so-
called “Hawthorn Effect” posits that productivity and performance are improved when 
workers feel like they are receiving attention and that their employers care about them. 	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This research, which has been seen as “objective” science and canonical in management 
literature, ignored the political nature of the Hawthorne Works experiments themselves 
and the very interconnection between science and corporate interest.446    
 Resting on Mayo’s research, corporations began to design diverse new means of 
control as many companies attempted to change workers’ attitudes by experimenting with 
participatory decision-making, group dynamics, and “worker centered” approaches. They 
pursued the control of labor through consent rather than coercion, more standardized 
benefit programs and professional management practices to engineer workers’ 
subjectivity and deter them from joining national unions.447 The legacy of the Hawthorne 
experiments shows that science is deployed to justify and mask capital’s interests in a 
system of paternalistic welfare capitalism.448  
 These industrial forms of labor management based on welfare capitalism seemed 
to disappear during the great Depression; however, historian Sanford Jacoby shows that 
while welfare capitalism was indeed curtailed by the Depression, it was never eliminated. 
Rather, he argues that welfare capitalism had to be reshaped and modernized between 
1930 and 1960 to grapple with both industrial unionism and ascending state welfare 
programs. This new phase of welfare capitalism was supplemented by government 
programs, and distinguished from earlier versions as capital sought to establish a “kinder, 
gentler sort of paternalism” which emphasized consent rather control.449 
 Current labor management practices of Internet firms like Google – with 
corporate slogans like job enrichment, quality of work life, and participatory management 
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– seem innovative but they are deeply rooted and need to be situated within the 
continuing history of welfare capitalism as a form of labor control by management.  
Welfare Capitalism 2.0 
 With growing competition and rapidly changing markets and technologies in the 
search engine industry, a steady stream of engineers and other professional workers who 
may be tasked with immediate and strategically imperative work objectives is considered 
vital. Borrowing Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s term, this class of workers can be 
described as “cadres” – young, educated, technical experts of high social status, “whose 
support for capitalism is particularly indispensable for running firms and creating 
profit.”450 Boltanski and Chiapello found that “they aspire to share decision making 
power to be more autonomous, to understand managerial policies, to be informed of the 
progress of business.”451 In the search engine industry, the cadres are the small segment 
of software engineers, financial analysts, project managers and other related professionals 
described in the previous chapter – many of them belonging to the managerial class 
and/or possessing the mobility to climb the social ladder.   
 Given this, capital instills a management technique that rests on an ethos of 
premium corporate paternalism, autonomy, flexibility, non-hierarchy, and participation. 
Cadres are not constrained or disciplined by traditional hierarchical structures and strict 
behavior rules; but they are expected to take initiative, to be self-starters, and to engage in 
a rigorous and creative form of discussion where decisions emerge among employees.452 
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Capital encourages these abstract behaviors to provoke creative, innovative, and self-
motivated, entrepreneurial risk-taking.453  
 Boltanski and Chiapello call these new qualities of labor management the new 
spirit of capitalism, “the ideology that justifies people’s commitment to capitalism, and 
which renders this commitment attractive.”454 The notion of these non-hierarchical, 
autonomous, and participatory capitalist firms may seem antithetical to capitalist 
management; however, the majority of cadres are socialized into its capitalist business 
values, and their participation remains circumscribed by capital’s profit goals. Thus, it is 
far from truly being autonomous or participatory in the sense of being fully independent 
or worker control of the ownership structure. 
 Under the moral tone of “Do no evil” and “organizing the world’s information,” 
Google triumphantly presents its endeavor as a worthwhile alternative opportunity. Its 
slick leaders – Larry Page, Sergey Brin and Eric Schmidt – are far from tyrannical in 
their public images. They are portrayed more as freedom fighters who challenge and 
revolt against oppressive regimes – such as China and Cuba – as defined by the US 
government. For young cadres, working for such a search engine firm, whose main 
business is information access, this seems to offer an uncompromised opportunity where 
working for capital and pursuing the public good are completely compatible. With the 
rhetorical façade of democracy, freedom of information and human rights, Google 
develops global common values that not only motivate and drive its employees, but 
extend out to attract intellectuals, activists, and the public to sympathize with its 
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enterprise. As its employees internalize these values – share them – Google has no need 
to use rigidly strict control management techniques. As Richard Edwards points out, “the 
most sophisticated level of control grows out of incentives to workers to identify 
themselves with the enterprise, to be loyal, committed and thus self-directed and self-
controlled.” 455 
 Unlike industrial factory firms that exploit every ounce of a worker’s labor to 
increase profits, Google is often praised as an exceptional company having the utmost 
care for its employees in mind. The company has long been known for taking care of its 
workplace and everything within its employees’ lives – from meals to laundry to death 
benefits that include paying the spouse or domestic partner of the deceased 50% of their 
salary for 10 years. The question raised at this point is: if the 19th century’s corporate 
welfare program was created to control labor, curtail labor unions and government 
intervention, then what is the motivation behind Google renewing and expanding 
employee benefits when there are few labor unions and scarce threats of government 
intervention? Why do companies like Google spend so much money on employee 
benefits? Some might think that the exploitative nature of capitalist systems has given 
way and that the “new economy and benign capitalism is truly possible;” yet, Google’s 
management techniques illustrate that the “new economy” carries characteristics of a 
supposedly bygone era of welfare capitalism. Why – in response to what threat or 
compulsion?  
 100 years ago, NCR’s president John Patterson said about his company’s welfare 
program that “it pays,” and similar practices have been paying off for Google as well. 	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The company generates $931,657 in revenue per worker, 170% higher than Yahoo!’s 
$344,758 in revenue generated per employee.456 Laszlo Bock, Google’s VP of People 
Operations, described it thusly “The important thing to note is that you don’t need a lot of 
money to do what Google has done. If you give people freedom, they will amaze you.”457 
Thus, seemingly over-the-top lavish perks and freedom – to be sure, only for Google’s 
most elite employees – are not contradictory to capital logic; rather, they closely align 
with capital accumulation by bringing cadres into the Google enterprise and are a 
successful way of hiring and managing a highly skilled workforce.  Google’s welfare 
capitalism is a strategy based on economic self-interest aiming to secure the enthusiastic 
and intensive labor of the most highly talented engineers, programmers, and managers in 
the world – a scare commodity, easily lured away by competition.  
 Google’s different mode of management is commonly exemplified by the 
company’s provision of free gourmet food for its employees receiving positive press 
coverage. While corporate free food programs are not new, Google seems to have 
brought them to a different level by offering to executives as well as all employees local, 
fresh and organic meals – 3 times a day – cooked by top chefs and catering to the 
international regional tastes of its employees. This kind of free food program has often 
been portrayed as Google’s genuine exceptionalism; yet, this is part and parcel of the 
company’s management strategy. In fact, the real objective has stemmed from the service 
of corporate interest. A Google executive once stated that the company’s free meals 
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program is a way to increase productivity; workers do not leave their workplace for 
meals, which means extending working hours.458 Joe Labombarda, the executive chef at 
Google’s Manhattan office admitted, “the unlimited free food supply was originally 
designed to maximize productivity and loyalty.”459 At the turn of the last century, free 
lunch, with the idea that well-fed workers were more productive, embodied corporate 
paternalism.460 Google’s free food is not a “perk” – it is part of a productivity 
maintenance strategy.  
 And free food is not the only management strategy that Google uses to increase 
productivity. Eric Schmidt blatantly put forward his control technique in order to increase 
productivity in the Google workforce:   
The goal is to strip away everything that gets in our employees’ way… We provide a 
standard package of fringe benefits, but on top of that are first-class dining facilities, 
gyms, laundry rooms, massage rooms, haircuts, car washes, dry cleaning, commuting 
buses – just about anything a hardworking employee might want. Let’s face it: 
programmers want to program, they don't want to do their laundry. So we make it 
easy for them to do both.461 
 
He presents this idea as if the purpose of these generous benefits is truly to look after 
workers’ personal growth and their interests, but by “stripping away everything,” Google 
extends employees’ working hours by reducing any work interruption and stoppage. In 
his interview with McKinsey & Company, Inc., a management consulting firm, Schmidt 
also revealed how the company manages productivity and intensity of work, stating:   	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You need two things. You have to have somebody who enforces a deadline. In a 
corporation the role of a leader is often not to force the outcome, but to force 
execution. Literally, by having a deadline. Either by having a real crisis or 
creating a crisis. And a good managerial strategy is “let’s create a crisis this week 
to get everybody through this knot hole.”462  
 
Under industrial capitalism, the speed and intensity of work were coded into new 
machineries that set the pace of work for working class labor. While Google does not use 
machinery in a 19th century sense, it does resort to psychological manipulation –
techniques of labor control stemming from the early 20th century.   
 Moreover, Google is trying to extend its control over employees’ lives beyond the 
Google “campus” just as Ford Motor Company had pioneered in the early 20th century. In 
2003, Google proposed and pressured the Mountain View city council to build employee 
housing and a hotel and conference complex within proximity to the Google campus.463 
Pursuing the project, Google real estate chief David Radcliffe wrote in a letter to city 
officials that the company’s goals were to build a headquarters that would be “nurturing 
and regenerative to the environment, provide a vibrant community and work/life balance 
for all.”464 Google envisions constructing a company town – a modern day company town 
following in the footsteps of Pullman, IL or McDonald, OH – and corporate culture 
where there are no boundaries between work and private lives and employees will have 
no reason to leave the Google “campus.” By blurring the lines between work and private 
lives under the name of providing a “vibrant” community, the company does not need to 
deploy a traditional tightly controlled management mechanism to extend workers’ 
working hours; rather, Google intends to reshape workers’ lifestyles and physical 	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environment in order to motivate workers to voluntarily put in longer hours at work and 
stay loyal to the company. 
 While Google’s housing proposal was opposed by the Mountain View City 
Council and the company had to drop its plan for the time being, Google has been 
expanding its physical footprint since 2011, spending 600 million dollars to acquire 
buildings in suburban Silicon Valley. Google is also constructing its ambitious new 
corporate campus by adding a 42-acre section of NASA’s Moffett Field – a former US 
Naval air station – through a long-term lease contract with the federal government. While 
detailed information is hard to come by, the new mega campus is supposed to have nine 
buildings surrounded by a quad, piazza, garden and contemplative space.465 This time, 
Google is embracing nature into its corporate strategy. Google’s new corporate structure 
is close enough to a wetland that Google has promised to use only 5 percent of the land 
for new office space, reserving 15 percent to wetland restoration areas. The company 
confidently said that Google will provide employees access to the wetlands, which it sees 
as a “potential source of inspiration and education.”466 
 Google’s “unorthodox,” “worker-centered” and “democratic” management 
strategies are typically equated with its overall approach; yet, this is not the entire picture. 
On one level, Google embraces a “care-free” or “hands-off” approach to managing its 
elite employees, seemingly with little direct control over labor processes and moving 
away from industrial forms of labor control; but on another level, it has adapted a form 
innovated by Western Electric – a method built on data for managing its workforce.  
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Google by Design 
 Few will question that the search engine business is driven by data, but it is less 
well-understood that this extends to the management of its workplace as well. Data is an 
integral part of Google’s organizational culture. Google calls its human resources 
department “People Operations (POPs),” and manages all aspects of its employees’ lives. 
POPs operates under the principle that “All people decisions at Google are based on data 
and analytics.”467 POPs distinguishes itself from the traditional HR department, asserting 
that “everything has been researched and is backed up by data.” If Ford had its sociology 
department and Western Electric had Mayo’s research team, Google has POPs where 
scientists collect detailed data on workers’ behaviors and activities. On Google’s own 
blog, they state, “we apply science to organizational issues as well.”468 Google’s POPs – 
a team of scientists and researchers working on the development of management – is the 
place where science and HR meet.469 Google claims that the company wants its HR to 
emulate a science lab where everything is observed, tested and measured – even down to 
employees’ emotions.  
 A Google spokesperson, Jordan Newman, once proudly alluded to Google’s 
overarching management principle in a New York Times interview, “to create the 
happiest, most productive workplace in the world.”470 While we have seen how it links 
workers’ happiness to productivity – and this has been broadly embraced by business 
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practices and business literature471 – Google also resorts to intensive data to ensure 
workers’ happiness. Google scientists are experimenting on employees to determine how 
to maximize their happiness. The company has established the People Analytic team 
within POPs to observe and measure the emotional states of employees and thoroughly 
analyzes employees’ satisfaction to benefits, perks, salary, talent management, hiring and 
various aspects of employees’ lives in order to tune their management.   
 Slate Technology columnist Manjoo Farhad corroborates this by showing how 
Google uses its employee data tracking system to empirically quantify aspects of 
workers’ lives such as optimal lunch lines, the shape of furniture, and diet. Farhad reveals 
that POPs measured the lunch-line for their employees and found that 3-4 minutes is 
optimal in terms of workers having time to meet new people but at the same time not 
“waste time.”472 Google even specifies the shape and length of the so the company can 
put their employees in physical proximity to spur conversations and share information.473 
As “people walk down between the chairs, they bump into each other — it’s actually 
called a ‘Google bump’” according to John Sullivan, a management professor at San 
Francisco State University and workplace consultant.474 This is no mere accident, but 
designed – and it is driven by data.475  
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 Google’s management of its employees has even gone down to the level of 
individual diets. Jennifer Kurkoski, who has a PhD in organizational behavior and is part 
of the People Analytic team, has experimented with changing workers’ diets. Kurkoski 
explains, “When employees are healthy, they’re happy. When they’re happy, they’re 
innovative.”476 Kurkoski conducted experiments to help Google employees make better 
food choices as she rearranged the location of food, resized plates, and replaced food 
containers in order to reengineer employees’ eating habits. The objective behind this 
experiment was to understand ways to control food intake and the food choices of 
employees. The irony of Google’s attempts to have their employees make healthy food 
choices is a balancing act; on the one hand, Google provides unlimited access to free food 
to increase productivity; on the other hand, it has found that the company needs to deal 
with the side effects of unlimited access to food and the concomitant risks to workers’ 
health. This seems a benign experimentation, and even could be considered an act of true 
care; however, poor health will directly affect workers’ capacity to perform their tasks 
and productivity and ultimately affects Google’s bottom line.  
 From the minutia of diet to the entirety of the environment, Google is even 
designing its new campus based on data – data to bolster its workers’ productivity and 
efficiency. The new Googleplex – set to be the largest office in the US – takes its data-
driven approach to labor management to a whole new level. The company has measured 
everything from environmental factors like sun and wind to working and living habits of 
its thousands of employees. In a Vanity Fair interview, David Radcliffe, vice president of 
Google’s Real Estate & Workplace Services, proudly stated that no worker would be 	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more than a two-and-a-half minute walk from any other co-worker in the 1.1-million-
square-foot complex.477 He explains that the new campus layout is designed to generate 
“casual collisions of the work force” and said, “You can’t schedule innovation… We 
want to create opportunities for people to have ideas and be able to turn to others right 
there.”478 Eric Schmidt and Former Google Senior VP of Products (and current advisor to 
Google CEO Larry Page) Jonathan Rosenberg call it “foster[ing] serendipitous 
connection.”479 It seems “casual” or “serendipitous,” but if I can paraphrase David 
Noble’s book America By Design, it’s productivity by design. 
 Laszlo Bock, Vice President of People Operations, states, “We try to bring as 
much analytics and data and science to what we do on the people side as our engineers do 
on the product side.” Bock proudly declared that Google even has data on productivity 
based on the relationships between new employees and their managers’ greeting on the 
first day. He states that “when an employee starts on their first day, we have data that 
says, if the manager shows up and says, ‘Hi nice to meet you, you're on my team, we’re 
gonna be working together,’ and does a few other things, those people end up 15 percent 
more productive in nine months.”480 Measuring the correlation between the greeting by 
the managers and productivity is actually only a minor part of Google’s data-driven 
management. Concerned about employee turnover that could have a negative effect on its 
ability to compete, Google even built an algorithm to identify those employees most 
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likely to leave based on employee reviews, promotions and pay histories.481 Google’s 
characteristic of labor management is epitomized by Laszlo Bock’s statement: Google 
built an algorithm to “get inside people's heads even before they know they might 
leave.”482 
 While Google wants to get inside its employees’ heads, it also mines data to 
change employees’ behavior, questing to identify the metrics for “good” managers.  In 
2009, Google launched a premier project called Project Oxygen to identify such traits. A 
team of researchers gathered more than 10,000 observations about managers and 
performance reviews, employee feedback surveys, and nominations for top manager 
awards.483 The researchers then extracted general patterns in the data, built hypotheses 
and continued to collect more data by interviewing managers.484 The results of this 
analysis are the “Eight Good Manager’s Behaviors and Three Pitfalls” rules, which have 
been systematically implemented into Google’s management training program.  
  This set of eight “good” behaviors is incorporated into its own workforce training 
program called GoogleEDU. GoogleEDU is a vehicle to socialize employees and their 
managers into the Google culture and its corporate values. In 2012, Google renewed 
GoogleEDU programs to boost employee performance. Karen May, Google’s vice 
president of GoogleEDU, who has led the redesign of GoogleEDU, sums up the core of 
Google’s “new” management philosophy: “what’s important is that it aligns with our 
overall business strategy.”485 	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Google dances between paternalistic, participatory and data-driven scientific labor 
management in order to get inside of its paid workers’ heads to increase productivity and 
maintain stability in its workforce; however, these techniques are not exclusively applied 
to cadres and other paid workers. They are also employed in Google’s approach to its 
massive unwaged user labor force. The search engine firm is scientifically monitoring 
and managing users as well as giving them “free” services as a form of welfare program 
on capital’s behalf. By espousing welfare programs along with scientific management, 
the industry wants to get inside of all users’ heads – and Google has been doing so to 
unpaid labor long before it got inside its own workers’ heads. This is the actual essence 
of Google’s tenet – “focus on the user and all else will follow.”  
Scientific Management of User Labor 
As described in an earlier chapter, since unpaid users’ labor plays a vital role in 
Google’s profitability, studying data about and managing user labor have become as 
important – if not more so – as managing paid labor. While the search engine industry 
does not use the term “user labor,” as it does to its paid labor force, Google user activities 
are studied, observed and measured in variant forms of user studies as their labor is 
incorporated into production processes. From the early stages of their business, search 
engine firms have been conducting substantial research on users and tapping deeply into 
academic institutions as they shape and expand the field of user studies and develop 
expertise in this new field.  
Initially, when search engine firms were using traditional information retrieval 
(IR) techniques, documents were the main unit of analysis and search results were based 
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on the keyword similarity between the query and the documents.486 However, as the 
Internet provides an interactive platform where users interact between documents and the 
system,487 users have become an important unit of analysis in IR systems; their activities 
as users provide a vital feedback loop in determining improvements of IR systems. In 
particular, as search business model has become based on advertising, users have become 
the most important unit of analysis and user feedback is directly linked to advertising 
revenue.  
By the end of the 1990s, large-scale user studies on commercial search engines 
had begun to be visible within the academic industrial complex. One of the earliest user 
behavior studies was the Excite Research project by Jansen and Spink in 1998.488 This 
research initially analyzed 51,000 queries and later expanded the data set to 2.5 million 
queries from Excite’s transaction logs to look at searchers’ online activities, including the 
number of queries per user, number of terms per query, number of documents viewed, 
query modification and distribution and occurrence of terms. In 1999, Craig Silverstein 
from Stanford University teamed up with Michael Moricz from AltaVista to conduct an 
analysis of one billion entries for search requests from AltaVista query logs.489 This 
research was considered to be significant because of the longitudinal nature of the large-
scale commercial search data collected to understand individual patterns of search use.490 
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Silverstein et al. found that users tended to type short queries and that the majority looked 
at the first 10 results.491 The search engine business continues to exploit this general user 
behavior pattern as it sells search results.  
In particular, large-scale user research is considered a necessary method to learn 
general and individual patterns of what, how and why users are searching as the industry 
engages the mass population.  Search engine firms began to conduct their own research 
using their own data – frequently but not always in conjunction with academics.  
User studies are encompassed in a range of different research areas including user 
experience, user engagement, human computer interaction, user data mining etc. Over the 
last 10 years, under these diverse rubrics, search engine firms have been deploying 
various research methods to understand users through log analysis, ethnographic studies 
click metrics, questionnaire surveys and lab and field studies on searchers’ activities 
across the spectrum. It is notable that search engine firms began to publish some of their 
research output at academic and industry conferences beginning in the early 1990s. Since 
1993, Google – which lists 715 researchers – has published 2,899 research articles as of 
July 2014; Yahoo! lists 2043 publications.492 The research area of user studies overlaps 
with a range of other fields; thus, it is difficult to identify the exact numbers of 
publications specifically targeting user activities. However, much research related to user 
activities commonly falls into the areas of algorithms, machine learning, artificial 
intelligence, data mining, human-computer interaction (HCI), and information retrieval 
(IR). Microsoft has more than 2000 publications falling under the IR heading while for 
Google, almost 50% of its research output belongs to those areas.  	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Not accidently, these research areas have become popular within the wider field 
of computer science in universities. According to a dataset of 2200 faculty in the top 50 
US Computer Science Graduate Programs from Brown University, the largest field of 
research in computer science is Algorithms & Theory which is at the nexus of machine 
driven user data mining and analysis.493 As a business strategy, the search engine industry 
has been supporting robust programs for universities around the world, aiming for them 
to serve corporate interests through the establishment of funding, visiting faculty 
programs, post doc programs, and internships. 
 Before 2010, Google funded many smaller research grants,494 but since 2010, it 
has begun to substantially fund research focused on Google’s business, launching its 
Google Focused Research program – “areas of study that are of key interest to Google as 
well as the research community.”495 In the first year of the program, a large grant of 
$1.35M went to a University of Washington researcher, a former Intel research director, 
whose work is on mobile data collection in science. In 2014, Google received 691 
proposals and funded 115 projects in 46 countries;496 the company gave the most funding 
in the fields of human-computer interaction, systems, and machine learning which are the 
areas where users are most involved. Academic institutions are eager to seek Google’s 
funding and work with the “most innovative” company in the world as they ally their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 This dataset was collected as a project for a Human Computer Interaction course at Brown University in 
Spring of 2014. Detailed data is available at http://cs.brown.edu/people/alexpap/faculty_dataset.html. 
494 Nick, Eaton, “Google grants UW researcher $1.35M for data collection,” Seattlepi, February 4, 2010, 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2010/02/04/google-grants-uw-researcher-1-35m-for-data-collection/; 
Steve Lohr, “Google puts New Focus on Outside Research,” New York Times, February 1, 2010, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/google-extends-outside-research-funding-to-new-
fields/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
495 “Announcing Google's Focused Research Awards,” Google Official Blog, February 2, 2010,  
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/announcing-googles-focused-research.html. 
496 “Google Research Awards: Winter 2014,” Google Research Blog, February 18, 2014, 
http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2014/02/google-research-awards-winter-2014.html. 
	  168	  
research with corporate commercial interests. Of course, this shouldn’t come as a surprise 
as spending cuts from public funding has led universities to seek corporate funding more 
intensively and policies like the US government’s 2013 “lab to market” initiative to spur 
commercialization of Federal government’s taxpayer funded academic research. By 
bringing universities and corporate researchers together with government support, the 
industry has been able to bolster the field of user studies, and bring experts under its 
sway. 
Delving into Users 
The Internet industry is pushing the scope of user research beyond merely 
tracking general patterns of user behavior through traditional analysis of query logs. 
Basically, every minute movement of users is becoming of interest to the industry. 
Google research is working on prediction of users’ behavior based on historical 
performance of user search patterns,497 tracking individual user behavior over various 
search services and platforms such as images, maps, voice, mobile and tablets,498 
examining the conditions that convert users into consumers, and even detecting an 
individual searcher’s frustration in real time,499 users’ response times to speed of search 
services,500 and building a user’s personal interest profile based on click behavior and 
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personalized recommendation system.501 Along with Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! have 
also expanded their research in behavior biometrics and cognitive behavior. This type of 
research seems merely to be purely academic scientific experimentation, and far from 
current search engine business, but they are the basis of future profit-making projects.  
Eye-tracking technology built on visual behavior data is an illustrative example. 
In 2005, Google researchers published an article entitled “Incorporating eye tracking into 
User Studies at Google” which revealed that the company collected eye-tracking data to 
supplement their understanding of user behavior as well as to measure users’ feelings 
towards Google’s services and products.502 Yahoo! and Microsoft have both endeavored 
to keep up with Google in this area. Microsoft has published several research studies on 
eye-tracking of users’ visual attention as they surf the Web. These studies examined gaze 
duration and differences in individual gaze patterns to understand user attention and the 
relationships between visual attention of where and why users look on the screen and 
decide to click.503 This eye-tracking technology is now commonly being used by search 
engine industry to see how users navigate homepages, identify “hot zones.” 
While the search engine industry, allied with academic institutions, is able to 
guide the general research agenda for user studies on behalf of the industry, search engine 
firms are also pursuing their own secret projects to help them preempt and monopolize 
the market. Google has its semi-secret lab called Google X where engineers and scientists 	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are experimenting with self-driving cars, drone technologies, robotics, and Google glass. 
In the lab, Google has also quietly developed eye-tracking as a hands-free way of 
unlocking, manipulating and navigating mobile and wearable devices,504 and “pay-per-
gaze” eye-tracking technology that could measure user engagement based on how long a 
user looks at an ad and their emotional response as indicated by pupil dilation so that 
advertisers could price based on actually seeing their ads.505 Wired magazine reports that 
Google’s pay per gaze technology is clearing a path for an advertising business model for 
wearables.506 Google has already filed patents for these technologies.  
User Labor as Big Data  
 The search engine industry’s consistent investment in user research has been 
critical to figure out ways to understand and normalize inherently irregular, 
heterogeneous and complex user information activities so that they can be predicted and 
incorporated into search engine mechanisms, products and profit. However, the 
precondition of this process is the collection of user activity data; in other words, 
surveillance is the prerequisite for search business. Thus, from the beginning of its 
business, the industry has aggressively deployed and experimented with a wide range of 
data mining techniques to collect and control user data.  
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 There are two common methods implemented by the industry to observe and 
manage searchers’ activities – server logs and client logs. One of the original methods 
used to observe the characteristics and patterns of searchers’ activities is the transaction 
log. The transaction log (which refers to a search log) in a search engine is the record of 
interactions between the search engine and users’ searches.507 Search logs are considered 
server-side logs since Web servers record and store the interaction between searcher’s 
browser and the search engine.508 This server-side log basically allows the tracking of the 
interaction between the user, her query, and the search engine.509 The data included in the 
logs are the user’s IP address, time spent on a page, click path (aka “click stream”), the 
url of the requested item, search term used, search content, number of unique visitors, 
browser type, and browser language.510 Search engine firms record a “server log” every 
time a user makes a query with their search engine. One of the reasons that using server 
logs to monitor user activities has been common is because a large set of data can be 
collected in a fairly easy and low-cost way. Since users are not aware of the process 
whereby their activities are being observed, this is a technique “to obtain a large quantity 
of data on unaltered user behavior in the complex Web environment.”511 The industry has 
been fighting to retain control of these data.  
 This mass quantity of routinely collected search logs could be held by search 
engine companies for an indefinite period up until 2007, when the European Union’s 
advisory body of member states’ telecommunications ministers, called the Article 29 	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Working Party (WP29), asked that major search engines doing business in the region 
anonymize the personally identifiable data in search logs after 6 months to protect 
consumer privacy. Google’s rival Microsoft, which had less than 2 percent market share 
in Europe at that time,512 first agreed to comply with the European Union’s demand that 
data retention be cut to six months while the company reminded the Working Party that a 
single company – which meant Google – was controlling the majority of the market and 
its data practice had turned into an industry standard. Shortly thereafter, Yahoo! said the 
company would limit its search logs to 90 days before anonymization and pressured its 
competitors to shorten their data retention period.513 Yet, the importance of user data for 
search engines showed when the company reversed its decision in 2011 and extended its 
data retention back to 18 months. Yahoo!’s reason for its reversal was “to meet the needs 
of consumers” yet, the company admitted that shortening its data retention policy had 
“set them apart from the rest of the industry.”514 It suggests also that the longer duration 
possesses importance.  
 Google initially resisted the EU’s demands, but compromised to make search log 
data anonymous after 18-24 months, and later cut it down to 9 months’ retention. In the 
process of negotiations with the EU, Google’s security/privacy engineer Alma Whitten, 
who was involved in Google’s decision on data retention, was quoted in Ars Technica 
describing Google’s data retention; 
Wonderful things can be done with an abundance of data… When Google’s teams 
began looking at the data retention issue a few years back, they “started with 	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zero” and tried to see if they could make it work. They could not; Google would 
lose the ability to do too many useful things.515 
 
In other words, without harnessing search logs – records of users’ labor – Google would 
limit the profit delivered from its products. However, Google and other Internet firms 
persistently present the reason for data collection and retention as one of “care” for its 
users. Like Yahoo!, Google’s first privacy principle is “use information to provide our 
users with valuable products and services.”  
 While collecting and analyzing search logs are popular techniques and 
indispensable for profit-making, Internet firms have found that the server side search logs 
are limited in terms of harvesting user activities in their entirety – because server logs 
only capture the clicked link or the information submitted through the browser.516 
However, the industry is interested in learning user activities before the actual click to 
understand users’ search intentions through users’ mouse hovering and scrolling etc. 
Bernard Jansen, Amanda Spink, and Tefko Saracevic noted that search log data reflects 
real artifactual search behavior, but do not provide the context of search activities.517  
 To overcome the limitations of server-side logging, the industry has also been 
deploying client-side techniques – referring to a user’s computer or an application that 
makes requests to servers – to capture more comprehensive individual activities, 
including information such as what a user might consider but does not actually click, 
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printing, bookmarking, use of the back button, etc.518 Client-side logs are collected by 
installing Web applications on a user’s computer.519 The browser is one of the most 
common Web applications that are utilized by search engine firms to collect individual 
searchers’ activities. Compared to search logs, client-side logs reveal literally every move 
a user makes – including keystrokes, mouse clicks, submission of the form, backtracking, 
user login and profile information, and page requests – and have the most robust types of 
logging information. Lara Catledge and James Pitkow examined client-side user 
interactions on NCSA’s XMosaic and pointed out that “actual user behavior, as 
determined from client-side log file analysis …  can supplement the understanding of 
Web users with more concrete data.”520 Given this, there is a reason that search engine 
firms have introduced their own browsers and designed numerous other client side apps 
to work with their specific browsers because they are not only a way to increase Web 
traffic but also can be used as platforms to collect enormous amounts of information on 
user activities.  
 This log data from both the server and client sides provides a large breadth and 
quantity of information surrounding user activities on the Web. However, the problem of 
these data for Internet businesses was initially in the difficulty in tracking an individual 
user’s activity, because the HTTP protocol in which a search engine and a browser 
communicate is a “stateless” protocol. This means that each query is a new connection 
and appears independent of any requests the user (browser) made previously, while most 
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Web applications require multiple requests to finish a particular task. The HTTP protocol 
was initially designed to support stateless applications. This preserves some degree of 
privacy for users; yet, the stateless protocol was problematic for Internet firms for their 
online business, because applications have to maintain “state” information in order to 
remember login permission, transaction stages, items added to a shopping cart etc., but 
HTTP protocol does not support those necessary business functions.   
 This is where  “cookies” come in. Cookies were introduced by Netscape in 1994. 
They are small text files that reside on the searchers’ hard drive and pass between the 
Web browser and Web server. Cookies help to maintain “state” and contain a unique 
identifier, which allows a Website to recognize and distinguish the user whenever s/he 
visits a site. Thus, they are used to identify a specific session ID when a Web browser 
interacts with a Web application. Moreover, cookies contain state related data such as a 
user ID, passwords, purchase history, and consumer preferences, which can be 
extrapolated to a single visitor. These data are the vital assets for the Internet 
marketplace. Cookies are a more accurate method for identifying individual users than 
simply depending on IP address. The IP address of the client machine also represents an 
individual user, but it is difficult to associate the IP address with the particular user since 
more than one person could use one computer and/or ISPs often assign dynamic IP 
addresses.521 Since identifying and reaching out to each individual user rather than 
merely targeting demographics is critical to the Internet industry, cookies have become 
an essential and necessary tool for the user analysis process, and expansion of online 
advertising. Thus, search engine firms are fighting tooth and nail to control cookie data.  
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 In 2007, Google’s cookie data were set to expire in 2038. Google was the first 
search engine firm to specify a data retention policy of 30 years and this became the norm 
among Internet firms. Google’s draconian data control was heavily criticized by privacy 
advocates, and when the EU asked US internet firms to reduce their data retention 
periods in 2007, as mentioned earlier, Google changed their retention of cookies 
information to 18 months while keeping its server logs for 9 months before anonymizing 
part of its IP data. This means that Google truncates/ anonymizes the last octet of the IP 
address to prevent itself from being able to trace any particular query back to a particular 
computer. This doesn’t completely anonymize the data, it just makes it more difficult to 
computationally zero in on specific users’ activity. 
 Since their inception, cookies have been at the center of privacy debates. When 
Netscape implemented cookies in 1994, cookies were accepted by default, and users were 
unaware of their existence. However, there was soon a growing concern over cookies in 
terms of privacy. In 1995, the Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF), an Internet 
standards body, led the development of cookie specifications; at that time it was not clear 
that Netscape’s cookie specification would become the basis for the IETF’s standard.522 
Initially, IETF proposed prohibiting a browser from accepting third party cookies or 
permitting a browser to accept them by default provided the user could control the option 
and the default was to opt out.523 There was also a proposal to limit state information with 
cookies being destroyed at the end of each browser session. Online advertisers 
vehemently objected to this proposed standard because they had already recognized that 
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limiting cookie usage was a threat to their business model. In the end, Netscape’s cookie 
specifications were used as a baseline, which favored corporate- over users’ interests.  
 Interestingly, Netscape’s default cookie specification being altered not by public 
demands but by the information industry itself has had far-reaching implications. Internet 
firms began to block third party cookies to prevent the collection of their data by rival 
firms. Apple’s Safari browser has been configured since 2003 to block third party cookies 
by default, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) and Opera browsers enabled “Do Not 
Track” as a default and Mozilla’s Firefox browser has blocked third party cookies since 
Firefox version 26 in late 2013. Google’s Chrome browser is the only one to allow all 
cookies as the default setting. The significance of the industry’s move could be merely 
seen as a victory for users and privacy advocates, but underneath this shift there are inter 
capitalist rivalries trying to set the terms on behalf of their own interests. In particular, 
Microsoft’s change of cookies settings directly attacks Google’s ads business, given IE’s 
large market share of over 58%.524 Blocking third party cookies in IE prevents Google 
from using behavioral ads targeting based on users’ previous browsing activity in its 
AdWords. On the other hand, Microsoft is positioning IE 10 as a “pro-consumer” product 
and an alternative to Google’s Chrome browser. In the case of Apple’s Safari browser, it 
has only 5% of market share on the desktop, but it is the most widely used browser on 
mobile devices and designed to block third party cookies. This is a major problem for 
Google whose business is advertising. So what’s Google’s solution?  Google along with 
other advertising companies, were willing to break into Apple’s Safari security settings to 
collect user data. Google used a code in its advertisements to trick Safari browser into 	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collecting user data on both desktop computers and iPhones. For hacking Safari browser 
and tracking users’ history, Google was fined  $22.5 million by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).525 The fact that Google was willing to take this risk knowing full 
well the legal consequences shows the critical nature of the data. Google and its 800-
strong legal team clearly understands that its voracious data collection activities are 
potentially illegal, yet the company is intentionally – and sometimes covertly – pushing 
the boundaries of data collection and privacy laws to shape the legal environment in favor 
of its business. 
 Cookies are still the most widely used technique for data collection of users’ 
online activities, but this is also changing. According to a study by the UC Berkeley 
Center for Law and Technology, nearly 85 percent of the top 1,000 sites have cookies set 
by a third party.526 However, Internet firms have been looking for alternative 
technologies for cookies because third-party cookies are inconsistent and limited in reach 
because they are now blocked by default on major browsers, some users remove cookies 
on a regular basis, and cookies do not translate well to the mobile environment because 
they don’t provide cross device user tracking capabilities.527  
In the rapidly growing mobile space, Internet firms have already begun to use new 
forms of tracking technologies. Google introduced its Advertising ID (AID), which 
allows advertisers to track user behavior across all Android apps using the AID to target 
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ads to specific users at specific times.528 Google’s AID is similar to Apple’s Identifier For 
Advertisers (IDFA) introduced in 2012 (and now required for all iOS apps). Google has 
not yet abandoned cookies on mobile devices; however, as the Internet business is 
shifting to the mobile sphere, the industry is in search of better user tracking techniques. 
One of the most controversial data collection methods employed by Google was 
the packet sniffer, a piece of software (sometimes a hardware device) which was able to 
monitor the network traffic coming in to a Web server and to extract usage data directly 
from TCP/IP data packets. The use of a packet sniffer is not illegal per se because it was 
originally designed to assist network administrators in troubleshooting their network. Yet, 
between 2007 and 2010, Google used it to capture vast quantities of private Web traffic 
data from open Wi-Fi routers.529 In fact, Google was building a database of Wi-Fi 
location information to correlate cell towers and Wi-Fi routers with coordinates to use in 
its mobile business. Google admitted that it sniffed open wireless networks “to map those 
networks, which would then be used by mobile devices such as smartphones to pinpoint 
their locations in Google's mapping services.”530 According to court documents, Google 
used its new patent-pending Wi-Fi sniffing technology to collect data.531 The patent 
application illustrates that Google is interested in more than just basic Wi-Fi location 
information. Rather, the company states that, “collection, decoding, and analysis of a 
user’s payload data would, therefore, serve to increase the accuracy, value, usability, and 
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marketability of Google's new method.” 532 Though Google claims that collection of 
payload data – including all traffic on unsecured Wi-Fi networks like email, text 
message, passwords, and other personal information submitted by Web forms, browsing 
histories etc. – was inadvertent, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Report 
shows that Google wanted more than mere Wi-Fi network location data.533 The FCC 
concluded that Google did not violate any law; FCC closed the case with a mere $25,000 
fine for failing to cooperate in the FCC’s investigation.534 Along with the FCC, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ended its investigation without a fine and concluded 
that Google had given the FTC assurances that the company would not use data that they 
collected. These verdicts are indicative of the US government allying itself with Google 
and legitimatizing these kinds of data collection practices. Google even took this case to 
the US Supreme Court in an attempt to legalize collecting private data through open Wi-
Fi networks after a federal appeals court ruled that the practice violated user privacy.535 
The Supreme Court declined to hear Google’s case.  
After much publicity, Google declared that the company had stopped the data 
collection program by its Street View Cars. Yet, this did not mean that Google has given 
up mapping Wi-Fi hotspots, given that all of Google’s mobile products hinge on a 
database of locations vital for mobile services – including mobile applications to function 
and to serve highly tailored ads based on users’ specific locations. A Google product 	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manager revealed in the Wall Street Journal that “the collection of location information 
from millions of mobile devices and personal computers is ‘extremely valuable’ to the 
company's future business.”536   
Now Google is leveraging users with mobile devices to collect its data as Android 
phones regularly check on users’ location using GPS, Cell ID and Wi-Fi to locate the 
device and send back data to Google’s location servers. The location service identifies a 
phone’s location by comparing the names and strengths of nearby Wi-Fi hotspots against 
its database of Wi-Fi hotspots.537 With this method, users do not even need to turn on 
Google Maps or actually be connected to a Wi-Fi hotspot because their phone will detect 
Wi-Fi- and users’ location regardless.538  
 This technique was originally developed by Skyhook Wireless, which competes 
with Google’s location service. Apple chose Skyhook over Google when Apple’s first 
generation iPhone did not have a location database, while leaving data collection to 
Skyhook and Google. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Google was irked by Apple’s 
use of Skyhook over Google’s service, and when Samsung and Motorola chose to use 
Skyhook’s service, the company forced them to drop the contract under the clause of 
incompatibility with Android OS and to replace it with Google’s own system. In fact, 
Skyhook filed a lawsuit against Google for business interference and patent infringement. 
The suit documents revealed that Google’s main reason for fervently trying to handle 
location services for mobile phones was because Google “could collect the users’ Wi-Fi 	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information.”539 In a New York Times article, Michael Shean, the co-founder and senior 
vice president of business development at Skyhook said user location could be more 
accurately pinpointed through Wi-Fi hotspots than via GPS because GPS accuracy is 
limited in urban environments and inside buildings so Internet firms would use Wi-Fi and 
GPS in tandem. He also pointed out that they use data from users’ phones to constantly 
update their database of Wi-Fi hotspots.540 Why then is Google even using coercion to 
collect data through mobile phones? Google is racing after location-based services (LBS) 
market set to be worth $39.87 billion by 2019. Since Google had to drop collecting Wi-Fi 
data through its maps car, collecting location information through Android has become 
more essential than ever.  
 Apple and Microsoft are using the same technique to collect location data. Since 
2010, Apple also began to provide its location-based service through its own database of 
Wi-Fi hotspots. The company was even recording users’ geo-location data in an 
unprotected file on iPhones. This led to a Congressional investigation in 2011, and 
Apple’s response to Congress was “by using any location-based service on your iPhone, 
you agree and consent to Apple’s and its partners and licensees’ transmission, collection, 
maintenance, processing and use of the location data to provide such products and 
services.”541 Yet, it turned out that even if location services were turned off, Apple was 
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still collecting and storing the data.542 In order to please European regulators, Google 
offered users an opt-out option from Google’s location service.543   
 Besides these controversial data collection methods, there are lesser-known but 
long-standing techniques that are also employed. For example, a Web beacon, often 
referred to as a Web bug, is another technique to collect user activity data. The Web 
beacon – sometimes used in tandem with or to deliver a cookie – is a transparent 1 pixel 
by 1 pixel graphic that is embedded in a Web page or email. When implemented using 
JavaScript instead of a graphic, they may be called JavaScript tags. Web beacons help 
advertisers track users. Described in an earlier chapter, Google’s Analytics service and 
advertising networks such as DoubleClick use Web beacons to count how many have 
access to particular Websites and to provide a survey of targeted market information. 
Mining these data, they create user profiles indicating the types of ads to be shown to 
particular users. Web beacons are also embedded in email like Gmail, Hotmail, etc. to 
track details about when a message is read and to whom the message might be sent. 
 This is not even close to a comprehensive list of user tracking and data control 
strategies, but illustrated above are the major techniques and efforts that are employed by 
the search engine industry to collect and manage user activity data. Backed by the use of 
enormous technical capacity, labor and capital, the amount of user data collected, 
managed and analyzed by search engine firms is astronomical. Bing is currently storing 
nearly 300 petabytes of data and creating nearly 1 terabyte of data each day.544 Google 	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processes 25 petabytes (a petabyte is about 1,000 terabytes) each day. The search engine 
industry is the major data collection machine in the data business – the epitome of so 
called “Big Data.” This big data, collected primarily through the labor of unpaid users, is 
the basis of the search business.  
 The “big data” of search has been growing exponentially, predicated upon 
effective techniques of labor control. As Jacoby has pointed out, welfare capitalism has 
endured after the Great Depression. There is a resurgence of welfare capitalism – a mark 
of the industrial economy; however, while earlier welfare capitalism was designed to 
control the working class in order to quell the power of labor unions, today’s welfare 
capitalism is being deployed to manage the elite class in non-union tech firms. Backed by 
data, “science” and the interactive nature of Internet technologies, the current welfare 
capitalism is redressed with a façade of democracy but conceals the exploitative 
relationship between capital and labor as if capitalism could be built on democratic and 
participatory ideals. While Taylorism has been criticized for its dehumanization of 
workers, a new stage in the historical arc of Taylorism is reemerging that is celebrated 
today and has been adopted by Google and other Internet firms. And this time, it’s being 
applied not only to low level factory workers but to elite cadres and the unwaged labor as 
well. This lucrative search business built on the backs of massive amounts of unpaid 
labor is transnationalizing as it searches for new markets and new labor by expanding its 
geographical territories. The following chapter scrutinizes the different economic zones 




 Market Dynamics and Geopolitics: A Search for Stability  
The search engine industry operates across territorial boundaries as the gateway to 
the newly established marketplace of the Internet, and has become a key part of the 
world’s information infrastructure. Search is being organized as a social, political and 
economic control structure, and plays an instrumental role in deepening information 
markets on a transnational scale. This fundamental function of search is dominated not by 
Japan, Germany or France or China, but by the US-based search engine industry – mainly 
Google. US dominance in search seems to reaffirm the existing global political economic 
power structure, however, it has opened up a new geopolitical flash point as it recounts 
the unequal structure of information control. As Schiller posits, the construction of 
extraterritorial networks is a complex and contradictory process, one which not merely 
depends on technical experts but involves interests of states, various corporate users, and 
political constituencies.545 
 By situating search within current geopolitical contexts, this chapter elucidates 
tensions and conflicts to control over the new strategic information domain, a vital sector 
in organizing global transnational political economy. In particular, it focuses on the most 
globally contested zones where US-based transnational capital is facing opposition – the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), a relatively new and expansionary force within the 
global economy and the world's second biggest economy, and the European Union (EU) 
– US’s longtime ally as well as its global competitor and political counterweight. 
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Examining the geopolitical aspects of search, this chapter situates the dynamics of the 
political economy of contemporary transnational capitalism.  
Unfinished Battle 
 Historians have documented that information and communication networks have 
long been of strategic importance to the global political and economic interests of the 
great powers.546 In the 19th century, European powers – Britain, Germany, France, Russia 
– and their capital extended their political influence and commercial interests by building 
global information networks. Great Britain exerted its political, economic and military 
power, led manufacturing, commerce, finance and industrial technologies as it 
monopolized global information. Between 1864 and 1880, British firms laid submarine 
cables to Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, India, Hong Kong and Australia as the amount of 
global submarine cable increased eighty six times.547 By 1887, Britain controlled 70 
percent of the world’s cables; and twenty-five years later, it still retained a 63 percent 
share and dominated global information flow and networks.548 The majority of countries, 
including the United States, depended on British-controlled information networks for 
military and strategic purposes and finance and commodity markets.549 This put its rivals 
Germany, France, and Russia in vulnerable positions, which manifested during World 
War I (WWI).  When Great Britain declared war against German imperial ambition, it 
first destroyed two German submarine cables that connected Europe and America, and 
began to censor all communication that went through British-controlled cables in order to 	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isolate Germany.550 This affected the US political economy due to the lack of sufficient 
independent network infrastructure. Britain’s control of information infrastructure indeed 
hindered the growth of US economic power. This WWI experience spurred the US state 
and US capital to build independent information networks in order to fuel its own 
political and economic influence and geographical expansion. Unscathed from WWI, the 
US elevated its position into a rivalry with the other world powers, as Germany was 
defeated and Great Britain and France were weakened by the war.551 
 After WWI, the US attempted several times to build its own network, but this did 
not occur until World War II (WWII) and after. But over the course of WWII, the US had 
risen as it gained economic and military power, moved away from relying on Britain’s 
colonial information system control, and began to build its own information 
infrastructure.552 The expansion and dominance of the information industry played a 
central role in the US ascent. US information power has not gone unrecognized by its 
global rivalries, and its formidable position in the information sphere has been repeatedly 
assailed over the course of time as geopolitics and economics have changed. 
  In the 1970s, the French government was alarmed by US corporate dominance in 
computer and information technologies. The response to US dominance in the 
information sphere was articulated in the 1978 report, Computerization of Society – aka 
the Nora and Minc Report.553 The report, commissioned by the French government, 
warned of American domination in “telematics” as a threat to French sovereignty and 
economic competitiveness and warned of IBM’s dominance in the European information 	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market. The report urgently called on France to counter IBM, develop its own 
information-based industry as well as a comprehensive national strategic policy and 
investment in national information technology systems.  
 From a different direction in the 1970s, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
mobilized by Third World countries aspiring to self-determination, challenged the US 
and the western dominated information sphere as they recognized the importance of 
control over information for their economies, cultural independence and national 
sovereignty and demanded a New International Information Order (NIIO). Led by NAM, 
NIIO called out the imbalance of global information flows and sought out a more 
equitable, balanced information exchange among sovereign nations. The US, which had 
deployed the Free Flow of Information doctrine to support its global expansion, was 
criticized and questioned.554 This conflict over NIIO led the US to leave UNESCO, 
which had made room for NIIO. More recently, the US has reasserted the doctrine at the 
forefront of its foreign and economic policy on the global stage to control over the 
Internet. The battles over the information sphere have never ended, but the actors and 
their motives have altered as have the technologies in contention with the emergence of 
the Internet and its related industries within a changing geopolitical and economic base.  
 The business of search is one of the new information domains where this global 
battle over the information sphere has arisen. The search engine industry operates across 
territorial boundaries as the gateway to the newly established marketplace of the Internet 
and has become a key part of the world’s information infrastructure. It is also a 
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component of the most dynamic and prized pole of economic growth: The Internet 
industry.  
 The US recognizes the importance of this in the maintenance and extension of US-
led global capitalism. President Obama, addressing American innovation in his 2011 
State of the Union address, claimed that: 
What America does better than anyone else is spark the creativity and imagination 
of our people. We’re the nation that put cars in driveways and computers in offices. 
The nation of Edison and the Wright brothers; of Google and Facebook.555 
 
The search engine industry is one of the top new US strategic information industries and 
has opened up an entirely new global market. Led by Google, US search engine firms 
dominate in the sphere of information search, as they expand the domestic US 
information market, churn out many new products and aggressively build an 
extraterritorial information network. This requires them to remove barriers between 
nation states. However, Google’s global dominance is not a permanent condition; rather, 
its continued growth and expansion actually depends heavily on volatile and politically 
organized international markets. 
Contested Zones 
 There are a few places in the world where US capital is struggling for a foothold. 
China, Russia and South Korea are those rarest of places where there is a viable 
alternative to Google, and domestic capital has so far been able to capture and maintain 
those search markets. In particular, one of the most contested markets has been China – 
the world's largest economic growth zone and Internet market by population – where 
Google and other US-based Internet firms have made little headway. In China, according 	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to the survey by China Internet Network Information Center, 632 million people are 
logged on and spend an average of 25.9 hours a week online.556 As of 2013, the country 
had only 42% Internet penetration rate and still has much fertile ground where digital 
capital can dig. By comparison, the US has about 247 million Internet users and has 85% 
Internet penetration.557  
 In the world’s largest Internet market, the Chinese search engine Baidu – not 
Google – has organized and is mobilizing the labor of millions of unpaid voluntary users. 
As of 2013, the company had 21,800 paid workers, handling 5 billion daily search 
queries from unpaid voluntary users – more than any other search engine in any other 
single national market.558 To put this in perspective, the search giant Google processes 
3.3 billion queries on a daily basis.559 While Baidu only has half the paid employees that 
Google does, it has an immense reservoir of unpaid labor power. Baidu holds almost 80 
percent of China’s search-engine market by revenue and combined, China’s top three 
search engines Baidu, Qihoo, and Sohu command almost 90% of the market.560 Globally, 
Baidu is a distant second behind Google with 18.03% global market share – but this 
exceeds the combined market share of Bing and Yahoo!.561 
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 The rise of the Chinese search engine industry has been commonly presented in the 
mainstream media in terms of the Chinese state’s favoritism toward Chinese companies 
and/or the result of Google’s partial withdrawal from China in 2010, and an attempt by 
new “emerging” global power China to challenge the current hegemon – the US. Yet, 
given China’s deep reintegration into global capitalist markets, this perceived view of 
Google representing the US, the bearer of liberal democracy vs. Baidu representing the 
authoritative regime China, is incomplete and misleading and needs to be explicated in 
order to understand how the global search engine industry might actually have evolved. 
Haughty and self-serving declarations of moral principles set aside, US search companies 
need to participate in China’s high growth Internet market. And, unlike most other 
regions of the world, and even allowing for very extensive financial involvement by US 
and other foreign Internet firms, US search companies face real and intensifying 
competition from units of Internet capital based in China. 
 Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the search engine industry landscape is 
quite different. In major European countries such as France, Britain, and Germany, 
Google is the search engine. Unlike in China, there are no competitors in Western Europe 
– once the center of global information power – who are able to challenge Google’s 
expansion. Given this absence of rivals, Google should be able to extend its economic 
activities without obstacles. Yet, the reality shows otherwise. Google is facing severe 
opposition, is on the receiving end of numerous antitrust lawsuits from a number of 
European countries and is dealing with a series of ongoing legal problems across Europe, 
from anti-monopoly to copyright to privacy. Google has been dealing with a major 
antitrust investigation in the 27-member state bloc of the European Union. As of 2013, 
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six European countries, including France, Britain, Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy 
had agreed on joint legal action against Google over its privacy policy. And Google’s 
legal problems in Europe are far from over. With that in mind, what is the nature and root 
of opposition against Google in Europe? Who are the actors behind these conflicts? 
New Challenge: China 
 The information industry has long been considered of strategic importance for 
China within the wider context of its reintegration into the global capitalist economy.562 
In the 1970s, the post-Mao Chinese Community party – just coming out of its Cultural 
Revolution – launched a national campaign on four areas of  “modernization” – including 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. According to Yuezhi 
Zhao, this nationalist development agenda by Chinese political elites was a way to 
reclaim China from historical defeat and “catch up with the West” – including in 
information technologies.563 Thus, in the process of shifting from a socialist economy to a 
more state-capital oriented economy, Chinese policy has prioritized its information 
technology sectors and reorganized them as a new zone of economic growth. The former 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin once stated, “None of the four modernizations would be 
possible without information.”564 The information industry has been treated by the 
Chinese State as a pillar industry,565 and it is important to consider China’s ICT 
development to set the stage for the geopolitics of search in that region.  
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 By the 1980s, China had implemented extensive industrial policies to develop 
domestic information sectors, including the building of special economic zones and state-
funded technology parks, supporting homegrown software and hardware IT firms, 
investing in state-led nationwide large-scale IT infrastructure projects, and offering tax 
breaks for Chinese Internet startups.566 At the same time, China has built out its 
information infrastructure and made a concerted effort to promote the commercial use of 
information technologies at every level of industry, government and people’s everyday 
lives. As part of the reorganization of its information sectors, the Chinese state has 
attracted substantial foreign capital as a vital economic strategy in shifting its economy 
move toward information-driven development. China’s accession into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2000 was seen as an official juncture of China’s opening up to 
foreign capital. However, as Yu Hong shows, long before that, the Chinese government 
had facilitated foreign investment in development of Internet sectors via joint ventures, 
contractual arrangements, equity investments, and foreign R&D investments.567 By the 
early 2000s, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, Alcatel, GE, Bell Labs, and GM had all already 
established R&D centers in China. The development of Internet networks and its 
commercialization were political and economic arrangements at the center of the Chinese 
Party State’s industrial policy, which made it possible for transnational capital to reach 
China’s growing and lucrative information sectors. In particular was China’s industrial 
policy regarding Internet services running over telecommunication networks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Xiudian Dai, “ICTs in China’s development strategy,” in China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital 
Leap Forward, ed. Christopher Hughes et al. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 8-29. 
567 Yu Hong (2008), "Distinctive Characteristics of China’s Path of ICT Development—A Critical Analysis 
of Chinese Developmental Strategies in Light of the Eastern Asian Model,” International Journal of 
Communication 2 (2008): 456-471.  
	  194	  
 In 2000, the Chinese government standardized the regulatory framework for its 
Telecom Sector as it prepared for accession into the WTO. It clearly defined the 
categorization between basic telecom service operators and value-added information 
services operating over the network such as email, Internet services, online data 
processing etc.568 The PRC purposefully relaxed the restriction on foreign investment in 
value-added services – allowing foreign investors to own up to 50% – and the process of 
obtaining service licenses as compared to basic telecommunication businesses.569 The 
policy explicitly encouraged Chinese private capital as well as foreign capital 
participation in the development of Internet service sectors. By intentionally relaxing 
state involvement, the Chinese party state planned to cultivate market opportunities for 
domestic companies by using foreign capital and speeding up the commercialization of 
the Internet and its related industries.  
 With this effort by the Chinese State to accelerate market logic, foreign capital 
flooded into the Internet market in China. While direct foreign investment and whole 
foreign ownership of Internet services was prohibited in the Internet industry, many 
domestic and foreign firms pursued joint ventures, joint research and development, and 
complex contractual arrangements of mutually beneficial interest to allow foreign firms 
access to the Chinese market and give Chinese firms access to foreign capital. In the case 
of US internet firms like Yahoo!, Ebay, Amazon, Microsoft MSN, they all entered into 
the Chinese market through joint ventures with a local company. In addition to joint 
ventures, another common route that Chinese Internet firms used is a system called 
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Variable Interest Entities (VIEs), a workaround in which foreign investment can be 
utilized to participate in restricted industries such as the Internet and telecommunication, 
but may not directly control the enterprise. The VIE structure is often referred to as the 
Sina-model because it was first deployed in 2000 by Chinese Internet company Sina.   
 Under the VIE structure, two entities are created: one is offshore and the other is 
in China. PRC individuals and foreign investors first establish an offshore entity in the 
Cayman or other British Islands so that foreign investors are able to inject capital into 
that entity; in turn they can acquire ownership in offshore assets. The first entity then sets 
up a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) in China as a direct subsidiary. This 
subsidiary in China sets up one or more domestically licensed companies as its operating 
companies, and these domestically licensed companies are called VIEs.570 The China 
subsidiary sits between the off-shore firms and the VIEs. Via a series of contractual 
agreements with the Chinese subsidiary, the VIEs enable the overseas-listed company to 
effectively run its operations inside China. 
 Besides Sina, other major Chinese Internet companies like Baidu, Tencent, 
Tudou, Sohu.com, and Alibaba’s rival JD.com have been listed on the stock markets in 
the US, Hong Kong, and Shanghai using the VIE structure.571 Chinese e-commerce giant 
Alibaba, which recently became the world’s biggest IPO, is operating under the VIE 
structure as well. In 2011, the law firm Cadwallader reported in the Financial Times that 
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42 percent of Chinese companies listed on the US stock exchange are using the VIE 
structure, with thousands of unlisted companies operating in the same way.572   
 The Chinese party state is well aware that many of its Internet firms use VIEs to 
draw in foreign capital, and that foreign capital uses VIEs to invest in the restricted 
Chinese Internet industry. Periodically, there have been rumors that the state would 
perhaps regulate the VIE structure. In 2006, the Ministry of Information, which regulates 
Internet firms, said it was taking a look at the VIE practice. In 2009, three other 
ministries announced that VIEs were banned for companies involved in Internet 
gaming.573 More recently, in 2011, Reuters reported that the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) had asked the government to regulate VIE corporate structures. 
Yet, so far, the Chinese Party State has maintained its ambiguous policy stance and has 
never declared VIEs to be illegal or actually attempted to clamp down on the system and 
practice. What then is the reason for the Chinese Party state not taking action against 
VIEs to restrict foreign capital into Chinese strategic industries? On the flip side, 
according to a report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, US 
shareholders in Chinese Internet firms face “major risk” because Chinese courts might 
not hold that those contractual agreements are legal. Why then do US investors continue 
to invest in Chinese Internet firms in this manner?  
 There is a mutual understanding among transnational capitalists that the Chinese 
state would be unlikely to take any measures that affect major Internet firms anytime 
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financial interests involved are already massive.”574 Alibaba’s CEO Jack Ma, in his talk 
at China 2.0 conference in 2011 at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business, 
assured the audience that the PRC would not regulate the VIE structure given that so 
many Chinese Internet firms commonly operate as VIEs.575 In other words, transnational 
capital is so deeply interwoven into the development of Chinese Internet industry that it is 
hard to untangle without harming domestic capital and party-state elites own financial 
interests as well. This is not an accident; rather, it is the direct result of Chinese party 
state policy in the process of shifting its economy to being more market-oriented, 
absorbing transnational capital in order to reintegrate into the global capitalist economy. 
Thus, the rise of Chinese Internet firms like Baidu is tightly intertwined with the interests 
of transnational and domestic capital, and domestic and transnational capital classes. As 
Zhao posits, the defining feature of the information industry in China is that it developed 
during a period of market liberalization, globalization, and transnational integration.576 
The ascendance of Baidu and other Internet firms needs to be situated within this context.  
The Rise of Baidu 
 Baidu was co-founded in 2000 by Robin Li and Eric Xu, Chinese nationals 
educated in the United States. Current CEO Li studied computer science at the State 
University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo and worked at Dow Jones & Co. in 
Princeton, New Jersey, and Infoseek, an early search engine firm partly owned by 
Disney, as a search engine engineer. Xu, a former Xerox employee, has a Ph.D. in 
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biochemistry and is well-connected in Silicon Valley. In 1999, the two raised $1.2 
million in seed money from Silicon Valley venture capital firms Integrity Partners and 
Peninsula Capital and returned to China.577 On January 18, 2000, with that seed money 
and using the VIE structure, they co-founded Baidu, which was incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands as Baidu.com. In 2005, Goldman Sachs and Piper Jaffray (PJC), along 
with Credit Suisse First Boston (CS), underwrote Baidu's IPO and listed it on the 
NASDAQ stock exchange. Baidu’s IPO was considered the biggest opening on 
NASDAQ since the dot.com peak of 2000. Soon after its IPO, Baidu secured another $10 
million from two other US venture capital firms, Draper Fisher Jurvetson and IDG 
Technology Venture.578 The 2010 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission stated that Baidu’s initial majority investors were 
Americans and American firms.579 Ironically, Google – Baidu’s competitor in China – 
even bought a 2.6 percent share of Baidu in 2005, and sold the shares with 1100% return 
as the company started its own operations in China. As of 2013, 63% of Baidu’s shares 
are held by 471 financial institutions,580 including Baillie Gifford & Co, Price (T.Rowe) 
Associates Inc., Oppenheimer Funds Inc. etc.581 – Baillie Gifford & Co, Price (T.Rowe) 
Associates and others are also top shareholders of Google.582   
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 Baidu is a typical Chinese Internet startup nurtured by the Chinese state and by 
transnational capital during the late 1990s, even while the investment of Chinese venture 
capital in Chinese Internet startups slowly rose to today’s levels. Like other search firms, 
the majority of Baidu’s revenues still come from search advertising, but it has attempted 
to diversify its revenue stream. While Baidu relies on Chinese advertisers to reach 
China’s burgeoning consumer population, it also depends on many US advertisers that 
utilize Baidu to tap into the domestic and growing overseas Chinese market. Baidu has 
not revealed how many of its advertisers are US-based or from other foreign countries, 
but the number is expected to grow according to Scott Kessler, an analyst for Standard & 
Poor’s equity research services.583 As part of its strategy, Baidu is also aggressively 
building partnerships with foreign- as well as booming domestic IT companies. For 
foreign companies, partnership with Baidu is a way to break into the Chinese information 
market.  
 In 2006, Baidu struck a deal with MTV to provide television and music content to 
Baidu. The company teamed up with Providence Equity Partners – one of Hulu’s 
investors – to inject $50 million into the creation of licensed online video platform 
qiyi.com,584 established a joint venture with Japan-based Rakuten to operate a Business-
to-Consumer (B2C) online shopping service in the Chinese market, entered into a 
cooperative agreement with Nokia, and worked with Intel to develop search services for 
home PCs, laptops and mobile phones. Baidu partnered with Dell, Inc. to develop tablet 	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computers and mobile phones to target the Chinese market dominated by Apple and the 
Chinese company Lenovo – itself the buyers of IBM’s PC business. Recently, Baidu 
reached an agreement with BMW to bring self-driving cars to China under the project 
name called “Vision Zero” showing its ambition beyond traditional Internet sector. In the 
deal, Baidu will provide the map and content services while BMW supplies the vehicles. 
By partnering in these ways, Baidu has strategically integrated deeply into the global 
information sphere and expanded its business across the market.  
 The rise of Baidu in China has often been attributed by the Western media as the 
result of Google’s partial withdrawal from China in 2010 and Chinese government 
policies favoring Chinese-owned companies. After Google moved its operations to Hong 
Kong, Business Week reported that “Baidu will now enjoy near-monopoly status” in the 
Chinese search market. This prediction is only partially correct. Indeed, after Google’s 
partial departure, Baidu was at once able to raise its market control to 80%, but that was 
only a brief aberration. As of 2014, Baidu controls 58.76%, while its domestic rival 360 
Search shares 25.41%, Sogou 12.58%, and Google has 1.34%.585 By no means has the 
search engine market in China stabilized with Baidu seemingly reigning over the 
domestic search market. Baidu is facing fierce competition among fast-growing Chinese 
homegrown Internet firms, so its continuing dominance is not assured in the rapidly 
changing information landscape in China despite Google’s partial departure.  
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 The search engine market in China is highly dynamic, unstable and competitive. 
One of Baidu’s newly emerged contenders is Qihoo, founded by a former Yahoo! 
Executive586 and initially backed by the venture capital firm Sequoia Capita,587 which 
was also a major backer of Google. In addition to Sequoia, Qihoo is supported by both 
Chinese and foreign venture capital firms such as IDG Ventures, Highland Capital 
Partners, Trustbridge partners, and Chinese private equity firm CDH. The company is 
best known for being China’s largest antivirus software vendor, but it launched a search 
engine called so.360.cn, then used it in place of Google as the search engine on its portal. 
As of 2014, Qihoo runs the second largest search engine and browser in China.588 During 
its initial public offering in 2011, Qihoo 360 Technology raised $175 million in the 
biggest IPO by a Chinese company in the US that year.589 Citigroup and UBS investment 
bank underwrote the IPO, which meant that the banks had committed to purchase a 
certain amount of Qihoo shares at an agreed-upon price, and listed it on the NASDAQ in 
2011.590  
 Shortly after launching its new search engine, Qihoo introduced its own Web portal 
site hao.360.cn and its own browser the 360 Browser. So far Qihoo is chipping away at 	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Baidu’s search market share, and Baidu has responded by blocking Qihoo from access to 
its products and services. Baidu also took legal action against Qihoo 360, claiming that 
Qihoo 360 violated its robot exclusion protocol by indexing its Web content without 
permission.591 In response to the lawsuit, Qihoo argued that Baidu’s actions violated 
China’s anti-monopoly laws.592 To ease the tension between these competitors, the 
Internet Society of China, a government-backed trade group, stepped in and got search 
companies and other Internet firms including Baidu, Qihoo 360, Tencent, Sina etc. to 
agree to sign a self-regulation pact including a code of conduct to maintain fair 
competition.593 This “self regulation” can be seen as weakening the role of the Chinese 
state in the new market-oriented economy. However, as Yuezh Zhao succinctly posits, 
“self regulation” is a way for the Chinese state to couch the market as a benevolent, non-
political entity.594 It is part of the Chinese state’s neoliberal strategies where the party 
state distances itself from the market yet maintains its influence and strategically 
facilitates the commercialization processes.  
 In the midst of its battle against Baidu, Qihoo teamed up with China’s e-commerce 
giant Alibaba to launch 360.etao.com, an online shopping search engine. This move is an 
aggressive strategy by Qihoo and Alibaba meant to grab market share from Baidu's 
dominance in the Chinese search engine market. Besides search, Qihoo offers competing 
services like vertical search engines specializing in music, software, and mapping 
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services.595 Qihoo 360 had a hiring spree for its search unit, specifically targeting and 
recruiting employees from Baidu, as well as search teams from Tencent and Sohu.596 
Trailing Qihoo is Soguo, a subsidiary of Web portal Sohu and a long-time player 
in the Chinese search market. Sohu was the first Chinese language search engine/portal in 
China. The company was founded by ChaoYang Zhang, who received his PhD in 
experimental physics from MIT in 1993. Zhang left his position as MIT’s liaison officer 
for China and returned to China in order to start his own company, Internet Technologies 
China (ITC), with help from MIT media lab director Nicholas Negroponte – the One 
Laptop per Child (OLPC) evangelist – and Edward Roberts of MIT’s Sloan School of 
Management. ITC later changed its name to Sohu.597 In 2004, Sohu launched an updated 
search engine called Sogou. As the search engine market heated up in 2012, Sohu 
announced that the company would join the search engine battle between Baidu and 
latecomer Qihoo. However, since then, Sogou has sought buyers, spurring interest from 
domestic Internet giants Baidu, Tencent and Qihoo 360.598 The company had been 
holding a solid 10% share of the search market, but has not been able to sustain growth, 
facing competition from Baidu and Qihoo. From its competitors’ point of view, Sogou’s 
10% was vital enough to shift the balance of the search engine market. For Baidu, 
keeping Sogou out of Qihoo’s hands was necessary in order to maintain its dominance 
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and protect its share of the market it now enjoys.599 However, in 2013, Sogou made a 
deal with Tencent, which invested US$ 448 million for a 36.5 percent stake in the 
company and merged with Tencent’s search engine SoSo, which had a smaller market 
share. After the deal, Sogou’s market share rose to 12%, and Tencent-backed Sogue is 
now planning for its own IPO.  
Tencent – founded by Pony Ma, the third-richest man in China – is another major 
player in the Chinese Internet market and often ranked as the third largest Internet 
company in the world behind Google and Amazon, with market capitalization of $132 
billion. Tencent is more known for its core Instant Message (IM) product QQ and for 
gaming, but it jumped into the search market, and developed its own search engine called 
SoSo (meaning “search search”) and e-commerce portal. Initially Tencent partnered with 
Google’s search ad platform, but in 2009 it decided to replace Google with its own ad 
platform.600 While Tencent is a small player in desktop search with slightly over 3.5% 
market share, it is a bigger player in mobile search and online games. After acquiring the 
36.5% stake of Sogou owned by Chinese search engine Sohu, the two joined forces to 
challenge Baidu. About half of Tencent’s revenue was from online gaming, with another 
fifth coming from products like the mobile chat service WeChat/Weixin – which has over 
300 million registered users – instant messaging service QQ, etc. 601 The company is 
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more than 30 percent owned by South African media group Naspers Ltd, who also owns 
shares of Facebook and Mail.ru (MAIL), the largest Russian-language Internet firm.  
Meanwhile, e-commerce giant Alibaba rolled out its own general search engine 
called Aliyun or Alibaba Cloud Search – the same brand as its mobile operating system. 
Under its cloud computing division, Aliyun offers the basic features of search: Internet, 
news, images and maps, and competes directly with Baidu.602 This is not the first time 
that Alibaba has entered into the search market. In 2010, it partnered with Microsoft and 
launched the shopping search engine Etao.com.603 And to tackle China’s mobile search 
market, in 2014, Alibaba formed a joint venture with Chinese browser developer UCWeb 
called Shenma. Alibaba CEO Jack Ma voiced his domestic ambition, saying at the time 
“What Alibaba is going to do is to challenge the flagship of the industry and trigger 
benign competition”604 while it also aims to take its e-commerce business to emerging 
markets.  
If Alibaba is ambitiously moving into Baidu’s territory, Baidu is looking to carve 
out its own space in Alibaba’s lucrative e-commerce market. In an attempt to directly 
challenge Alibaba’s Taobao (TMall) dominance in e-commerce with over 80% market 
share, Baidu set up an e-commerce department in October 2007, and its C2C platform 
Youa, backed by venture capital like IDG-ACCEL and Qiming Venture Partners, opened 
in October 2008, but failed less than 3 years later. Since then, Baidu has attempted 	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several other e-commerce ventures without success.605 Will Baidu completely relinquish 
China’s e-commerce market estimated to be worth between $420-$650 billion by 
2020?606 The answer is no. In 2014, Baidu has joined forces with Tencent and the Dalian 
Wanda Group, the Chinese real estate, cinema and retail conglomerate, and once again 
entered into the e-commerce business against Alibaba. The three companies are set to 
launch Wanda E-Commerce, in which Baidu and Tencent would each hold a 15 percent 
stake. They plan to invest about $811 million in so-called online-to-offline business 
ventures where Wanda’s nationwide offline chain of 107 malls and department stores are 
integrated with the utility and popularity of Baidu’s and Tencent’s online search, social 
networking and payment services.607 To defend itself, Alibaba has embarked on a similar 
initiative into online-to-offline ventures, investing nearly $700 million to acquire a 
minority stake in the Intime Retail Group, which operates 36 department stores and 
shopping centers around the country. 608 And recently Tencent built a partnership with 
China's number 2 online retailer JD.com, preying on Alibaba’s weakness in mobile 
business.  
Similar to the US market, as Chinese Internet firms diversify their accumulation 
strategies, they move into each other’s territories of search, social media, browsers, 
mobile phones, music, games, video, e-commerce, and “Internet of things” all predicated 	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on continuing commodification of the Internet. For defensive and offensive purposes, 
Baidu is also pursuing a strategy of vertical integration by acquiring e-book sellers 
(Fanshu.com), a travel-booking service (Qunar.com), e-commerce sites (Yougou.com, 
360buy.com, tg.com.cn, yaodian100.com), an online community (jingtime.com) and a 
housing information portal (anjuke.com).609 In 2013, Baidu acquired online video 
provider PPS for $379 million and merged it with its own video platform, iQiyi, to 
compete with the top Chinese video business Youku Tudou – which had received a $1.22 
billion investment led by Alibaba. iQiyi also launched an in-house film studio – similar to 
Google’s YouTube tactic for original content creation – to produce domestic and 
Hollywood films while it has been working with movie studios to produce TV shows. 
Baidu’s main business and the majority of its revenue is still desktop search, but, as the 
company diversifies, it faces fierce competition from social media, e-commerce, video 
companies such as Alibaba’s e-commerce, Tencent's QQ SMS, Sina’s Weibo twitter-like 
microblogging service, and Renren, China's Facebook clone. 
 While Chinese Internet firms are competing with each other over these new 
markets, there are other contenders to Baidu that are barely on the western media radar – 
Chinese party state information service outlets. China Central Television (CCTV), 
People’s Daily and Xinhua are all flexing their muscles to expand their businesses into 
the increasingly lucrative Internet market and compete with privately owned Internet 
firms. In the process of “opening up,” the state-run media firms People’s Daily, Xinhua 
and CCTV have restructured and integrated into the market by incorporating private 
capital. The Chinese Communist party elites have vested interests in the market and have 	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become major players across the information sectors as the state assets have corporatized, 
commercialized and capitalized.610 This process is far from over. The state run companies 
are in the midst of undergoing additional restructuring processes in order to take part in 
the profit of the Internet – a new site of capital accumulation – as they compete and 
collaborate with private Internet firms.  
People’s Daily started to build its online operation in 1997 when it launched 
People’s Daily Online (People.cn Co.), an online portal for People’s Daily. The 
newspaper’s Internet venture was primarily viewed as the Chinese party State's effort to 
propagate its party agenda through new media, but it is equally a business imperative as a 
commercialized press in order to cope with the shifting information industry. In 2010, as 
part of an effort to expand its private capital, People’s Daily also built its own news 
search engine called Jike, hoping to tap into the burgeoning search engine market. Not 
surprisingly, Jike was not able to make even a dent against domestic competitors Baidu, 
Qihoo and Sogou and failed, but the state media has not given up on the search business 
and relaunched a new search engine called ChinaSo in 2014 by merging Jike and 
Xinhua’s search engine Panguso.611 This might not be the last attempt for People’s Daily. 
 Considering the changing information market environment, state capital has been 
pressured to expand its own operations to the Internet as it attempts to increase revenues 
by injecting more private capital into its business.612 People.cn Co. has not shied away 
from its market-oriented business model. The company described its business as a 
“market-oriented” commercial news portal which has benefited from transnational 	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capital613 and expressed that “it needs to accelerate its restructuring drive and ‘take active 
measures’ to compete with those commercial rivals.”614  
One of People.cn Co.’s defensive and offensive measures was moving toward an 
IPO in order to raise more private capital on the global financial market. In 2012, 
People’s Daily Online Co. launched its IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and raised 
$222 million, three times what it initially expected.615 People.cn Co. is the first Chinese 
state-owned information outlet that has gone public. As the Financial Times reported, 
“this is the first time a Chinese state media company’s listing includes not just 
commercial but also editorial assets.”616 People.cn received investments from many large 
state-owned enterprises including People’s Daily, China Mobile Ltd, China Unicom and 
China Telecom Corp Ltd.617 
  While People’s Daily and many other Chinese state information outlets have been 
building online operations from early on, compared to privately held Internet firms like 
Baidu, Tencent, Sina, Sohu, they are still relatively small scale. Through its IPO, 
People’s Daily Online intended to inject more private capital into its coffers and expand 
its business as it continues to integrate into the global capitalist information market. The 
company is ready to use new capital to upgrade its technology including mobile delivery 
and content,618 as it shifts into the mobile market and expands to include video services, 
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online news services, gaming platforms etc.619 After People.cn Co.’s IPO, Xinhua and 
CCTV have followed suit and are preparing for IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
 CCTV has already moved a large portion of its content – ranging from news, 
drama and variety shows – online to CCTV.com. It is planning to team up with China 
Mobile to launch an Internet TV station as CCTV’s online video platform.620 This 
initiative is motivated by private online video companies like Youku Toudu Inc. and 
Baidu’s iQiyi.com, which started to compete with CCTV for advertising revenues.621 In 
fact, CCTV has dominated the advertising business for the last 20 years, but the 
emergence of privately-owned Internet firms has changed the dynamic of the industry 
and chipped away at its advertising market share. In 2012, while CCTV had an ad income 
of US$4.3 billion,622 Baidu's ad income reached US$3.6 billion.623 If Baidu is able to 
continue to grow at its current rate, it will easily pass the broadcaster’s ad revenue soon. 
Baidu’s new video platform iQiyi.com is directly threatening CCTV. In The Wall Street 
Journal, a CCTV spokesman bemoaned the difficulties for state-owned, less marketized 
information firms to compete with newly emerged private Internet firms in a fully open 
and competitive Internet market.624 There is a growing pressure on Chinese state capital 
like CCTV. 	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 The tension between CCTV and Baidu is illustrated in CCTV’s hostile coverage 
of Baidu. In 2011, CCTV ran a series of critical stories about Baidu’s ad sales practices 
by revealing false ads on Baidu. This led the Baidu vice-president for sales to apologize 
on  CCTV to viewers affected by fraudulent information, and promising stricter 
censorship and policies in its sales procedures.625 The scrutiny of Baidu could be seen as 
CCTV’s outstanding journalistic standard, but CCTV’s critical report on Baidu also 
needs to be set next to the fact that Baidu and CCTV are fighting for the same online ad 
revenues.626 One of the reasons for CCTV to launch its own search engine is reciprocally 
to better compete with Baidu and other internet firms on that important turf.  
 Chinese state run news agency Xinhua also joined the race for Internet business 
by building its online unit Xinhuanet.com in 1997. In 2011, Xinhua released its own 
search engine, Panguso.com, in partnership with state-owned telecommunications carrier 
China Mobile, which came on the heals of the People’s Daily starting its own search 
engine, Goso.cn.627 The news agency is also venturing out to social media, offering its 
own Twitter-like messaging service. State run information outlets have long been 
commercializing their businesses, but they are renewing their ambition to do so in the 
Internet market.628 In January of 2011, Xinhua unveiled its first research center – called 
Xinhuanet Industrial Park – built to develop new media products in China’s New Media 
Development Zone in southern Beijing. Li Congjun characterized the construction of 
Xinhuanet Industrial Park as a strategic move to expand Xinhua’s media businesses and 	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enhance its online competitiveness. According to the Global Times, Xinhuanet has 
decreased its reliance on the government’s service purchases and fees, and the Chinese 
government has spurred state-backed media to seek IPOs to raise private capital in order 
to compete with private Internet companies.629 While a majority of the company’s 
revenue – 63.67% – now comes from online advertising, Xinhuanet’s mobile accounts 
still only account for 8.37%. 630 The company understands the significance of competing 
in and expanding its mobile Internet business, so it plans to invest in mobile Internet 
infrastructure with new capital from its IPO. Xinhua has hired China International Capital 
Corp. as an underwriter and filed for an IPO in Shanghai in 2014.  
Re-convergence  
 These private and commercialized state run Internet firms are all now re-
converging in the rapidly growing mobile market which will be a major revenue source in 
the future. In 2014, China became the largest mobile market in the world by revenue631 
and there are about 632 million people accessing the Internet in China, with 
approximately 75% of this number through mobile technologies.632 Given the importance 
of the mobile market, Baidu has been injecting a large amount of capital into the mobile 
market as well as cloud computing through which run mobile apps, software, data and 
services. Utilizing its dominance in desktop search and its brand name, Baidu has become 
the frontrunner in the mobile search engine market.  	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Baidu entered the mobile market relatively late. Its first move for mobile business 
was in 2011 with the launching of Baidu Yi, its own mobile operating system, to 
integrate its range of services into mobile devices. Baidu Yi is based on Google’s 
Android operating system, but as Amazon did for its Kindle Fire, Baidu forked 
(modified) Android OS, replaced Google services and directly integrated Baidu services 
including mapping services, an ereader, music services etc.633 Baidu began to build 
strategic partnerships with domestic and transnational telecom and mobile device 
companies in China to carry its Internet services. In 2011, Baidu started its own smart 
phone with US hardware vendor Dell running on its cloud-based Baidu Yi. This major 
attempt failed as Dell’s phone did not sell well; rather, low-end Baidu Cloud phones from 
China’s Changhong and TCL Corp generated more sales than the high-end Dell model.634 
This hasn’t deterred Baidu as the influx of mobile technologies is radically reorganizing 
the information industry as a whole.  
Rather, Baidu has shifted its investments more toward mobile applications, 
including its mobile browser, mobile search, and Baidu Application Center. The key part 
of Baidu’s strategic plan lies in the mobile cloud. The idea is that once Baidu has user 
information stored in its cloud services, it will discourage users from moving to other 
services or platforms. Google is already effectively using this strategy.635 Baidu has 
invested $1.6 billion in a cloud computing center to further its mobile strategies. Baidu 
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had less than 10% of its total revenue coming from mobile ads a few years ago, but as of 
2014, it had reached 30% of its total revenue coming from mobile.636 
 In the meantime, Easou Technology is trailing closely behind Baidu in the mobile 
search market. Easou, with headquarters in Shenzhen, started its business in 2005 as the 
first mobile search engine in China. Its revenue hit 300 million yuan in 2011.637 While 
the company does not have a PC platform, it targets the small and medium business 
mobile market where users do not generally use PCs on a regular basis. Unlike Baidu, 
whose mobile advertisers are mostly larger companies shifting their advertising budgets 
from PC to mobile, Easou relies on small and medium advertisers.638 Mobile search 
advertisements make up over 70 percent of Easou’s revenues, due to increasing numbers 
of cheap smartphones and 4G network access; the rest comes from paid music, games 
and software downloads.639 Since 2005, according to China Daily, Easou.com has 
received $50 million in four rounds of funding and is looking to go public on the 
NASDAQ.640 In the last round of funding, SB China Venture Capital, the Hsinchu, 
Taiwan-based company, United Microelectronics Corporation and French venture capital 
company Ventech joined in the venture.641   
 Trailing behind Easou is Tencent, which was reorganized in 2012 in anticipation 
of growing profits from its mobile platform and heavy investment in the app and e-	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commerce space. Tencent is competing with Baidu and Alibaba over the mobile search 
market642 and its mobile messaging app WebChat/Weixin grew to roughly 355 million 
monthly active users as of the end of 2013.643 The company has diversified revenue 
sources, moving to games, subscription fees, and advertising, whereas Baidu concentrates 
on online advertising.644 Tencent is trying to leverage its large user base against Baidu, 
and is also broadening its business spectrum on a global level by joining into partnerships 
with foreign companies. For example, Tencent teamed up with American Express to 
create Tenpay in order to provide a cross-border online payment platform to enable 
Chinese users to shop online on foreign Websites.645 This move is a threat to China’s top 
online payment system, Alibaba group’s Alipay, which, since 2007, has provided a 
payment service enabling users to shop on more than 600 overseas Websites.646 In 
response, Alibaba went on the offensive by acquiring stakes in Sina Corp’s social-
networking Website Weibo – a competitor of Tencent and navigation and maps firm 
AutoNavi. 
Transnationalization 
 Given the ever-intense domestic capitalist rivalries within China as illustrated 
above, Baidu’s dominant position in the Internet market continues to be challenged. 
Moreover, unlike its dominant position in the desktop market, Baidu has not been able to 	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fully exploit the domestic mobile market yet. These factors are pressuring Baidu to look 
for overseas expansion of its business. Baidu’s CEO Robin Li expressed that 
international expansion is an “important way” for the company to spur future growth; the 
company is investing 2 billion RMB in Shenzhen to build a new 220,000-square-meter 
complex for international operations. The Center is scheduled to open by 2015647 and will 
focus on R&D for strategic projects including Internet operating system. The company 
also has a presence in the US with the opening of the Institute of Deep Learning in 
Silicon Valley dedicated to Artificial Intelligence (AI).648 Baidu recently hired the 
leading AI researcher Andrew Ng to head Baidu’s research. Ng was a professor at 
Stanford University and previously worked on deep learning at Google. And the 
company is in the process of establishing an R&D center in Brazil, working with two 
local universities.  
Baidu’s transnational ambitions go back to 2007 when the company first launched 
its Japanese services, partnering with Japanese e-commerce giant Rakuten; yet its global 
expansion has not been a smooth road. In Japan, Yahoo! dominates the market with over 
50 percent market share – although Yahoo! search in Japan is powered by the Google 
search algorithm  and Google also holds over 36% of the Japanese market.649 Microsoft 
had attempted to convince Yahoo! Japan to use Bing’s search algorithm, but this effort 
failed because SoftBank, the Japanese cellphone and Web giant and Yahoo! Japan’s 
major stakeholder, refused their overture because of the larger benefit of using Google 	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search technology strength in Japanese language queries.650 As a newcomer, Baidu was 
dealing with incumbents Yahoo! and Google, and was not able to make a dent in the 
Japanese search market. Yet, this has not deterred Baidu’s global expansion efforts. 
Despite its unsuccessful venture in Japan, Baidu regrouped its global strategies and in 
2011-2012 launched services in Vietnam, Thailand, Egypt, and Brazil followed by 
Indonesia to test those markets. These targeted countries may seem to be randomly 
selected, but Baidu’s global strategy is calculated by targeting emerging markets and 
non-English territories.651 
After Japan, Baidu launched a local-language version of its Web directory 
Hao123 in Thailand, which has 25 million Web users. The company slowly introduced 
new services, including anti-virus apps now being used by 3 million users.652 The 
Chinese firm aims to make its site a business gateway for Thai companies exporting to 
China. Starting in 2011, Baidu offered the Vietnamese portal vn.hao123.com and Q&A 
service zhidao.baidu.com.vn followed by PostBar (“Baidu Tieba”) and social network 
“Tra Da Quan” – which means “coffee shop” in Vietnamese. Yet, Baidu is not the only 
Chinese company that is transnationalizing its business. Baidu’s domestic competitors 
have already entered Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia where they compete with each 
other and alongside Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft. In particular, Tencent WeChat 
mobile messaging app ranks 19th in popularity on Google Play and Apple Store in 
Vietnam, and has embarked on a joint-venture in Indonesia, the region’s largest 
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country.653 In 2013, Sina Weibo also expanded its presence in Thailand via a partnership 
with Jiaranai Entertainment based in Bangkok.654  
 To assist its global expansion, Baidu has been increasing its R&D abroad and 
opened its overseas joint lab with the Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R) in Singapore 
to focus on research on natural language processing technology for Thai and Vietnamese 
as well as Arabic and Portuguese. While Baidu’s move into Vietnam and Thailand seems 
a logical move considering their geographical proximity, what rationale could be behind 
targeting Egypt and Brazil? Historian Vijay Prashad, in his book The Poorer Nations, 
gives historical insight to understand Baidu’s geographical expansion. He characterizes 
emerging countries like Brazil, China, Egypt etc. as “locomotives of the Global South” – 
countries having both high economic growth rates and which are demographically large – 
to promote South-South corporations. They were initially organized as an alternative to 
Western neoliberalism; however, with defeat of the non-Aligned Movement in the 1980s, 
they are integrated into global capitalist system and committed to “neoliberalism with 
southern characteristics.”655  
In fact, Brazil has led the way in South America. It has the largest Internet 
population in South America and is fifth in the world with nearly 107 million Internet 
users as of 2014. Additionally, Brazil has a lot of potential growth in this area – only 53 
percent of its population currently has access to the Internet.656 Baidu’s strategy is not to 
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convert Google users, but to attract new Internet users. Jonathan Dillon, head of Baidu’s 
international business, considers Brazil its most important market outside China, saying, 
“Brazil is a growing economy with a flourishing internet industry.”657 Brazil is one of the 
most densely populated countries in the world, but US companies still have relatively less 
presence. To tackle this not-yet-fully-tapped potential growth market, Baidu and the 
world’s second largest consumer electronics vendor Lenovo have banded together and 
released the Baidu cloud powered smartphone.658 Baidu also recently obtained a 
controlling stake in Brazilian online-discount company Peixe Urbano to further its push 
into Brazil as it anticipates that the country’s e-commerce market will grow 18% 
annually by 2016.659 
The Middle East is another region with a burgeoning number of Internet users; 
yet, digital capital has also not yet fully exploited this region. In particular, Egypt is 
considered a strategic market by Internet firms because it is the most populous country in 
the Middle East and the third most populated in Africa. In 2011, Baidu introduced Arabic 
Baidu Zhidao, which allows users to post questions and privileges users for good 
answers. The object of Baidu Zhidao is a common way for search engine companies to 
develop much-needed Web content via free user labor in a market where there is little 
Web content available. With this content, Baidu is developing proficient search 
technology that works in Arabic – a widely spoken language.660 Kaiser Kuo, Baidu’s 
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director of international communications, did not hide Baidu’s ambitions in targeting 
Egypt. She told the press that Baidu was not only interested in standard fusha Arabic 
script because it is commonly used from the Maghreb to Mashriq, but also that Egypt is 
considered a culturally dominant country in the Middle East, with a large amount of 
cultural production and a large number of trained engineers.661 The idea is that mastery 
over this language will help Baidu generate more products and also expand into the wider 
Arabic world662 Kuo said, “in these markets, we’re dipping our toes in the water and just 
learning the lay of the land … We’re not in a huge hurry. We can be patient.” 663 Not that 
patient. Early in 2014, Baidu was testing its search site in Thailand, Brazil, and Egypt. In 
July of 2014, Baidu search went live in Brazil as the Brazilian and Chinese governments 
made a series of agreements including the creation of a “digital city” funded by the 
Chinese Development Bank.664  
Meanwhile, Baidu’s counterparts are not sitting on the sidelines watching while 
Baidu gobbles up new markets. In Egypt, the most popular search engine is Google with 
close to 95% of the search market share; Google also has over 98% market share in 
Thailand, Brazil and Indonesia. Attempting to expand its market share and counter 
Baidu’s move into Brazil, Google increased its Brazilian workforce by 50% from 350 
employees in 2011.665 This move comes as the Brazilian government is heavily investing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661 Neelima Mahajan-Bansal, “Growth Engine: China’s Search Giant Baidu,” CKGSB Knowledge, March 
12, 2013, http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2013/03/12/technology/growth-engine-baidus-global-expansion/ 
662 Mahajan-Bansal, “Why Baidu Likes Egypt and Other Such Matters.” 
663 Loretta Chao, “Baidu Brushes Up On its Arabic, Thai,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2011, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/09/15/baidu-brushes-up-on-its-arabic-thai/. 
664 Angelica Mari, “Chinese search engine Baidu goes live in Brazil,” ZDnet, July 18, 2014, 
http://www.zdnet.com/chinese-search-engine-baidu-goes-live-in-brazil-7000031771/. 




in its information sectors to accelerate the country’s social and economic development.666 
Yet, despite Google’s dominance in these countries, what makes these countries 
attractive markets for Baidu is that Internet penetration of these countries is still pretty 
low. Thus, Baidu is targeting populations and markets where US-based digital capital has 
not yet fully saturated. So far, compared to Baidu’s market power in China, Baidu’s 
overseas operations are relatively small and limited which has led it to seek strategic 
partnerships to leverage its market power. As a start, Baidu is forging a relationship with 
a French multinational telecommunications company – Orange S.A., formerly France 
Telecom S.A. – to provide a mobile browser for its Android customers in Africa and the 
Middle East.667 Baidu is accelerating its global expansion, aiming to have its products 
and services used by half of the world’s population by 2019.668  
US-based transnational capital 
 While Baidu is making an aggressive push inside and outside of China, what 
about US-based search firms inside China? In 2010, Google announced it was exiting 
China and moving its servers to Hong Kong over a claimed Chinese cyber attack of over 
30 different companies including Google’s own servers. And Microsoft and Yahoo! have 
never had a strong foothold in China and its roughly 632 million Internet users as of 2014 
– which accounts for less than half of the country’s entire population.669 Can US-based 
transnational capital give up the world’s largest and fastest growing Internet market? The 
answer is absolutely not. 	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 After Google’s announcement, a Microsoft spokesman stated that the company 
had no plans to move out or redirect its operations in China. Microsoft CEO Steve 
Ballmer wrote in a blog post about the importance of China for its company and stated its 
position thusly, “we have done business in China for more than 20 years and we intend to 
stay engaged, which means our business must respect the laws of China.”670 Microsoft 
remained silent about censorship and the whole hacking incident, not wanting to damage 
its long-term relationship with China. From Microsoft’s perspective, this is a business 
opportunity with one fewer competitor.  
 One year after Google relocated its servers to Hong Kong, Microsoft seized the 
opportunity by teaming up with Baidu. Microsoft’s partnership with Baidu was intended 
to capture English search, which has a 5 percent market share in China, while abandoning 
the Chinese language search market. To pursue this partnership, Microsoft confirmed that 
the company would comply with Chinese law and said, “as part of this partnership, Bing 
will incorporate certain filtering technologies and processes to ensure that we are in 
compliance with local laws.”671 
 So far this strategy has not paid off for Microsoft. The company holds less than 
one percent of the Chinese search market. Microsoft VP Shen Xiangyang lamented about 
Bing’s lack of market share improvement, saying, “If you can’t see users’ search 
questions and choices, if you don't have enough data to work with, then there is no way to 
make improvements [to the search engine].”672 Since search engine algorithms rely on 
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user feedback, Bing needs unpaid user labor to improve and refine its search technology. 
Bing’s lack of user traffic has stymied the improvement of its search. In an effort to find 
unpaid user labor to provide feedback and create content, Microsoft Bing teamed up with 
Hudong, which is known as China’s Wikipedia – with Bing providing search to Hudong 
and in exchange being given access to a large amount of content to assist it in enhancing 
and refining Microsoft’s search engine technologies.673 Whether this will give Microsoft 
a competitive edge is questionable; however, Microsoft is still expanding and looking for 
alternative routes into the Chinese market.  
 As former Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer said, the company has been operating 
for years and search is only one of many pieces of its business. As of 2013, Microsoft had 
a workforce of 4,000 in China, but the company was preparing to radically expand its 
operations, with plans to hire 1,000 additional employees in China and increase its R&D 
by 15 percent.674 One of the reasons for Microsoft to significantly invest in China in 
terms of resources, workforce, technology and partnerships is because it is betting on its 
cloud computing platform Azure to help it expand in China, Japan, and Australia. 
Microsoft is partnering with 21Vianet, one of the largest Internet service providers in 
China, which operates and sells the Windows Azure service in China.675 Microsoft’s 
move to the cloud isn’t without Chinese and US government involvement. China’s party 
state has encouraged the development of cloud computing as a strategic industry and is 	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formulating a national economic policy. In 2010, to push cloud computing, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) designated five pilot cities for cloud computing 
development.676 In 2011, during the 22nd US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and 
Trade, cloud computing was on the agenda for bilateral exchanges.677 With Chinese- and 
US governments’ blessings, the Shanghai Municipal Government became the first in the 
region to deploy Microsoft’s cloud services.678  
 Microsoft has also launched its Chinese Microsoft store online, partnering with 
Alibaba Group’s TMall, a shopping site that handles goods for more than 50,000 
merchants, including major brands like Dell, Gap, Lenovo, and Samsung. Microsoft’s 
game console Xbox One also began to sell in the Chinese market, where earlier game 
consoles had been banned by the Chinese government for 14 years. Despite Microsoft’s 
search engine setback, there is little sign that the company will retreat from the 
potentially lucrative and expansive Chinese information market.  
 Yahoo! on the other hand has been downsizing its Chinese operations as its 
business in general has seriously suffered in the US. Yet, Yahoo! still has some presence 
in China through partial ownership of Alibaba rather than its own services. Yahoo! first 
entered into the Chinese market in the late 1990s under the domain name of 
cn.yahoo.com with a joint venture with Chinese computer-maker Founder. In 2005, as a 
way to gain access into the Chinese Internet market, Yahoo! acquired a 40 percent stake 
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in Chinese e-commerce firm Alibaba.com and merged its China-based subsidiaries into 
Alibaba – including the Yahoo! Chinese search engine. This gave Yahoo! 35 percent 
voting rights in Alibaba.com and in return, Alibaba obtained the exclusive right to use 
and grow the Yahoo! brand in China.679 However, today, as Yahoo!’s business is 
dwindling in both China and the US, the company’s earnings have relied heavily on 
Alibaba’s soaring revenues.  
 In 2011, Alibaba bought back half of Yahoo!’s 40 percent stake for US$7.6 
billion, in a move widely seen as preparation for an initial public offering. After selling 
back the stocks to Alibaba, Yahoo!’s stake dropped to 20% ownership of Alibaba. Since 
then, Yahoo! China has closed both its email and music search service as the company is 
trying to revive its sagging business with serious acquisition sprees using the cash gained 
from selling its Alibaba stock and from Alibaba’s IPO. Yahoo!, who was one of the 
earliest email providers in China, ended its email service in 2013 and asked users to 
transfer their accounts to AliCloud, a core business of Alibaba.680 By closing its Yahoo! 
Mail and Music services, the company leaves only its Yahoo! Web portal in China. 
Yahoo!’s deal with Alibaba stated that the company had the right to buy back half of that 
stake from Yahoo! when Alibaba had its IPO. After Alibaba’s IPO, Yahoo!’s stock price 
actually went down as investors who had acquired a stake in Alibaba via the Yahoo! 
proxy, are now moving to purchase Alibaba stock directly.681 Given its declining search 
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and display businesses and shrinking revenue, at this point, Yahoo! has little capacity for 
long-term survival let alone expansion in China. 
 How about search giant Google? Google also entered the Chinese market in 2005 
and was able to gain over 35% market share of search service by number of users by the 
time it moved operations to Hong Kong. Now it only has a little over 1% of search 
market share in China. Google’s flagging business in China has often been explained by 
mainstream analysts within the context of Google’s withdrawal from the Mainland 
Chinese market in 2010, attributing the move purely to the company’s extraordinary 
moral high ground in refusing to compromise with the Chinese government’s censorship. 
Microsoft and Yahoo! did not abandon the Chinese market. Did Google really give up the 
world’s largest growth market on behalf of its self-claimed business principle “do no 
evil”? The answer is no.  
 In fact, Google never actually left China. Google itself dismisses the popular 
claim that the company departed from China; in 2012, Daniel Alegre, Google’s president 
of the company's Asia-Pacific operations, stated:   
We never left China, and we continue to believe in the market … It’s a very 
vibrant Internet market. We have some of the best employees at Google and we 
continue to grow not only our revenue but also our headcount in the country.682 
 
Google was praised for its “idealistic” act of leaving China to protest and evade Chinese 
government censorship, and presented itself as the corporate moral vanguard; however, 
as Alegre confirmed, the company has continued its operations in China. It is true that 
Google started to deliver its main search service through servers in Hong Kong instead of 
from Mainland China, which has contributed to Google’s radically shrinking search 	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engine business in China.683 However, it is a well-known fact that Google has kept its 
R&D operations, Google offices and its ads business in Beijing and Shanghai; in 
addition, it has never ceased its other business ventures – like music, maps, online 
shopping and mobile ads platform AdMob services. In 2011, John Liu, Google’s vice-
president in China also refuted the popular claim, and restated, “it [Google] has continued 
to provide music and translation services all through the past year… Our related business 
has also had significant progress.”684 This statement is corroborated by the Wall Street 
Journal, which reported that Google still had more than 500 employees in China as of 
January, 2013, including more than 300 engineers.685 This represented only a decrease, 
not a full-fledged flight from China, as Google had about 700 employees in 2009, 
according to a former Google executive in China.686 
As a matter of fact, after “leaving” China in March 2010, Reuters reported that 
Google simply shifted its business in China, targeting display advertising, particularly 
centered around China’s growing export firms who need to access global consumers and 
mobile business.687 Given China’s heavy reliance on exports, as much as Google needs 
the growing Chinese markets, Chinese firms also need Google – which reaches 90% of 
Internet users worldwide via its ads network. Considering these mutual interests, it is no 
surprise that Google re-focused on rapidly-growing Chinese exporters who were eager to 
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reach out to overseas customers through global search sites like Google.688 In China 
Daily, Analysis International, a market research firm, noted that Google’s Chinese 
revenues center around exports as it remains a a primary avenue for Chinese domestic 
advertisers doing overseas marketing.689  
 By early 2012, Google started to hire more engineers, salespeople and product 
managers in China to gear up its mobile business.690 And the company also rolled out its 
advertising platform DoubleClick Ad Exchange service in China to attract local Chinese 
businesses. Google’s DoubleClick has existed in China before, but added a real time Ad 
exchange marketplace – part of Google’s broader Ads Display Network.691 On the 
advertiser side of the equation, Google obtained Hylink Advertising, Taobao.com, Yoyi, 
and Aegis Group, while on the publisher side, Sina.com, Sohu.com, CNTV, and 
Ifeng.com have also joined the service.692  
 As of 2013, in China’s growing mobile market, Google's Android OS is on 
approximately 84% percent of Chinese smartphones, while iOS has 12.8% percent of the 
market.693 China had over 270 million Android users by the end of 2013 – 30% of the 
total global mobile market.694 By running Android OS on many different mobile phones, 
Google plans to control the smartphone market by driving mobile traffic to Google 
services. While Android is an open source platform, it is built around Google services 	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like Gmail, Chrome Internet browser and Android’s App Store – now called Google Play. 
All new Android code has to go through Google’s code review process, and Google also 
tightly controls the Android trademark so that the Android name is only used with 
Google’s approval. 695 
 Given that the majority of cellphones run on Android OS, Google possesses a 
competitive advantage in mobile in-app display advertising in China. AdMob’s mobile 
display ads are embedded in more than 300,000 phone apps,696 and have more than 
10,000 registered developers in China.697 App developers and corporations alike – 
including BMW and Shanghai General Motors – are marketing to Chinese smartphone 
users utilizing Google’s AdMob, which reaches across smartphone platforms.698 
According to China-based market research firm iResearch, Google generated 45 percent 
of all mobile display ads, compared to just 9 percent for Domob, its closest Chinese 
competitor.699 In comparison, in the US market, more revenue is generated in mobile 
search advertising than mobile display, both of which are dominated by Google today.700 
Gartner predicts that mobile display ad spending will grow and take over mobile search 
in China.701  
Google has never given up its efforts to gain market share in the world’s largest 
Internet market. The company also quietly turned off its much-publicized Chinese anti-	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censorship service in China after only six months. The service’s key feature was the 
notification of users when they typed a censored word, and giving them a choice to 
rewrite the keywords or redirect them to a help page explaining how not to be cut off 
from the Internet by Chinese authorities.702 Yet, Google continues to criticize the Chinese 
government’s censorship in public as if the company had left China. 
 However, Google’s persistent presence does not mean that Google is having a 
smooth ride. US digital capital is struggling and has bumpy roads ahead. Unlike in the 
rest of the world, Google has not thus far established a dominant position in China. Not 
only has Google’s general search market share in China been shrinking, Google shut 
down its shopping and music services as it was not able to compete with Alibaba’s retail 
search service Etao and Baidu music – which has a licensing agreement with One-Stop 
China, a joint venture with Universal, Warner and Sony BMG.703 While Google has 
boasted that the company has more than 1 billion devices with Android OS worldwide (as 
of late 2013), tens of millions of those smartphones in China use only Android Open 
Source Platform, which does not connect to Google services.704 The major Chinese 
Internet firms like Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent have all forked (modified) Android OS 
and replaced Google services with their own search and other services.  
 The 2010 dispute between Google and Alibaba offers a glimpse of Google’s need 
to control every inch of the Android market space in China. Google aggressively blocked 
Acer, a Taiwanese electronics company, from working with Alibaba to build a 
smartphone running Alibaba’s mobile OS by enforcing the Open Handset Alliance 	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agreement that Acer had signed. Under the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) – funded since 
2007 by Google – Acer was required to run versions of Android compatible with the 
Android ecosystem, and Google insisted that Alibaba’s Alyun Android-forked mobile OS 
was not. In the end, under Google’s threat, Acer retracted its agreement with Alibaba – 
which instead launched the K-Touch handset manufactured by handset maker Tianyu 
(not a member of the OHA) running Alyun OS with its own email, app store, etc.705 In 
2013, Alibaba made another mobile push to expand the reach of its OS by rebranding 
Alyun as Alibaba Mobile Operating System and subsidizing mobile handsets running 
Alibaba's mobile OS 1 yuan per month, and sharing revenues from a fund of $161.49 
million with mobile app developers to spur them to build apps for its OS.706 Despite 
Google’s offensive tactics, Alibaba, whose revenues exceeded 2 percent of China’s gross 
domestic product in 2012,707 did not flinch; rather it went on to bolster its mobile OS 
AMOS by making deals with five lower-end Chinese smartphone makers, including 
G’Five and Zopo, to sell AMOS-installed devices.708 The fastest growing Chinese smart 
phone maker Xiaomi, who hired Google’s former executive Hugo Barra as vice-president 
of international operations, is also running a forked Android OS but without Google Apps 
and services using it own services.  Xiaomi is solidifying its hold as the third largest 
mobile maker, breathing down Samsung’s and Apple’s necks.   
 Google is facing stiff competition in China; however, the company will not or 
cannot afford to give up on the world’s largest Internet market. The company will 	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continue to deploy diverse tactics to tackle the Chinese market, and is not above eliciting 
help from the US government. Daniel Alegre, Google’s top executive in Asia, in an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal in 2012, alluded to Google’s affirmed new 
strategy by saying “Google is aiming to capitalize on its fast-growing Android operating 
system for mobile devices, online-advertising and product-search services to grow in 
China.” One goal, he said, was to introduce Android Market (now known as Google 
Play), which wasn’t available in China as of January, 2012, in order to offer mobile 
applications to users of Android-powered smartphones and tablets.709 How far will this 
strategy work and be able to change market dynamics in Google’s favor?  
 There are hundreds of local providers that already offer paid and free apps in 
China.710 Unlike in the US apps market, where Apple and Android dominate, the Chinese 
app market is more fragmented. There are about 20 major players, with Baidu, Qihoo 
360, and Tencent leading the way – distributing about 86% of mobile apps.711 In addition, 
Google’s domestic competitor Apple is showing the importance of the expanding 
Chinese market by being willing to work within Chinese legal requirement concerning 
privacy in launching a localized Chinese app store, and storing personal data in China 
Telecom servers. In May of 2013, Amazon jumped ahead of Google and began its mobile 
app business in China, and launched its Android App store, which offers both free and 
paid apps – which is different from Google Play, which currently offers only free apps in 
China. Given this, whether Google can carve out market share in China remains open.  	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This uncertainty possibly helped to motivate Eric Schmidt to visit China. In 2013, 
he made a public appearance in China on his way from a trip to North Korea as a mystery 
speaker at “Geek Park” – the Chinese version of TED talks – to target product managers, 
developers and investors. At the gathering of 3000 “geeks,” he spoke about Google’s 
Android operating system, and attempted to persuade local developers to write 
applications for the platform,712 enticing them by talking about ways to monetize apps. 
Schmidt told the crowd, “don’t just settle for the China market. Go after the world 
market.” He sounded more like a cheerleader than a moralist.  
 Giving up on China is not an option for Google. Because not only is China the 
largest Internet market and growing economic zone, but also Chinese Internet firms are 
attempting to establish their market positions in other emerging markets across Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, where Google is trying to maintain and expand its dominance. 
This is a serious threat to Google’s future growth, so Google has to figure out ways to 
interact with them. Despite China’s Internet market being fueled by transnational capital, 
the PRC’s policies enable and provide maneuverability for domestic digital capital to 
compete.  
Europe: Old Challenge 
Countering Google Search Engine 
 US-based transnational capital is confronting serious obstacles in China’s search 
engine market. Google in particular also faces vicissitudes in Europe despite its 
overwhelming domination of Europe’s search engine market. Since World War II, 
Europe has had a long history of struggle to challenge US dominance in the information 	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sphere, but it has not been able to build a globally competitive information economy or 
even autonomous information systems. In fact, Europe’s dependence on US information 
systems has benefited both the US and US capital. Google’s global dominance has again 
provoked Europe’s anxiety over losing control over strategic emerging information 
sectors to the US.  
 The full story of European countries’ failed attempts both individually and within 
the framework of the EU, to establish a thriving, multifaceted information industry 
independent of and competitive with the US, has never been told. It started in the 
immediate postwar period and extended from digital computer to satellite to data 
communication network to today’s Internet system and application; competitive tensions 
pertaining to search service must be placed in this larger context. 
 In 2005, during the French-German ministerial conference, then-French President 
Jacques Chirac warned about the danger of losing the “power of tomorrow,” and stated 
that, “We must take the offensive and muster a massive effort.”713 Chirac was responding 
specifically to US dominance in the information industry, and in particular to Google. At 
the conference, Chirac, alongside then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, endorsed a 
proposal to build a Franco-German Internet search engine called Quaero (Latin for “I 
Seek”). Later that month, following the conference, Mr. Chirac self-servingly declared, 
“culture is not merchandise and cannot be left to blind market forces. We must staunchly 
defend the world’s cultural diversity against the looming threat of uniformity. Our power 
is at stake.”714 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 “Attack of the Eurogoogle,” Economist, 2006, March 9, http://www.economist.com/node/5571496. 
714 Ibid. 
	  235	  
 With urgency, France and Germany initially agreed to commit around $1.3 billion 
to $2.6 billion toward the project over five years in order to build an alternative search 
engine.715 European-based technology companies like Thomson, France Télécom, 
Siemens and Deutsche Telekom also contributed to the Franco-German project.716 Yet, 
this effort was far from successful in mobilizing European countries to counterbalance 
Google; rather, it ended rather ignobly when Germany dropped out of the project in 2007.  
 The media reported that the main reason for Germany opting out of the Franco-
German project was due to a disagreement regarding the format of the search engine – 
with German engineers pursuing a text-based search engine and French engineers 
favoring a multimedia search engine. Yet, this offers merely part of the story. The 
German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel – from the Christian Democratic 
Union, which had defeated Gerhard Schröder’s party – shifted Germany’s position, 
considering Quaero to be not worth the $1.3 – $2.6 billion investment. Angela Merkel 
had never committed to the project in public.717 According to the New York Times, 
Germany’s retreat from the project was because many German participants in the project 
did not want to be associated with an anti-Google project as they considered Google’s 
technology to be beneficial.718 Rooted in historical legacy, France was overtly anxious 
over US dominance of new information spheres and the enrichment of US digital capital 
at the expense of French, while the German government still aspired to ally itself with the 
US to be part of global digital capitalism.   
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 Soon after Germany pulled out of the Franco-German project in 2007, the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) launched the search research 
project Theseus which was first presented at the German Chancellor’s IT summit 
established by BMWi in December 2006.719 Theseus focuses in developing new 
technologies for Internet services based on semantic Web technologies, which links 
information together via metadata through partnerships with 60 academic institutions and 
private industry. Hendrik Luchtmeier, a spokesman for BMWi, distinguished Theseus 
from Quaero, stating that Theseus would not develop a search engine per se, but would 
support companies and organizations working in areas including search-technologies and 
advanced communication networks.720 By aiding private IT companies and the public 
institutions that support them, the German government intended to build its own 
information sector that would have capacity to compete in and be an integral part of the 
global information market. The Theseus program, one of Germany’s biggest research 
projects, is a way to produce marketable products and services.721 Economics Minister 
Michael Glos openly posited Theseus’s economic agenda, stating that, “… New forms of 
acquiring, searching for and evaluating Internet-based information are of strategic 
importance for the German government … With Theseus we want to improve Germany 
and Europe’s ability to compete and reach a top position in IT and communications 
technology.”722 The program received a 100 million euro subsidy from BMWi – with 
approval from the European Union –with another 100 million euro planned contribution 	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by participating partners from both industry and research institutions.723 In the first phase, 
the German government funded major German multinational IT companies – Siemens, 
SAP, Empolis and Deutsche Thomson – and planned to also aid medium- and small sized 
companies.724  
 Mainstream media reported that the reason for the split between France and 
Germany was because of differences in technical approaches to search technology – 
Germany wanted to build Theseus based on the semantic Web, while France was focused 
on multimedia search technologies. However, the real agenda for the German 
government all along seems to have been to build a German centered IT sector – rather 
than a European – to insert power into and help shape a global digital capitalism in which 
Germany would have a growing stake. 
 Quaero and Theseus are not the only European projects. Pharos (Platform for 
searcHing of Audiovisual Resources across Online Spaces) is another EU search engine 
project similar to French search engine Quaero. Pharos also focuses on multimedia and 
audiovisual search technology. A smaller project was led by the Norwegian search 
company Fast Search & Transfer ASA (FAST) and financed by both private and public 
funds. The European Union’s Information Society Technologies Programme – with 
thirteen partners from 9 countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Switzerland and the UK) and including France Telecom, L3S Research Centre at 
the University of Hannover, Fraunhofer Institute for Digital Media Technology – funded 
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FAST with 8.5 million Euro.725 The private company running the Pharos project shut 
down in 2009, shortly after Microsoft’s 2008 acquisition of FAST – now known as 
FAST, a Microsoft Subsidiary. 
Countering Google Book Search in Europe 
 Along with the announcement of building European search engine Quaero in 
April 2005, then-President Chirac and the Premiers of Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and 
Hungary, also sent a letter to the President of the European Commission and 
recommended that the EU create a digital European library to make Europe’s cultural 
heritage accessible for all. This was a state-centered response to Google book search, 
which had embarked on a project to digitize books, maps, newspapers, paintings, 
photographs and other cultural artifacts from around the world. Jean-Noël Jeanneney, 
who was the head of Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF) from 2002 – 2007, called 
out Google’s book project as a bid for supremacy based on privileging American culture 
and privatizing public resources. Europeana was the answer to this supposed attack on 
French culture.  
 Europeana – a European Commission initiative – aggregates resources from 48 
European national libraries, museums and archives. At the same time, the BnF was also 
part of a larger initiative of the European Commission’s five-year economic strategy 
called European Information Society 2010 (i2010)726 meant to build a European-based 
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digital economy. The EU launched this initiative in 2005 in order to foster economic 
growth by prioritizing information sectors within a single European information market, 
and to provide EU investment in research on information-related business.727 Given this 
context, the digital library Europeana is not only on EU’s cultural agenda but also on its 
political and economic agendas. The chosen vehicle was public-private partnerships 
(PPP) in digitizing cultural materials as a step toward the building of an EU-based 
information economy. Following in the footsteps of US digital capital, the EU moved 
into the cultural realm, which had not been fully captured by capital and made into a 
marketplace. Digitization was the first step in this process.  
 The EU has made a concerted effort to build its regional information economy by 
recruiting cultural institutions – though it has been done unevenly across European states; 
yet, Google has also already seized upon some of Europe’s eagerness to generate its own 
cultural materials, as well as to build its own information-based cultural industry. 
Digitization and organizing digitized information are expensive, onerous processes that 
require enormous financing, extensive technical expertise and a developed infrastructure. 
However, so far, few institutions in Europe can afford the cost and/or have the technical 
capacity to compete and outpace Google – especially amid the current economic crisis 
and widespread austerity policies. The EU has promoted digitization of cultural materials 
and contributed them to Europeana; but it made clear it would not pay for the actual 
digitization work, which was left to individual member nations and institutions. Given 
this, many European cultural institutions such as national and university libraries in Italy, 
Austria, Spain, Ireland and Britain have allied instead with Google, which is willing to 
digitize their collections in order to speed up the digitization process. Google’s offer is 	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enticing for many European institutions because it entails the company digitizing 
institutions’ materials free of charge in exchange for adding the digitized materials into 
Google book search as well as Europeana.  
 France was the exception among European countries in defying any alliance with 
Google and challenging US dominance of European information sectors. In 2009, 
conservative then-President Nicolas Sarkozy vowed to spend $1.08 billion as part of an 
economic stimulus package toward digitization of the content of museums, libraries and 
cinematographic heritage organizations. 728 He warned that he would not allow Google 
“to carry out a massive literary land grab on French and other European literature.”729 
Sarkozy stated, “we won’t let ourselves be stripped of our heritage to the benefit of a big 
company, no matter how friendly, big or American it is”730…  “We are not going to be 
deprived of what generations and generations have produced in the French language just 
because we weren’t capable of funding our own digitization project.”731  
 The plan for France was to use existing digital collections within the Gallica project 
in order to challenge Google. How would France pursue this? Sarkozy emphasized the 
importance of public-private partnerships in digitizing his nation’s cultural works. France 
aimed to build up Gallica’s collections by partnering with French publishers and private 
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companies.732 This public-private partnership was a way to open up public resources to 
private companies – a step toward exploitative privatization of public resources. France’s 
overarching concern was eroding US dominance in the information market and protecting 
France’s cultural heritage for French commercial interests – not to attack capitalist 
development of information 
 In December 2009, after France had said no to Google and decided to pursue its 
own digitization project, French Minister of Culture Frédéric Mitterrand and Google 
executive David Drummond met in Paris to discuss France’s concerns. In a New York 
Times interview, Bruno Racine, President of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF) 
(2007 - present), emphasized the “necessity of a partnership with the private sector in 
order to secure the capital needed for vast digitization projects.”733 Racine’s position 
shifted from that of his predecessor, Jean-Noël Jeanneney, who had been a fierce 
opponent of the Google Book search project to digitize the world’s books. France now 
left the door open for Google to be part of the public and private partnership. According 
to a cable made public by WikiLeaks, the reason Mitterrand altered his position was 
because it would take $1.5 billion and technical expertise to digitize 14 million works in 
the BnF, and Google agreed to create jobs in France and open a scanning facility in Lyon 
as part of its digitization agreement with the University of Lyon.734 
 By January 2010, France had agreed to work with Google on the digitization of 
books at the BnF; but they insisted that they would not allow Google to have legal control 
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over digitized materials. Google was demanding exclusive control over the works for a 
period of 20 – 25 years. Mitterrand was quoted in an interview in Le Monde as saying,  
Google came to Europe with the attitude of a conqueror, and many opened the door 
to it by signing deals which I find unacceptable, (that) are based on excessive 
confidentiality, impossible exclusivity, and a casual, even one-sided approach to 
copyright … We will propose to them ... to exchange files without confidentiality 
or exclusivity, in total transparency and with total respect for copyright.735 
 
France aspired to control its own information and insisted that Google drop its exclusivity 
clauses in the agreement.736 Yet, before the French government’s official partnership 
announcement with Google, the Bibliothèque Municipale in Lyon had forged a deal with 
Google to digitize its entire book collection and to give Google the rights to the works for 
25 years. This became the first library in France to partner with Google to digitize books.  
 France had led Europe in voicing its opposition to US control over information, but 
there are signs that France is gradually having its information sphere taken over by US-
based transnational capital and marching toward privatization of their own cultural 
materials. In 2013, the French Ministry of Culture announced a public-private partnership 
between the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF) and US-based ProQuest to digitize 
over 70,000 books, 200,000 sound recordings and other documents in the public domain. 
Within this partnership, ProQuest will retain 10-year exclusive agreements allowing the 
company to host and commercialize the digitized collections.737 In fact, this ProQuest 
move is alarming to Google which has been eyeing rich European culture to absorb into 
Google’s profit-making realm. Toward this goal, Google launched its Cultural Institute 	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under the guise of digitization of world culture for global access; yet it aims to digitize 
cultural materials from museums and archives around the world and gobble them up into 
its business of information.738 The Google Cultural Institute has already opened up 
headquarters in Paris to preemptively occupy the untapped cultural information sphere. 
Can France continue to resist US-led digital capital in Europe and build its own 
information-based economy as a counterweight to the US? Will France be able to push 
back against Google’s massive global scale of corporate takeovers of culture that have 
become such lucrative resources? At the same time, can US capital pass on such a 
massive reservoir of culture that could be a new source of profit making? 
Battlefield 
 Google’s relentless advances into Europe’s cultural and information spheres have 
been stirring Europe’s deep-seated anxiety over US information dominance. But 
ironically, the battle is less between European- and US-based capital, then between rivals, 
much of US based Internet capital looking for competitive advantage extraterritorially by 
making use of European legal authority in the jurisdiction of the EU. As a result, Europe 
has turned into a major battlefield for US inter-capitalist rivalries.  
 In 2010, the European Commission (EC) – the EU’s executive body and the 27-
nation bloc’s antitrust authority – officially opened its antitrust case against Google on 
whether the company was penalizing its competitors in search ranking. This antitrust case 
was initiated by four companies based in Europe – French legal search engine Ejustice.fr, 
1PlusV, the parent company of eJustice.fr, UK-based Foundem and Microsoft-owned 
Ciao! based in Germany. These four companies filed official complaints with the EU, 	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stating that Google’s search algorithm had had significant negative consequences for 
their Web site traffic. On the surface, it seemed that these cases had been brought by 
European companies protesting against Google’s European market dominance. In point 
of fact though, as Nicolas Petit, a professor of competition law at the University of Liege 
in Belgium pointed out, “Everyone understands here in Brussels that it’s Microsoft versus 
Google.”739 Microsoft is behind numerous antitrust complaints to the EU against Google, 
in order to challenge Google for giving preference to its own services and advertisers in 
search rankings. Microsoft has been using several lobbying groups to urge the 
Commission to probe Google’s business practices. The Financial Times uncovered the 
fact that Foundem was supported by the Initiative for a Competitive Online Marketplace 
(ICOM), a Microsoft-backed lobbying group, to turn their charge against Google into a 
formal anti-trust complaint.740 ICOM is largely funded by Microsoft, its sole trustee. In 
2007, the Wall Street Journal and the Observer both revealed stories about Microsoft’s 
cozy relationship with ICOM.741   
 In addition, Ciao!, once a long-time Google AdSense partner, now is owned by 
Microsoft. Initially Ciao! took its case to the German competition authority, but moved 
its case to the EC to  have legal standing throughout Europe rather than limiting its case 
to Germany. In March 2011, Microsoft itself filed a formal complaint with the EC, 
stating that Google had engaged in an unfair, anti-competitive “pattern of actions.”742 
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TripAdvisor, a travel review Website, also joined the EU competition complaints against 
Google. TripAdvisor, along with Microsoft, is one of the founding members of 
FairSearch. The 17-member group was created after Google had acquired flight-booking 
software ITA in 2010. Members of FairSearch also include other major US-based Google 
competitors – Foundem, Expedia, Hotwire, Kayak, Nokia (now own by Microsoft), 
Oracle etc.  
 Joaquín Almunia, the EU competition Commissioner, had already hinted in the 
summer of 2012 that Google and the Commission had “substantially reduced” their 
differences.743 Mr. Almunia had been suggesting that he would like to negotiate with 
Google rather than deal with them in court.744 In April 2013, the Commission concluded 
that Google may have breached antitrust rules and the Commission could fine the 
company as much as 10 percent of its annual worldwide revenue;745 yet, the commission 
accepted Google’s concession as Google submitted a proposal to address the concerns 
voiced by the European Commission. The Commission invited comments from interested 
parties on Google’s offer in relation to online search and search advertising.746 Microsoft 
led Google's rivals in pressuring the commission to reject Google’s proposal, which 
promised to label Google’s own services and show links to rival services in its search 
results. “It would be better to do nothing than to accept Google’s proposals,” said 
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Thomas Vinje of FairSearch. He further stated, “The proposals would make things worse 
rather than better.”747 Under pressure from Microsoft's lobbying groups, the EU made 
Google agree to further concessions to settle the case. In February of 2014, Google 
agreed to alter the way its search results display competitors’ links, seemingly putting to 
an end the three-year antitrust probe and avoiding a heavy fine for Google.  
 Yet, the agreement was highly criticized initially from Microsoft-backed lobbying 
groups, which are asking for an actual test of Google’s latest proposal before 
implementation.748 This time, European digital capital backed by firms like Lagardère 
Active in France and Axel Springer in Germany are also heavily voicing their opposition 
to Google’s proposed settlement with the EU. After many complaints and pressure from 
Google’s rivals in both US and Europe, in June of 2014, Commissioner Almunia alluded 
that investigation on Google could be reopened and finally the EU Commission rejected 
Google’s third proposed draft. Moreover, before the EC even settled Google’s antitrust 
cases, FairSearch members including Microsoft, Nokia – a Microsoft partner in the 
mobile market – and Oracle, filed another separate antitrust complaint with the EC, 
claiming that Google had abused Android’s market dominance in the smartphone 
platform to promote its own smartphone applications.749 
 Yet, by no means is Google merely on the defensive in its European antitrust 
cases. Google has the most extensive lobbying operations in Brussels and major 	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European capitals and its business operations in Europe have massively expanded over 
the years. According to Der Spiegel, Google has been building its lobbying network of 
PR professionals, activists, and academics.750 Google hired Antoine Aubert, who had 
previously worked for the EC for three years, as the head of Google’s Brussels policy 
team.751 In 2012, the company opened a Berlin office in Unter den Linden, the mecca for 
lobbyists. According to Der Spiegel, Google has 7 lobbyists in its Berlin office, and 
supports research institutes, interest groups and relevant conferences to influence Internet 
policy.752 The newspaper noted that a former Google lobbyist now works for the German 
Foreign Ministry where he co-organized a conference along with Aarhus University, 
Human Rights Watch, and Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society under the theme of 
“Internet and Human Rights.”753 This is one of Google’s more artful tactics as the 
company attempts to mobilize activists, academics, and government officials under the 
twin virtues of “human rights” and “Internet freedom” to which few would object; yet, 
this is an attempt to shield its corporate interests. Moreover, Google is not lobbying and 
intervening merely in its antitrust investigation cases, it has been attempting to influence 
policy in a range of areas including Intellectual property, privacy, ‘net neutrality, 
censorship, trade, data security, and cybersecurity.  
 Along with its massive lobbying activities, Google is wooing European countries 
with the promise of creating IT jobs during a time of huge European-wide economic 
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downturn. In 2011, Eric Schmidt held out a carrot of 1000 new Google jobs in Europe754 
and boasted about supporting 20,000 European entrepreneurs in 2013.755 Google, along 
with Microsoft, HP, SAP, Telefonia, and CISCO all joined the Grand Coalition for 
Digital Jobs launched by the EC to reorganize the European workforce centered around 
IT through a range of initiatives as European countries are restructuring their economies 
based on information technologies.756 Eric Schmidt is also one of 16 members of the UK 
Minister’s Business Advisory Group, which consists of a small group of people from 
strategic industries that offer business and economic advice to the Prime Minister.757 By 
asserting its place within the European economic agenda, Google is weaving itself into 
Europe’s economic development and trying to make itself indispensable. David C. 
Drummond, Google’s chief legal officer, once said, “We’re really trying to work with 
folks in Europe to establish ourselves as more of a local player.”758 Again an attempt to 
woo elite classes and ease antagonistic feeling against Google, in July of 2014, Google 
launched a new $100 million venture fund in Europe and noted “Our goal is simple: we 
want to invest in the best ideas from the best European entrepreneurs, and help them 
bring those ideas to life.” Eric Schmidt also more recently went on a “grand tour of 
Europe” with Google’s Advisory Council on the Right to be Forgotten – which consists 
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largely of European politicians, academics, lawyers, and other elites who had previously 
worked on privacy policy in the EU – in order to influence EU’s data policies.759  
 The inter-capitalist battles over the European market are far from settled, as the 
information market continues to be disrupted and reorganized around the Internet; this 
will no doubt intensify as lobbying efforts remain in high gear. Along with its continuing 
antitrust case, Google has already been hit with a fresh EU antitrust complaint. This time, 
at issue is its Android OS licensing. According to the Financial Times, Google is being 
investigated by European regulators about allegations including licensing Android below 
cost to mobile device makers and requesting that they install Google mobile services.760  
For Google, this will surely not be the last complaint.  
 The question is then what role will the European states play? States are not neutral 
entities. Up until recently, the EU had remained relatively favorable in its dealings 
toward Google; Google was able to escape from major legal action. However, Edward 
Snowden’s exposure of the US National Security Agency (NSA) and its secret global 
surveillance programs has complicated the relationship between European capitals, the 
US and other States, and political constituencies given the scale of US surveillance 
activities and the fact that the NSA directly collected data from servers of major Internet 
firms like Microsoft, Google, Apple, Yahoo!, and others. Despite Google’s vehement 
denial of its collaboration with the NSA, there have been several reports on Google’s 
collaboration with and close ties to the NSA. According to the UK Guardian, the US 
government even threatened to fine Yahoo! $250,000 a day for not complying with NSA 	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demands for PRISM data.761 While Google and other Internet firms immediately 
condemned the NSA’s actions, they are facing serious challenges in their overseas 
markets.  
 After the NSA news broke, Google quickly began to turn up its PR machine as 
Google and other US Internet firms recognized that NSA’s Prism program would cost 
their businesses that heavily rely on international markets – announcing that the company 
encrypts email against NSA snooping. Yahoo! also teamed up with Google to work on 
email encryption. IBM is spending a billion dollars to build a data center outside the US 
to assure its international clients that their data are safe from US government 
surveillance.762 Microsoft is now offering foreign customers the option of storing their 
data on servers outside US.763 In a New York Times interview, Daniel Castro, a senior 
analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, estimated that US 
cloud computing industry has a potential to lose $35 billion by 2016, and Forrester 
Research, a technology research firm, anticipated the losses could be as high as $180 
billion or 25 percent of industry revenue.764 
 There are strong signs that European- and other states are stepping up attempts to 
control information flows and network infrastructures. In February of 2014, the European 
Union and Brazil announced that they were building their own undersea cable to bypass 	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US undersea cables, which are used by Brazil to communicate with Europe. The project 
will be executed by Brazilian telecom provider Telebras and Spain’s IslaLink Submarine 
Cables. And German Chancellor Angela Merkel, backed by French President Hollande, 
also called for the creation of a European centered Internet network to avoid US Internet 
infrastructure. Chancellor Merkel said,  
We’ll talk about European providers that offer security for our citizens, so that 
one shouldn’t have to send emails and other information across the Atlantic. 
Rather, one could build up a communication network inside Europe. 
 
In response to the German and French proposal on an EU-centric communication system, 
the US Trade Representative (USTR) immediately struck back and criticized the plan as a 
violation of trade laws, stating “to create national-only electronic networks could 
potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination against foreign service suppliers 
that are directly offering network services, or dependent on them.”765 The USTR also 
denounced the Canadian government’s building of a unified email system requiring data 
to be stored in Canada and preventing US companies from bidding. Bell Canada was 
awarded the contract. 
 As European states challenge the US to control their own information systems in 
the wake of the Snowden revelations, this opens momentum for European capital to push 
their business interests. Mathias Döpfner, chief executive of Axel Springer, Europe’s 
biggest newspaper publisher, wrote a scathing open letter titled “We are afraid of 
Google” to Eric Schmidt in the Springer-owned Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
newspaper. In the letter, he depicted the power of Google as a digital super state:  
Google is to the Internet what the Deutsche Post was to mail delivery or Deutsche 
Telekom to telephone calls. In those days there were national state monopolies. 	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Today there is a global network monopoly. This is why it is of paramount 
importance that there be transparent and fair criteria for Google’s search 
results.766 
 
European capital is being mobilized and is pressuring EU regulators to restrain Google’s 
market power. Deutsche Telekom has proposed a law against European data being routed 
through Asia or the US, and disbanding the Safe Harbor agreement, which allows access 
to European data to US companies with European-level privacy standards.767 A Group 
called the “Open Internet Project” – backed by Axel Springer, the leading French mobile 
media group Internet Lagardère Active, and 400 European digital companies – lobbied 
the European Commission to revisit its decision on the Google settlement.768 Thirty 
European publishers from the European Association of Newspapers also urged the EU to 
reject Google’s latest proposal to settle an antitrust case.769 This time European capital 
has political clout, and European politicians are starting to shift their positions on Google. 
Arnaud Montebourg, France’s Economy Minister, compared Google to “a new East India 
Company” seeking to ravage European wealth.770 German Economy Minister Sigmar 
Gabriel even called for breaking up Google’s monopoly, and to “re-establish the 
sovereignty of law by ruling that Google can no longer simply bypass European 
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standards.”771 The EU’s incoming digital policy chief Gunther Oettinger signaled that 
Google market power could be constrained, and that the EU needs to boost European 
information industry and prioritize the industry.772  
 In January 2014, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Lisbon Council, a 
Brussels-based think tank, and Nesta (formerly NESTA, National Endowment for 
Science, Technology and the Arts) the UK’s innovation foundation, partnered with the 
European Digital Forum funded by European Investment Fund, Telefónica, Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Orange, and the European Commission to promote 
European capital centered digital economy. Neelie Kroes, vice-president of the European 
Commission, said as she introduced the Digital Forum at Davos, “Europe needs thriving 
startups and global internet companies to become a global growth centre again.” There 
remain open questions: would it be possible for Europe to build and sustain its regional 
information-led economy that could insert Europe into US-centered information systems 
that are deeply saturated within transnationalized digital capitalism? Can European nation 
states and capital build a unifying political force and set aside their conflicting interests?  
And how does Europe negotiate between European interests and the overarching interests 
of transnational capitalism?  
 The Chinese and European cases of search engine industry illustrate the instability 
of current US-centered global Internet economy and information systems as US digital 
capital is far from ruling the global search market outright. There has been increasing 
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resistance against Google’s dominance on the Internet; however, the nature of this strong 
oppositional movement against US Internet firms and the US state is not a revival of the 
New Information and Communication Order (NICO) aiming to reestablish self-
determination and to create a just world. Rather, these conflict zones reveal the 
intensification of inter-capitalist competitions over a new site of capital accumulation – 
the global information domain, and states have not been standing on the sidelines. As 
Schiller posits, “the force field of transnational capitalism was not constituted as a neutral 
political space.”773 It is certain that the new geopolitical landscape and political economy 
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Whether in libraries, educational and other cultural institutions or in corporate 
boardrooms, the conventional view is that the new technical capability to access 
information has intrinsically good and democratic value. It’s as if access to and 
distribution of information in and of themselves will deliver a more democratic and 
egalitarian global society.  
However, by looking at the political economy of search, this study challenges that 
conventional notion. It uncovers capital’s process of organizing the search industry in 
response to the commercialization of the Internet and in order to cultivate new territories 
of profit. The study demonstrates how the technical capability of search on the Internet is 
hard-wired into the center of global economic activity and how digital capital has 
established search businesses to reshape the information economy at large.  
Annexation and reconfiguration  
Searching is a basic human activity, ubiquitous in everyday people’s social lives. 
This domain of information searching used to be either informal or contained within the 
public sphere, where it was managed by non-market entities like libraries and other 
cultural and educational institutions. Capital has consistently tried to pry open and 
reorganize those institutions into commercial zones. However, entrenched practices such 
as public information provision by libraries and cultural institutions, fair use and mostly 
free access to government information774 remain bulwarks against commercial forces.  
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At the outset of the early 1990s, search activities were taking place through a 
mixture of non-market- and market information outlets. The development of the search 
function with Internet connectivity seemed even to open up new possibilities to access 
and organize information, and to bring back the pieces of the information domain that 
had moved to the market back into the public sphere. New technical capability for access 
and distribution of information and the lack of a market-based model over the Internet 
offered opportunities for cultural institutions to expand their influence in shaping 
information provision in general for the public good.   
However, despite its democratic potential and wondrous technical affordances, 
the search function has instead been reorganized by digital capital, and turned into a new 
industry. The search engine industry is ravaging through the public information 
commons, opening up new profit sites and engulfing the remaining non-market 
information domains, and has become the leading edge of the information economy. Over 
the last 10 years, everyday people’s information activities have massively migrated away 
from a patchwork of libraries, yellow pages, newspapers, magazines, community, friends, 
family, acquaintances to the transnational Internet based information retrieval system. 
This shift has spurred new practices of social and cultural life expressed in terms of 
efficiency, democracy and technological breakthroughs; yet it is far removed from 
democratic information provision.  
As demonstrated earlier, search technologies did not have inherent economic 
value nor did digital capital have any preconceived long-term business plan to monetize 
search function. As Robert Brenner agues, capitalist production is unplanned and 
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uncoordinated but has an inherently competitive nature.775 Under state policies that 
encourage capital to carefully structure the Internet into new economic growth zones, 
capital’s persistent attempts to further commodify and commercialize information over 
the Internet have engendered the development of search as a profit-making information 
service. Today search expands its markets across the Internet economy as it weaves into 
every information sector and beyond. By annexing public information provision, and 
reconfiguring existing information- and industrial sectors into its profit domain and 
controlling information infrastructure, digital capital has a stranglehold on the 
information space and has turned search into a large-scale global industry based on 
untold quantities of uncompensated labor.    
Labor and Class Relations 
The large-scale industrial size of search business under competitive market 
pressure impels efforts to establish distinctive labor processes to maximize 
profitability. On the surface, the search engine industry seems to offer a promise of 
capitalism that can be built on a new mode of production and new social relations that are 
not based on capitalist exploitation of labor. And if the dominant public rhetoric turns out 
to be true, then the industry is supposed to be a new economic engine that produces a 
large pool of highly skilled wage earners, eliminates low-waged jobs and leads to 
prosperity for all. Yet, instead, the structural change occurring now is engendering a new 
growth of inequality. 
The labor structure of the search engine industry is extremely polarized, with a 
hierarchical division of labor – a small number of skilled and highly paid cadre of 	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workers at the top with a mass of low- and unwaged labor at the bottom. This indicates 
that the highly automated search industry’s generation of profit and wealth does not hinge 
on a high percentage of skilled workers, rather it leans heavily on the exploitation of 
invisible low-waged processing labor, and on appropriation of a massive amount of 
unwaged labor. Throughout this historical process, digital capital has enlarged and 
reorganized a low-waged global working class, and related to an unprecedented extent on 
unwaged labor to integrate it into its profit-making project.  
Interestingly, this exploitative labor structure is mostly concealed from the public, 
and worse, search giant Google has been portrayed as defying its capital logic by 
empowering workers and seemingly relinquishing capital’s control over labor. In the era 
of austerity when many workers are willing to accept wage cuts to hang on to their jobs 
and are struggling for their survival, Google has been perceived as going against the grain 
in offering a system in which capitalism is compatible with democratic ideals. However, 
Google’s relation between labor and capital firmly allies with its corporate accumulation 
strategies by artfully applying the welfare capitalism management techniques of the 
industrial era and combining it with a façade of “objective” science and data to bring both 
waged and unwaged labor under Google’s corporate control. Google’s worker-centered 
corporate management strategies are not signs of altering capitalist social relations, but 
alliances within an elite class, and its “user-centered” approach has become both the basis 
of Google’s global surveillance-based search business, and the global infrastructure of 





This newly emerged search engine industry plays a pivotal role in transnational 
capitalist economy as it builds extraterritorial information networks to circulate an array 
of new information commodities, services and culture over an extraterritorial network – 
the Internet. US-based firms, and in particular Google, are impressively exploiting and 
capturing the global Internet space. However, their superiority over the Internet recasts 
the strategic political and economic importance of information flows and information 
networks, which reignite political conflict among major global powers maneuvering 
between domestic interests, capitals and rival social forces. The case of the search engine 
industry illustrates the volatility of US-dominated global information systems and the 
challenges against a historically long standing US information regime that are mounting, 
with structural changes to the political economy and both new and old geopolitical 
rivalries – including China’s reentry into the global capitalist system, and Europe’s 
renewed efforts to control its information infrastructure which are rapidly altering the 
dynamics of the geopolitics of information. 
The study shows that foreign transnational capital, and in particular US capital, 
heavily fuels the building process of Internet sectors in China, and China’s Internet sector 
is at the center of a reconstituting global digital capitalism. As part of Chinese State 
policy – if not benign neglect by the Chinese state – foreign capital has been drawn into 
building domestic Internet sectors that are linked into the global transnationalized 
capitalist system. Given the significant role of foreign capital in Chinese Internet sectors, 
PRC has no intention to cut off foreign capital for fear that it will jeopardize both 
domestic as well as foreign capital. Its silence on foreign capital in China’s strategic 
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sectors like the Internet is an intentional act on behalf of transnational political economy. 
On the US side, the US state and US capital will not abandon China’s high growth 
Internet market. And the contention between China and US is neither US’s effort to 
mobilize the democratic movement in China by offering new information technologies 
nor China’s attempt to challenge the US model of capitalism. Rather, the conflicts 
between China and the US are not over whether capitalist development should structure 
and guide the information sector – or any other sector – but about the terms on which this 
development will proceed. Which companies and which states will dominate and 
appropriate the greatest share of the profits that result?  
There is no doubt that these battles in the fastest growing markets will continue 
between US- and China-based transnational capital, but this might reach a point of 
rearrangement between the two countries. It has already begun to move in that direction. 
At the US-China Internet Industry Forum hosted by Chinese and US Internet firms, the 
US has been asking China for cooperation in the areas of Internet governance, Internet 
freedom and intellectual property. Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, speaking at the 2013 Forum stated: 
I want to stress that collaboration with the private sector – both in China and the 
United States – will be critical to progress in each of these areas … We desire 
cooperation, not confrontation, because we believe that business and scientific 
collaboration between our two countries and among all countries can be mutually 
beneficial.776 
 
On the European side, the battle between Google and the EU over cyberspace unveils the 
intensification of inter-capitalist rivalries among US capital over the European 
information market as well as the changing political climate in Europe that once again is 	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challenging US-centered transnational information economy. Google’s domestic rivals 
aligned with European digital capital are fighting against Google’s monopoly of the most 
lucrative information sectors, attempting to carve out their own market share. Meanwhile, 
Western European states and capital have been searching for European alternatives to 
Google, led mostly by France, but up until recently they had no political or economic 
front from which to challenge US digital capital. Yet, the political pressure in Europe is 
shifting to control over its information economy and information networks, facing 
sluggish economic outlook and Edward Snowden’s revelations of the far-reaching US 
surveillance program that transgresses national sovereignty. Especially after the 
revelations on NSA surveillance programs which struck a chord, public opinion across 
Europe and other parts of the world has shifted against US digital capital, and US’s 
closest ally Germany is even calling for European-centered information infrastructure to 
bypass US-controlled information flows. European governments are pushing to reform 
EU data protection regulations. European Court of Justice (ECJ) already required for 
Google and other search engines to comply with the EU’s “right to be forgotten” rule in 
which EU citizens have the right to request information online be removed from search 
results when the information is inaccurate. Spain passed a new copyright law that 
imposes fees for online content aggregators like Google to protect its domestic media 
industry – the so-called “Google Tax.”777 Germany’s Günther Oettinger, incoming 
European Commissioner for the Digital Economy, is strongly signaling the possibility of 
imposing an EU-wide “Google-tax.”778 And, European capital is taking advantage of this 
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political momentum to pursue its corporate interests and trying to occupy a better 
position within global digital capital.  
Of course, the US State and US digital capital are not going to take Europe’s 
pushback sitting down. The US State is asserting political economic power to fight 
oppositional forces in order to maintain US position, but dealing with enormous political 
challenges. Google is also working on several fronts to align with European capital. It is 
participating in building a submarine cable between the US, Brazil, and Africa with 
Brazilian ISP Algar Telecom, Uruguayan incumbent telco Antel, and a consortium of 
Angolan ISPs.779 More recently, Google showed its importance to the European 
information market. After it had been forced to remove German media company Axel 
Springer’s content from displaying in Google search, Springer changed their stance, 
finding that search engine traffic to the Springer sites had dropped 40%.  
 The battle over the control of global information systems is far from over. The 
questions remain: will the US be able to deflect its challenges once again and retain its 
control over the information system? How and in what ways may states collaborate to 
privilege transnational as opposed to domestic capital and navigate domestic political and 
social interests? And how may states yet deal as the ground continues to shift under their 
feet? 
Then the question for us is where is the hope for true democratic and 
emancipatory information provision when even the most basic functions of information 
access through search are being controlled and appropriated by capital? What are the 	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possibilities to organize around a democratic information undertaking? The answer is not 
about using Google alternatives that are funded by other venture capital firms. It’s not 
about choosing between Google vs. DuckDuckGo or merely implementing various 
privacy tools developed by the US State Department or corporations or negotiating with 
corporate power and capitalist states to tweak capitalism to be “gentler.” Then where do 
we go from here?   
There are signs of political hope in local, national and international arenas where 
collective actions are rejecting transnational corporate powers and capitalist development 
that dispossess, displace, and brutalize everyday people, and strip away public goods. 
There is little media coverage on this front, but in Mainland China, workers are resisting 
against China’s market-oriented reforms that have led to violence against the poor, and 
demanding social and economic justice.780 In Europe, anti-austerity movements are still 
alive across many countries from Spain and France to Ireland and Greece. Recently, tens 
of thousands of people in Spain, where unemployment has reached 29%, have rallied in 
the streets to oppose austerity measures imposed by capitalist states and transnational 
financial Institutions like the IMF. Workers at Amazon.com sites in Germany have been 
fighting against unfair wages, and have walked out on their jobs. Uber drivers are 
protesting against unjust working environment and increasing exploitation by the 
company, which profits from the supposed “sharing economy.”  Google’s sub-contracted 
security guards are protesting against Google, Apple and other Internet firms in Silicon 
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Valley for unjust labor practices. Facebook bus drivers are fighting to organize a labor 
union. In San Francisco, where thousands of people have been displaced as digital capital 
has swept into the city and enriched a small class segment, people are building solidarity 
under the banner of housing justice to fight for the right to stay, live and build their own 
city.  
Now we’re at the point of dismantling the myth of information and information-
based capitalist systems that persistently promise democracy and equality, but not only 
fail to deliver it but insidiously generate further inequality and injustice. We’re at the 
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